Cyprus: No man’s land

Introduction

The island of Cyprus has been a testing ground for various international relations theories. Cyprus’ turbulent path throughout history and its delicate ethnic composition stimulates scholars to expound on the subtle issue of majority sovereignty versus self-determination. A neutral observer would contemplate that after the breaking of the British imperial rule in 1960 that led to the island’s independence serenity would flourish. Following their independence from the protracted colonial fetters that have long dominated Cypriot history, it was expected that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would finally be able to celebrate their political and territorial freedom. Nevertheless, forecasting history is an anemic procedure that lacks scientific substance. The controversial 1959 London-Zurich agreements ignited a period of post-independence intercommunal conflict that reached its acme with the 1974 Turkish invasion. Since the aforesaid appalling date both communities have been refugees within their own country.

This paper aims to examine the United Nation’s diplomatic and peacekeeping presence in Cyprus. Our analysis starts in the early 1950s when Greece tried to internationalize the Cyprus question via the UN. Then, we will expose the numerous UN initiatives vis-à-vis the conflict’s resolution. At the same time, we will try to assess the overall UNFICUP’s (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) performance in the island and how it contributed to the island’s stability. However, the paper’s objective is not to employ a pathetic historic approach vis-à-vis the Cypriot imbroglio. Instead, we plan to undertake a heuristic course that aims to utilize the European Union’s (EU) post-modern approach pertinent to conflict resolution. The post-Cold War transformation of the Westphalian state indicates the erosion of an earlier exclusive and adamant definition of sovereignty. Since the end of World War II, EU has employed a constructivist gradual approach towards conflict resolution. The Union’s current political, economic and diplomatic clout corroborates the hypothesis that sidelining narrow national interests can contribute to comprehensive human prosperity. It is our view that by injecting in Cyprus the European institutional and discursive framework both ethnic communities will eventually find themselves in the position to discard the current ‘enclave mentality’ and move towards the creation of a pan-Cypriot identity.
UN PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS: AN EVALUATION WITH A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (the following section is written by Hakan Yavuzyılmaz)

This part of the paper will try to evaluate under a historical perspective the effectiveness of the peace making efforts of UN in Cyprus. Throughout the evolution of the Cyprus problem we are able to witness different mediation efforts by the organization. In the following part the effect of the various UN responses vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem and its various phases will be analyzed. The evolution and effects of the UN will be analyzed within the context of three phases in regards to the dispute: (a) The colonial phase, 1954-1959; (b) the period following the breakdown of the First republic of Cyprus, up to to July 1974 and (c), the period following the coup and the invasion of Turkey. A separate section will be on the Annan plan and its effectiveness on the solution on the Cyprus problem.

The first UN involvement pertinent to the Cyprus problem was a result of the Greek Cypriot side which maintained the idea of internationalizing the Cyprus problem. Britain’s unwillingness to discuss the independence and enosis with Greece paved the way for the Greek Cypriot side to search for an International forum in order to discuss the Cyprus problem. ¹ The choice of the UN General Assembly indicates that it was the best of the existing international institutions in terms of its membership, proceedings and public exposure to present the Greek case.² The application to the General Assembly aimed to find a proper ground for bilateral negotiation with Britain. In order to activate the political potential in the UN, Greek Cypriots also formed the resistance organization named EOKA to harass British in the island.³ Greek attempts to take the issue to the UN General Assembly were stalled by factors both related with Cold War issues but also because of Greece's low bargaining position in the UN. The Greek attempt for self-determination and its identification with enosis was rejected by the members of the UN General Assembly. The biggest impediment for the Greek attempts to find a solution to the problem by utilizing UN organs is a derivative of the United States neutrality, Britain’s political bargaining power in the UN and also British reluctance to internationalize the Cyprus problem. However, by 1954 Cyprus came into a salient international position after the “Baghdad Pact” defense mechanism was created which shifted the West’s defense wall from Middle East to Northern tier countries; a place where Turkey played a very important role. Both Britain and the US perceived the Cyprus issue as an Achilles’ heel for NATO’s southern flank. The US neutrality during the five sessions of the UN General Assembly was due to its reluctance to disturb its cold war allies. British reluctance to recognize the existence of the Cyprus question and US reluctance to internationalize the problem paved the way for the abortive sessions in the General

¹ Richmond, Oliver P., and James K. Lindsay, eds. The work of UN in Cyprus: Promoting peace and Development. : Polgrave, 2001. p.4
³ Ibid, p. 459
As a result, Greek Cypriots were pushed to solve the problem by bilateral talks with Turkey that culminated in the 1959 Zürich and London agreements.

In consideration with these developments and the abortive sessions in the UN General Assembly the question would be as follows: “How effective was the UN in this phase of the dispute?” During the colonial phase the General Assembly was used by the opposing parties in order to delegitimize each other. For the Greek Cypriot part, the availability of the UN increased Greek diplomatic options and it facilitated the internationalization of the Cyprus problem. During the sessions in the General Assembly, the Greek Cypriot stance was based on UN Charter Articles: 1, 10 and 14. Another effect the sessions in the General Assembly had was to modify the opposing parties’ goals. Greece modified her goals from self-determination and enosis towards a highly restricted independent Cyprus as a result of the tripartite negotiations; Britain recognized the Cyprus problem and was willing to give sovereignty to Cyprus in return for the protection of its bases in Cyprus and, Turkey modified its preferences by changing its goals from partition to restricted independence. The inability of Greece to achieve its goals within the UN structures paved the way for the tripartite sessions in London and Zürich agreements in 1959, which reinserted the United Nations in the Cyprus problem. As Hubert Faustman succinctly concludes; the internationalization of the Cyprus problem by Greek application to UN was a catastrophe for Greece and the Greek Cypriots aims of self-determination because in the end the sessions resulted in an increased Turkish involvement in the dispute and brought up the issue of partition of the island between two separate communities. With the influence of both Britain and Turkey the demand for self-determination and enosis vanished and partition became the viable option, which was seen as an important impediment to enosis. The parties that benefited from the UN General Assembly sessions were the United States, Turkey and Britain. The main misjudgment by Greece vis-à-vis UN’s role was that both Greece and Greek Cypriots perceived the UN as a court of justice, which acts only in accordance with the UN Charter. However, as Faustmann succinctly argues: “It (UN) was rather a universal political arena which many political interests clash.” In this sense Turkey who was supported by Britain was politically more powerful than Greece during the UN General Assembly sessions.

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4 General Assembly Resolution 1287 (XII) stated in its operative paragraph that “… The General Assembly …expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations…” There were five General Assembly sessions in which UN remained uncommitted. For detailed information on these sessions, see Richmond, Oliver P., and James K. Lindsay, eds. *The work of UN in Cyprus: Promoting peace and Development*. : Polgrave, 2001.


7 Hubert Faustmann The UN and the internationalization of the Cyprus conflict 1949- 1958, p. 41

8 Partition in this sense involved double self-determination, which sought to create to separate bi-communal entities one Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriots.

9 Richmond, Oliver P., and James K. Lindsay, eds. *The work of UN in Cyprus: Promoting peace and Development*. p. 35
The London and Zürich agreements concluded with the formation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The 1960 constitution and the treaties that guaranteed the role of the third parties created an international communalism. In this environment the question was not whether the 1959 agreements would last but how long they would last? In 1963, with Makarios’ thirteen amendments which aimed to revise the 1960 constitution, inter-communal violence broke out between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. In order to avoid the breakdown of the 1959 agreements, Britain called up the two guarantor powers and the two Cypriot communities to a conference in London in 1964. However, the Greek reluctance to turn to the 1959 status quo affected negatively the conference and consequently the London conference failed. Flowing from the imminent Turkish intervention threat and the subsequent breakdown of the Cyprus Republic, British and US planned a NATO peacekeeping force. The NATO peacekeeping plan failed because France, Germany and Greece were reluctant. France rejected the plan because it was observed of being as an Anglo-American plan. The Greek Cypriots saw the UN as the best political forum for legitimizing their quest to revise the 1959 status quo. Also UN could be utilized to protect Cypriot sovereignty and territorial integrity against Turkish invasion. As a result, the failure of the NATO plan urged Britain and Greece to appeal in February 15, 1964 to the Security Council in order to consider the deteriorating situation in Cyprus. Increased fighting in Cyprus, the dispatch of Turkish forces and possible Soviet threats paved the way for the appeal to UN Security Council.

Following the discussion in the Security Council UN Resolution 186 passed which mandated United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The 1963 crisis blatantly exposed the weak aspects of the constitution and also the ill nature of the treaties that established the Republic of Cyprus. The period from 1964-1965 and the subsequent Secretary Generals mission of good offices illustrated many of the difficulties UN mediation and peacekeeping are susceptible to. Resolution 186 attempted to provide a comprehensive peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building mandate in order to bring peace to the island of Cyprus. It was a delicate resolution in the sense that it also included a UN mediator whose role was to create a ground for turning back to “Normal Conditions” as it was stated in the resolution 186.

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10 The treaty of Guarantee, that guaranteed the right of intervention of Britain, Greece and Turkey in Cyprus. Also there were Treaty of Establishment and Treaty of Alliance.
11 Coufoudakis (1976) p. 462
12 Ibid p. 463
14 Resolution 186 can be summarized as: a) The creation, with the consent of the government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force; b) The composition and the size of the force to be established by the Secretary General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey; c) the functions of the force to be to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to assist in the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions; d) the force to be stationed on Cyprus for three months; e) the force to be financed by voluntary contributions; and f) a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary General in agreement with the four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem. For the original version see www.UNFICYP.Org. For some detailed elaboration See Coufoudakis, Van. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question." *The Western Political Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (1976): 457-73.
was Sari Tuomiosa who tried to solve the dispute internationally rather than internally. He was succeeded by Dr. Galo Plaza followed an opposite course since he tried to solve the dispute internally rather than externally. In March 1965 Galo Plaza’s report was submitted to both parties; the report epitomizes the following points: rejection of enosis; rejection of partition of the island; demilitarization and non alignment of the two communities with outside nations, and rejection of a return to 1960 status quo. The report was rejected by Turkish Cypriots and the immediate result was the hardening of the disputant’s positions. The Greek Cypriot side was happy except for the fact that enosis was rejected throughout the report. For the Greek Cypriot side the aspirations for enosis had lost its momentum to economic prosperity which came to Cyprus after independence. However, because enosis was seen as a part of the national pride they could still be inspired by it. The Turkish side response was negative and the Plaza’s report was rejected because of its rejection of the bi-communal state solution and its unbalanced nature. As a result, the UN mediation venture by Galo Plaza failed because the Turkish Side perceived Plaza as an ally of Greek Cypriots.

In order to evaluate the UN mediation efforts during the period 1964 -1965, it is useful to define what mediation is. Mediation can be defined as “a less formal and more flexible accommodation of conflicting interests by persuasion and the exchange of concessions rather than by determination of rights and obligations involved.” This definition indicates that mediation should be based on consent of the parties involved and it should be flexible in the sense that negotiations should be tailored in order to suit any emerging obstacle. As Mirbagheri succinctly stresses “ in order to avoid the freezing of attitudes by the parties, it may be best to establish a close link between peacekeeping and peacemaking approach and proposals. It can be argued that the UN mediation effort via Galo Plaza’s report failed as a result of the contradictory mandates of UN peacekeeping and peacemaking. UNFICUP’s mandate was to restore the status quo and provide suitable conditions for peacemaking efforts, something that tended to support the of Turkish Cypriot position which wanted to restore the status quo that was enshrined in the 1960 constitution. However, resolution 186 and its mandate also denied the Turkish Cypriot side and demanded the recognition of the Greek Cypriot side. Furthermore, it can be argued that the Mediator’s task was also affected by the deliberate outbreaks of inter-communal violence; the infiltration of outside forces; the Turkish invasion threats and bombings; and the inter-communal tension between Greek Cypriots. Another reason for the failure of the UN’s mediation representative was due to the inter-communal mistrust between the two communities, (and) the different perceptions for a fair solution to the problem.

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16 Ibid, p.106
17 Ibid, p. 45
19 Ibid, p. 8
20 Coufoudakis (1978), p.108
21 Mirbagheri (1998) p. 50
The failure of the UN mediation effort resulted in the 1967 crisis and the increasing inter-communal conflict between the warring factions. After the Turkish rejection of Plaza’s report a new status quo was established throughout the island. The Turkish enclaves were established and the two parties started living separately. The 1967 crisis resulted in the inter-communal talks under the good offices of the Secretary General. The significance of the inter-communal talks is that the role of the UN mediation initiative was transformed into good offices provided by the Secretary General. Another important aspect of the inter-communal talks was the tacit recognition of the Turkish Cypriot side by Makarios. The recognition of the Turkish Cypriot side was a significant development in the Cypriot history because until the inter-communal talks they TCs were labeled as “rebels”. The crisis in Kophinou and the subsequent international pressure for a peaceful settlement can explain the reason for the recognition.  

The Inter-communal talks between 1968 and 1974 had four phases; in the first phase they were held between Denktash and Clerides and also the Secretary General’s special representative for Cyprus Osorio Tafall was present. The main issue in the talks was the constitutional issues and powers of the local government. The main issue pertinent to the local government was that Denktash demanded a clear definition of the functions of the local governments in the constitution. On the other hand, Makarios opposed the idea of a local government deriving its powers from the country’s constitution. We can witness in the following three phases of the talks that the issue of local governance was the main impediment for reaching an agreement. The fourth phase of the talks which included Greece, Turkey and the UN resulted of the deadlock reached in the negotiations. Again, the Greek Cypriots inflexible stance on the issue of local governance and the Turkish Cypriots reluctance to change their stance resulted in the failure of the talks.

The UN played a positive role in the inter-communal talks. The presence of the good offices of the Secretary General kept the negotiations going when negotiations were confronted with emerging deadlocks. However, given the fact that the Secretary General could only assist at a procedural level according to his mission, there was not any direct mediation pressure deriving from Secretary General’s special representative. Each party was reluctant to back down from their initial positions. The above inflexibility led to cascading deadlocks until the Greek coup and the following Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. The suspicion on behalf of the TCs of enosis and the fear of taksim by Greek Cypriots created a zero-sum situation that one party's gain would lead to the other’s loose. Another reason for the failure of a peaceful settlement and agreement during the talks was the presence of spoilers during the peacemaking efforts, an issue that is discussed by Michael Doyle. Doyle and Sambanis succinctly argue that during the inter-communal talks the main spoilers were Denktash, General Grivas and the Greek militant group, EOKA B, which aimed to resist any adverse initiatives taken by Makarios’ except enosis. Various EOKA B actions against Makarios and Makarios’

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22 Mirbagheri (1998) p. 55
23 Idem, p 55
24 Greece, Turkey and UN represented respectively by Professor Aldikacti as the representative of Turkey; Judge Dekleris for Greece and Osorio Tafall, the secretary Generals special representative in Cyprus.
obstructionism followed by Denktash’s demand for secession created impediments for Clerides and Dekleris. Both the inter-communal mistrust, reluctance to make concessions and the actions of spoilers brought into a deadlock a fertile ground aimed to the peace settlement of the conflict.

The situation further deteriorated by the military coup in Greece and with the increase of the enosis supporters in the motherland. The latest phase of the dispute came into the fore when the Cypriot National Guard, led by the mainland Greek army officials, overthrew Makarios because of the latter’s dispute with the Greek junta. After the coup Sampson became president; a move that provided Turkey with a pretext to militarily intervene in order to protect the Republic from accomplishing a unilateral enosis with Greece and to protect the Turkish Cypriot population. The legality of the Turkish military intervention albeit, it is a point of contention was justified on the basis of the article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. In the following months of the invasion there were eight Security Council resolutions emphasizing the sovereignty, independence and, territorial integrity of Cyprus. However, Turkey violated these resolutions during the military occupation. Van Coufoudakis points to the powerlessness of the Security Council, the minimum consensus that was revealed among the superpowers in regards to peacekeeping and peacemaking in Cyprus; the divergence of goals pursued by US and UN and the illegality of the regime in Cyprus followed by the coup. During the second phase of the invasion Turkey sized about one third of the island something that resulted into massive refugee problem as a result of the movement of Greek Cypriots from the North to the South. The military intervention resulted in the displacement of (about) 200,000 Greek Cypriots who sought refugee in the south and about 40,000 Turkish Cypriots in the opposing direction.

After the invasion, UN Security Council resolution 353 called on the three guarantor powers for the restoration of peace and the constitutional peace in Cyprus. During the first round of the talks it was agreed that the areas occupied by each side were not going to be extended and a security zone would be established that only UNFICYP could enter. During the first phase of the talks, the Greeks Cypriots agreed to evacuate the occupied Turkish enclaves. The most significant aspect of the Geneva Talks was that for the first

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28 Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee gives the right for intervention to three guarantor powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey) for reestablishing the status quo that was established in 1959. It was a controversial article because the definition of intervention was not included in the article, also there is an ongoing debate on the legality of the intervention in regard to the UN Charter and legality of the constitution and agreements that established the status quo in 1959. For more information on the legality of the Turkish intervention from Turkish side See, Necatagil, Zaim M. The Cyprus question and the Turkish Position in International Law. : Oxford University Press, 1993.
29 Coufoudakis (1976) p. 470- 471
30 Mirbagheri (1998) p. 88
time the existence of two separate administrations was officially acknowledged. The second round of the talks was interrupted on the issue of the legality of the 1960 constitution. The negotiations failed when the Turkish side proposed a federation and the occupation of a smaller area. However, the failed negotiation paved the way for the second Turkish military operation 14 August 1960. In February 1975 the Turkish side declared the establishment of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”. Under the chairmanship of Secretary General Kurt Waldheim the Vienna Talks commenced. During the five rounds of the talks the most controversial issue was that the Turkish side called for a weak federal government with increased powers for the federated state. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side asked for a central government.

In 1977 following the failure of the Vienna talks the High Level Agreement between Makarios and Denktash with the presence of Secretary General's representative Javier Perez de Cuellar was reached. It was followed by a four-point agreement that would be the basis for future negotiations. The 1977 High Level Agreement was followed by the 1979 High level agreement which established the basis for future negotiations; and many of the disputed issues were addressed like the territorial and constitutional aspects, fundamental freedoms, demilitarization and the guarantee of independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of the Republic. Albeit, these points formed the basis for future negotiations they failed to be implemented.

During the 1980-1986 period a number of initiatives were launched by the United Nations in order to bring a peaceful settlement to the problem. These initiatives resulted due to Javier Perez Cuellar efforts who was appointed as the Secretary General in 1982. During 1980 till 1986 we witness many initiatives whose common point was their failure, they all tried to deal with the problems of resettlement in Varosha, the constitutional and territorial aspects of the problem, the power sharing in the central government and the basic freedoms. In 1983, the Turkish side unilaterally declared its independence with the establishment of the TRNC (Turkish Federated State of Cyprus). This move was strongly rejected by the UN and the Greek Cypriot side as well. UN Security Council resolution 541 of November 1983, rejected the unilateral declaration of Independence by stating “…it considers the declaration referred above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal and also calls upon all states not to recognize the Cypriot State other than Republic of Cyprus.”

During the mid 1980’s the Secretary General and his representatives followed a procedural basis operation scheme since they were reluctant to make any decisive input

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33 An Independent, non aligned bi-communal federal state; territory arranged in the light of economic viability or productivity and ownership; The three freedoms will be discussed in later negotiations; the powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the state. Mirbagheri (1998) p. 91-92

34 Ibid, p. 93

35 During this period there were plenty of initiatives and talks that failed to achieve a solution these were: The interim Agreement proposal, The Gobbi Initiative, Vienna Working Points, Proximity Talks and, The Draft Frame Work Agreement For detailed information about these peacemaking efforts See Mirbagheri (1998) p. 121-156

36 UN Security Council res 541 18 November 1983
vis-à-vis the ideas the warring parties uttered. This approach was different from the mediation efforts of Galo Plaza during the 1964-1965 period. During the 1990’s we again witness a direct mediation effort by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali. The set of ideas and the confidence building measure resulted in the direct and dynamic involvement of the UN Secretary General. A set of ideas were drafted and developed further by Ghali. These ideas stipulated two federated states with identical powers, with political equality for each community in which powers are divided between the federal states and the federal government, and a bicameral legislature with a federal executive. Both the Greek and the Turkish side perceived the document with some reservations. Issues pertinent to the federation and sovereignty structure of the two states and issues related with the displaced persons and territorial adjustments were points of friction. The 1993-95 period was dominated by the UN initiative in confidence building measures (CBM’s). CBM’s involved the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport with joint access to both communities and the opening of the Turkish area of Varosha for resettlement by Greek Cypriots. These confidence building measures created some optimism and paved the way for the 1994 proximity talks between Denktash and Clerides under the mediation aegis by UN representatives Joe Clark and Gustave Feissel.

The United Nations peacemaking efforts had varied according to the changing of the circumstances in Cyprus. During the colonial period, the UN remained reluctant to interfere in the issue. After the Republic’s independence and the inter-communal violence that broke out with Makarios’ proposed constitutional amendments we witness a more active UN involvement in the dispute with the establishment of UNFICYP, the appointment of a mediator and the overall active UN involvement in the conflict. Flowing from the failure of the direct mediation effort, the mediator’s role was transformed into the Secretary General’s good offices. Ghali’s energetic mediation efforts UN role in the conflict led to enact resolutions and necessary negotiations under the auspices of the respective Secretary Generals and their representatives in Cyprus.

Why did the peacemaking experiments in Cyprus fail? An examination of internal and external factors

Internal Factors

The post 1974 peacemaking period failed due to the parties’ diverging interests and the inter-communal mistrust they had. The 1967-74 inter-communal talks failed because of the issue of local governance. The Greek Cypriots perceived a powerful local government as the leading element to partition and Turkish Cypriot maintained that a weak local government would lead to Greek Cypriot domination. As a result, the on-going inter-communal talks were conducted under zero-sum negotiating basis. Another impediment for the peaceful settlement of the conflict was the majority/ minority perception of each community. It can be argued that the international peacemaking efforts in Cyprus failed to alter the above perception. After the 1974 invasion, Turkish Cypriots were eager to

translate their on ground strong military position on the ground into political gains. The military superiority increased their bargaining position and consequently their stance was hardened. This development was countered by the Greek Cypriots who put all their efforts in internationalizing the problem; something that irritated the other side.

External Factors:

Throughout the period of 1964-86 the peacemaking efforts of the international community was centered mainly on the United Nations. United Nations involvement was mainly by the mediation or the good offices of the Secretary General, also by the direct involvement of the Secretary General. Main issue related with the peacemaking is the divergence between the General Assembly and Security Council. While the latter pressured the former for taking appropriate measures for implementing the contents of the resolutions, the Security Council failed to comply. This was the crucial problem in UN peacemaking efforts, because UN action, which requires more than voluntary agreement of the disputants, depends on key members of the UN and these members pressure, which is essential for amalgamation of different perceptions. Another negative aspect to UN peacemaking was the divergence of goals between the UN and the outside powers. This problem can be exemplified by the divergence between the UN and the US. The US viewed the Cyprus problem in the Cold War context till the 1990’s and looked for fulfilling strategic objectives. Another negative effect of UN during the period considered was that the resolutions adopted by General Assembly or the Security Council recognized the government of Cyprus by Greek Cypriots. This also further alienated the Turkish Cypriot side and made them turn their face to Turkey. Another problem, which was significant during the mediation efforts of Plaza, was the contradictions in the international system based on sovereignty and the rights of ethnic groups. During the talks the Greek Cypriot side has used the language of intervention and sovereignty to argue that Turkish side constitutes secession, on the contrary the Turkish side has used the language of self determination and human rights in order to justify its claim for autonomy and secession. The work of the UN as a peacemaker in this kind of spectrum was very limited, mediators and the initiatives had to draw a fine line between these contradictory claims to find a solution which will be rational to each of the parties. Since the peacemaking peacekeeping relationship is crucial for assessing the overall peace building success in Cyprus, the next part of the paper will try to evaluate the positive and negative aspects of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

PEACEKEEPING IN CYPRUS: SUCCESS, FAILURE OR A SUCCESSIVE FAILURE?

After Makarios’ proposal of thirteen constitutional amendments intercommunal violence broke out. Deriving from the Turkish threat of intervention the Security Council passed resolution 186, in 1964 which set the mandate of a peacekeeping force in Cyprus “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary contribute to
the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”38 The force composed of soldiers from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and UK. However, the British presence in the on-going peacekeeping operation was controversial since it was agreed that permanent members of Security Council should not be represented in a UN force.39 The force was composed of 6.300 soldiers but the number declined to 2.300 by the time of 1974 crisis; in 1974 raised to 4.000 and in the following years declined to 2.500 soldiers. The current UNFICYP force consists of about 1200 soldiers.40 The force was financed by troop contributing states and by the government of Cyprus; also it is financed by voluntary contributions.

UNFICYP is deployed along the Green Line, which divides Nicosia. Moreover, it has a presence in areas where troubles are expected. As a result of the violence, the Turkish Cypriots concentrated into enclaves something that made more apparent the confrontation lines. As a result, this division facilitated UNFICYP’s mediating efforts. As a standard procedure, the force could only use force in self-defense. The force’s main tool is the deterrent effect it has pertinent to the warring parties. Moreover, the force tried to deter violence by conducting patrols, by acting as an observation force and by providing accurate accountings of incidents. During the pre-1974 period, UNFICYP succeeded in negotiating ceasefire between the two parties and halting any emerging violence. Most of UNFICYP’s efforts were also assisted by its liaison system that linked it to the political and military representatives of the two communities.41 Before the Turkish invasion, there were three crises where UNFICYP was unable to efficiently engage. In 1964, the Greek Cypriot national guard attacked Turkish positions in Kokkina. This move was followed by Turkish fighter sorties from mainland Turkey. Another crisis was the 1967 crisis where the National Guard attacked two Turkish enclaves. During the invasion of Turkey, UNFICYP remained passive mostly because it did not have the material force to battle against a regular army. The above crises highlighted UNFICYP’s inability to keep or restore peace in the face of deliberate, large-scale violence.42

The 1974 invasion partitioned the island (the Turkish Cypriot area now constituted 37% of the island). Consequently, the force’s modus operandi changed because instead of trying to keep the peace among the interspersed rivals throughout the island now a buffer zone was created.43 Because of the buffer zone, the force would now aim at maintaining peace and status quo by protecting the integrity of the new buffer zone. UNFICYP’s mandate remained the same, however it was vague enough to allow the force to operate under the new circumstances.44 Its mandate covers both humanitarian activities like assisting both parties around the buffer zone, watching people in the buffer

38 UN Security Council Res 186. 24 March 1964
40 Ibid, p. 488
41 Richmond, Oliver P., and James K. Lindsay, eds. The work of UN in Cyprus: Promoting peace and Development. : Polgrave, 2001. p79
42 Ibid, p. 82
43 The force controls the Buffer Zone, which separates the two sides and covers about the 3% of the island. In some parts it is 7 kilometer large and in some only several meters.
44 Richmond, Oliver P., and James K. Lindsay, eds. The work of UN in Cyprus: Promoting peace and Development. : Polgrave, 2001. P, 84
zone and work with ICRC in order to trace missing persons. Since the de facto partition of the island there are a number of incidents that risked escalating into full-blown conflict and violence. The military constructions along or into the buffer zone, overmanning of positions along the buffer zone, encroachments to the buffer zone, stone throwing, insults, pointing of weapons and harassment of the other side with spotlights. In response to these incidents the force interposes itself between arguments; investigates the incidents; mediates or acts as a liaison between the two sides; calls on the superiors of the violators and gets them disciplined and issues written protests to the offending sides.\footnote{Ibid, p. 87} Shooting incidents and mass demonstrations are two of the most the violence leading incidents and UNFICYP has done a good job in mitigating them.\footnote{The gunfight in Dherinia in 1993 and motorcycle demonstration of 11 August 1996 can be given as an example of the probability of conflict escalation as a result of shooting and demonstrations.} Despite, its conflict mediation capabilities it can be argued that UNFICYP is not in a position to “enforce peace”. However, it is located there in order to help the parties to implement their wish to “maintain peace”.\footnote{Alan James (1989), P.482} So its success depends on both the cooperation and pacific disposition of the two Cypriot communities and their outside backers.

In terms of nonmilitary activities, UNFICYP can be perceived as a success story in the peacekeeping history. The force helped to improve the Turkish Cypriot living conditions in the enclaves; worked to restore the operation of public services throughout Cyprus; facilitated the resumption of harvest; protected workers in factories in the buffer zone and worked closely with ICRC and later on with UNHCR to help refugees and internally displaced persons after the invasion. It also engages in police work, economic reporting and advising, building construction, school teaching, and technical assistance. In the post 1974 period, UNFICYP acquired an expanded humanitarian role. In terms of its military tasks in spite of its efficient resources the force failed to implement its mandate on the following issues: establishing freedom of movement, maintaining the military status quo by preventing the fortification of Turkish Cypriot enclaves and assisting the Cypriot government in defending itself against the extremist violence of EOKA B. As Doyle and Sambanis argue, during the peacekeeping operations the interpretation of the mandate can be seen as either “ceilings” or “floors”.\footnote{Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War & Building Peace. , N.J Princeton University Press, 2006. P.273 In the Cypriot situation, good leadership and proactive interpretation of the mandate would have allowed UNFICYP to enhance the Cypriot’s consent, and it can enhance incentives for negotiating a peaceful settlement in the island. In that sense it can be argued that the force interpreted its mandate as a “ceiling”.

There are two scholarly arguments about UNFICYP’s success. First and foremost, it can be argued that the force is a success because following the military intervention in 1974 there were no wars or any major violence between the two parties. However, it can be also argued that the absence of war is attributed to the presence of the Turkish military and the deterrent effect it has. The second argument claims that UNFICYP’s is part of the
problem, a fixture that has reduced the parties’ incentives to negotiate a settlement. Following this thought, it can be argued that the force’s removal will make the two parties to face each other and the “possibility of war” will have a deterrent effect between two communities. As a result, this prospect will increase their incentives for negotiating a peace. These aforesaid arguments have one thing in common; that they both see UNFICYP as a success peacekeeping story. However, Doyle and Sambanis argue that the peacemaking failure cannot be attributed to the success of the force but to its micro level peacekeeping failures. If we evaluate the performance of the force in the post 1964 period, it can be argued that the force’s failures led to failed peacemaking negotiations during the inter-communal talks. The force has the capacity to prevent any imminent coup by protecting the government of the Republic of Cyprus against extremist EOKA B supporters, by preventing the fortification of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and by establishing freedom of movement in certain places like the Kophinou enclave.

Despite its micro level peacekeeping failures prior to Turkey’s invasion, these days the force plays a crucial role in preventing any violent incidents from taking place and by solving any emerging disputes between two sides. It is a fact that there are about 1000 incidents both recorded and unrecorded, and UNFICYP’s presence pushes the odds of war towards odds of peace. These incidents might simply consist of stone throwing, and they can also take the form of shooting and mass demonstrations. UNFICYP does a good job in preventing these kinds of conflict from escalating into major incidents.

The Annan Plan (the following section is written by Michail Vafeiadis)

The latest United Nations peace initiative to resolve the Cyprus’ situation is the 2004 Annan Plan. The UN Secretary General’s reunification roadmap was first presented to the parties on November 11, 2002 when the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) was preparing to join the European Union. Before the plan was put in simultaneous referenda on April, 24 2004, it had already undergone four revisions. It is worthy to point out that the last modification occurred only 24 hours before the imminent referendum. In order for the Annan reunification scheme to become operational it had to be accepted by both communities. However, the Greek-Cypriot (GC) community overwhelmingly voted against it (75.83%) while Turkish-Cypriots (TC) approved it (64.90%). But before we examine the justifications the two parties provided for their respective decisions let us first introduce some of the plan’s main themes.

The Annan Plan envisages the creation of a United Cyprus Republic based on the Swiss model. According to the plan, Cyprus will be a federated state of two equal constituent states. The new Cypriot federal parliament will be made up by the Senate [where GCs and TCs will enjoy an equal number of representatives, (48 members) divided in a ration of 24:24] and of the Chamber of Deputies (consisted of 48 members but proportionally

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divided according to the communities’ population). In order for a decision to pass a simple majority in both Chambers is required. In addition, a collective Presidential Council will have to be consisted by six voting members (4 GCs and 2 TCs). The Presidential Council will have to choose the Republic’s president and the vice-president; but the aforesaid incumbents will have to rotate their positions every 20 months. Last but not least, the Cypriot Supreme Court should consist of an equal number of judges but also of three non-Cypriot judges. Finally, one of the plan’s provisions provides for the establishment of a Reconciliation Commission.

However, for a variety of reasons the two communities maintained contrary views vis-à-vis the plan. The main Turkish-Cypriot justification for accepting the Plan was its security and economic safeguards. After the 1974 Turkish invasion, TCs have been diplomatically isolated from the international community. Consequently, this resulted in a severe economic exclusion. The TC objective for agreeing to the Plan was twofold: in case it was accepted from both communities Turkish-Cypriots would be able to economically re-integrate themselves into the international community. On the other hand, in case of a potential GC rejection, TCs would blame the GC side for showing a lack of willingness for terminating the conflict. Thus, they would argue that TCs should no longer economically suffer since it was not their choice the continuation of Cyprus’ division. As a result, they should have to be re-incorporated into the international community. Another stimulus Turkish-Cypriots had for voting in favor of the proposed Plan was that they were given over-proportional political representation pertinent to their percentage of the population. Moreover, despite the fact that they had to withdraw from some territories and retain only 28.5% of the new Cypriot Republic, economically vital areas would still be under their control. Finally, the GC right of return to their homes would be strictly regulated in order to protect TCs from becoming a minority to their constituent state. Moreover, Turkey would maintain its right to intervene in Cyprus on behalf of Turkish Cypriots.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot strong rejection (75.83% voted against the Plan) reveals that the Plan maintained many institutional and administrative deficiencies that would grant only nominal independence to the new state. Moreover, they argued that the Plan was provocatively pro-Turkish. One of their main arguments is that albeit, the population is 77% Greek and 18% Turkish, the two parties will have a 50-50 political representation. Moreover, GCs maintained that the plan had many elements of the now defunct 1959 London-Zurich agreements which established the deficient first Republic of Cyprus (ROC). For instance, both Greece and Turkey would each indefinitely preserve in the island 6,000 troops. These contingents should be withdrawn when Turkey joins the EU. Moreover, GCs state that under the Plan’s provisions they would have to support Turkey’s European membership despite the fact that Turkey does not currently recognizes ROC’s government. In addition to the revived Treaty of Guarantee, the British Sovereign Bases would remain in the island under the consent of GCs, TCs, Greece and Turkey. Thus, Greek Cypriots argued that the Plan attempted to restore the founding treaties of the first Cypriot Republic that led to the 1960s tense intercommunal

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51 Wikipedia. *Annan Plan for Cyprus*.
52 Wikipedia. *Cypriot Annan Plan Referendum*. 
violence and the subsequent Turkish invasion. One of the main reservations GCs had was pertinent to the presence of the approximately 90,000 Turkish settlers. They argued that the vast majority of them would be granted Cypriot citizenship and residency rights. Therefore, instead of condemning their presence the Plan would actually contravene the 1949 Geneva Convention that prohibits the occupying power from attempting any demographic change against the local population. At the same time, GCs would not be able to constitute more than 6% in any Turkish village in the north. In this regard, they point out that this was another restriction against GCs that violates EU’s acquis communautaire (which calls for the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital). Finally, one of the most salient Greek Cypriot criticism vis-à-vis the Plan is pertinent to the GC property rights in the North of the island. According to them, the Annan Plan “nullifies decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, ends other cases pending in front of the court, and violates personal property rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights”. The Plan did not envisage any compensation schemes provided by Turkey. In contrast, Greek Cypriot property owners would be compensated for the loss of their properties via the federal treasury; which would be overwhelmingly financed by GCs. Finally, the Plan would protect the 10,000 foreigners who have illegally bought GC houses in the North. For all the aforesaid reasons, the Greek-Cypriot community decided to reject the Plan since they perceived it of maintaining biased elements that were counter-constructive towards a comprehensive and final solution of the Cypriot problem.

The European Union: a post-modern approach towards conflict-resolution

After examining Cyprus’ turbulent history and presenting past UN peace initiatives such as the Annan plan, it is now contemplated that the European Union is the last resort that can cut the Cypriot Gordian knot. However, there are two schools of thought pertinent to the academic debate vis-à-vis EU’s hitherto performance towards the Cypriot accession. Cyprus’ pro-European partisans assert that the Union maintains a ‘subversive character of integration’ (Diez, 2002) that can act as a stimulant for resolving protracted conflicts. In this regard, they stress that the Union’s federal inclination facilitates the re-articulation of its members’ absolutist and egoistic ethnic identities. On the other hand, some scholars argue that so far the EU involvement has negatively contributed to the conflict by alienating Turkish-Cypriots (TCs) and by hardening the negotiating positions of the two warring parties, therefore, the European Union has discarded its role as conflict ‘facilitator’. This paper maintains that although the partial integration of Cyprus has so far obstructed various reunification initiatives, nevertheless, the European solution should not be assessed via teleological lens. In contrast, it is our view that the European Union is a post-modern entity or a ‘multi-perspectival policy’ (Ruggie)54. For this reason, it is necessary to re-define the conflict’s contour and inject the European ‘esprit de corps’ mentality to the competing factions. As a result, a Cypriot conterminous identity will emerge where the comprehensive interests of all Cypriots can be promoted.

53 Van Coufoudakis, and, Klearchos Kyriakides, Case Against the Annan Plan, 11.
54 John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 172.
The following section is structured in the following format. The 1st part encompasses a historical inspection of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) accession negotiations with the European Union. Throughout the 2nd part we will introduce the main actors’ perspectives and reactions towards’ ROC’s European membership. Moreover, we will expose the faction’s close relationship with their motherlands and how such interactions negatively affect the peace process. Finally, in the concluding section we will argue why a ‘loose federation’ can serve as the springboard for the island’s definite peace. Finally, we attempt to show why the European Union can facilitate and safeguard such settlement.

I) ROC’s accession process

The first European-Cypriot intercourse is detected in December 1972 when the Republic of Cyprus concluded with the European Community an Association Agreement. The Agreement was based on a two stage platform and provided that within a ten year time-frame trade barriers should be abolished in order to establish a customs union. However, the 1974 Turkish invasion initiated a period of uncertainty in the island which resulted in the continuous delay of implementation of the Agreement. Eventually, the second stage materialized in 1987 when a complementary Protocol was signed between the two parties and moved towards the conclusion of the Customs Union. In July 1990, the Republic of Cyprus submitted its application for full membership in the European Community. Three years later, in July 1993 the European Commission responded positively to the Cypriot application by issuing an official Opinion. At this point, it is important to highlight that the Commission accepted ROC’s application by perceiving the latter as the sole legitimate political authority on the whole island. However, the Commission issued an ambiguous statement which although acknowledged the Cypriot problem it did not outcast the accession negotiations. In particular, the Opinion professed that the desired outcome of Cyprus’ accession to the “Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring the two communities on the island closer together.”

Yet, the 1993 Commission Opinion did not explicitly define the exact parameters of what a proper settlement envisaged. For instance, the Commission asserts that it “considers Cyprus as eligible for membership and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession”.56 Finally, the Opinion maintained that the accession negotiations should be reexamined in 1995 in order to evaluate the progress being made towards Cyprus’ intercommunal talks.

During the 1994 European Council summit in Corfu, Cyprus was for the first time officially included in the countries that were going to join the EU during its fifth enlargement. According to the Presidency’s summit conclusions, the “next phase of enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus and Malta.”57 The next step pertinent to ROC’s European membership occurred in July 1997 via the Agenda 2000 declaration.

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55 Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership – Extracts, 2.
56 Ibid, 3.
57 European Council at Corfu, Presidency Conclusions.
This is a key document since for the first time Cyprus’ accession was de-linked from an ‘a priori’ political settlement of the conflict. The Commission asserted that “the prospect of accession, whose political and economic advantages are now becoming clear to Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots, can in itself provide such an incentive… Agreement on a political settlement would permit a faster conclusion to the negotiations. If progress towards a settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened with the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as the only authority recognized by international law”.

The 1997 Luxembourg Summit is another important date pertinent to ROC’s European journey. The European Council for the first time announced a date for launching the accession process vis-à-vis the imminent 5th European enlargement; this important date was March 30th 1998. Last but not least, the 1999 Helsinki European Council was the last critical date before ROC joined the EU. Via the Summit’s Presidency Conclusions, it was asserted that fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria [divided in political; which include democracy, human rights, rule of law; economic, to maintain a market economy and; legislative, to adopt EU’s acquis communautaire)] was the single most important element for prospect member states. Moreover, the Helsinki Summit removed any additional requirements Cyprus had to fulfill except the Copenhagen criteria. Namely, the European Council explicitly declared that “a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition.”

Finally, the Cypriot turbulent path towards European membership concluded on May 1st, 2004 when the Greek-dominated southern part of Cyprus joined the European Union. However, the Cypriot European accession should be perceived as incomplete since the Turkish-Northern part of the island is still excluded.

II) Stakes. Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot perceptions of the EU; the ‘double minority’ psychosis, and the role of Greece and Turkey as sterile external contributors

In the following section, we will briefly explicate the Greek-Cypriot (GC) and the Turkish-Cypriot (TC) position vis-à-vis Cyprus’ partial integration in the European family. In this regard, I will present the actors’ opposing views. Moreover, we will examine the destructive role the respective motherlands play towards the problem’s resolution and why inter-Cypriot tensions might have an immediate cascading effect in Greek-Turkish relations.

Albeit, it is in the interest of both GCs and TCs for Cyprus to become a full member and embrace the European idea and polity; ROC’s entry has not so far facilitated a comprehensive solution that would propel the island to move towards this direction. Instead, the actors’ initial upbeat sentiments about the prospect EU membership were subsequently subsidized due to the maximalistic positions all parties maintained.

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58 Agenda 2000.
59 Helsinki Council
However, instead for an outright condemnation of the two factions we should pay considerable attention on Cyprus’ ‘double minority’ problem. According to this premise ‘the delicate balance and the essential problem of the island has been determined by the fact that the Turkish Cypriots are a numerical minority on the island, but the Greek Cypriots (as well Greece) are considerably smaller and weaker than Turkey’. The following analysis will expose the power of the aforesaid concept since it was manifested in many of the actors’ political maneuvers during ROC’s accession into the EU.

The Greek-Cypriot position

The Greek-Cypriot pro-EU strategy aimed to Europeanize the Cyprus dispute in order to accomplish political and security objectives. The continuing failure of numerous UN initiatives to reunify the island prompted GCs to look for other alternatives as well. EU’s label as a ‘force for peace’ (Diez, 2002) that had successfully eclipsed in the past deep animosity and mistrust between Germany and France was a catalytic factor for the GC decision. The Greek-Cypriot rationale maintained that by engaging into an accession association with the European Union TCs would become more forthcoming to undertake an independent posture by deflecting Turkey’s meddling into their internal affairs. This logic is evident in the remarks being made in 1999 by the foreign minister of ROC, Ioannis Kasoulides, pertinent to the negotiations among Cyprus and the EU. Kasoulides argued that a prospect Cypriot accession “will act as a catalyst inducing all sides to work for an early solution.” Due to the economic prosperity of the Greek Cypriot side EU membership tends to validate ROC’s political and security criteria and further substantiates the pertinence of the ‘double minority’ idea.

One of the biggest GC security concerns is the presence of the 30,000 strong Turkish military presence in the island. In addition, the estimated 60,000-120,000 illegal settlers that were brought into the Turkish-dominated side further aggravate GC anxieties. This syllogism is publicly uttered by GC political leaders who identify the EU as a potential deterrent. For instance, a few years before ROC’s admission Glafcos Clerides, the former Cypriot president, stated that “if Cyprus becomes an EU member within the next few years, the intervention of Turkey in an EU member country will become an imponderable action.” In addition, throughout the 1990s GCs along with their European aspirations and in order to condense if possible the ‘double minority’ syndrome, they embraced a militaristic course as well. In this regard, they assumed a military build-up that aimed to complement EU’s soft security approach. However, this logic highlighted once again the role of the motherlands in the conflict.

In 1993, the Republic of Cyprus signed with Greece a ‘Joint Defense Doctrine’. According to the agreement, in case of a Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Greece is committed to military interfere on behalf of Greek-Cypriots. Moreover, the 1993 military

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60 Nathalie Tocci. *Cyprus and the European Union: Catalysing crisis or settlement?*, 18.
61 Thomas Diez, *Why the EU Can Nonetheless Be Good For Cyprus*, 3.
pact between the two countries envisages joint military drills and planning. In this regard, Greece has utilized during the Nikiforos/Toksotis joint military maneuvers the Greek-Cypriot Paphos air-base to station its warplanes. The acme of the GC ‘double minority’ driven fear was their attempt to employ in the island the S-300 surface to air missile defense system. As the former GC president Clerides asserted, “Turkey’s rejection of his proposal to demilitarize the island leaves Cyprus with no choice but to purchase the S-300 missiles to counter military superiority of Turkey”. However, the missiles’ capability range which is capable of intercepting and destroying aircraft at ranges up to 150 km, and incoming missiles at ranges up to 40km’ made Turkey to vehemently oppose their deployment by declaring it as casus beli. The fact that the Turkish mainland lies only 75 km (47 miles) from Cyprus would give GCs the military capacity to destroy Turkish warplanes even before they take off. The GC rationale is that by deploying the S-300 in a potential Turkish offensive they will be in position to temporarily delay it and give the international community necessary time in order to take action and terminate the conflict.

The Turkish-Cypriot position

Contrary to the European and Greek-Cypriot viewpoint which maintains the view that the on-going accession talks will stimulate a final settlement of the Cypriot protracted conflict; Turkish-Cypriots espoused a reverse perspective. In this regard, they perceived ROC’s application as a GC ploy to further alienate them. TCs condemned the Greek-Cypriot move as illegal since it virtually excluded them from the negotiation process. In addition, they claimed that under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee GCs were prohibited from joining in any economic or political union with any other state. Consequently, we can argue that in order to convey their aversion towards ROC’s European adventures TCs employed retaliatory acts. The underlying logic was that the prospect GC membership in the Union would elevate their ‘double minority fixation’. Moreover, TCs perceived it as a favorable pretext in order to justify the continuous Turkish military presence in the island and their proxy relationship with their motherland.

The Greek-Cypriot EU accession process contrary to the initial sanguine expectations had a negative contribution to the peace talks since it reinforced hard-line elements within the TC administration. For instance, after the 1994 Corfu European Council Summit when the EU officially included Cyprus in the next enlargement process, the Turkish Cypriot Assembly annulled all past commitments towards a federal solution. Another TC retaliatory reaction occurred after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit when TC leader, Rauf Denktash terminated the on-going UN sponsored intercommunal talks. It is apparent that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was very skeptical of the GC European aspirations. For them, it was perceived as a strategic move that tried to revise the Greek-Cypriot ‘double minority’ status by shrewdly neutralizing the strong Turkish military presence in the island. Throughout the 1990s, TCs held the impression that the EU was being manipulated by the Greek government in order to further alienate them from the international community. As a result, in July 1997 the TC leader signed a bilateral

64 S. Gulden Ayman, A case of Brinkmanship: S-300 missile crisis, 8.
accord with Turkey that moves toward the “gradual economic and financial integration and partial integration on security, defense, and foreign policy matters”. The Turkish-Cypriot skeptical position in regards to ROC’s European path was publicly revealed in January 1997. After Denktash met the Turkish president Demirel, a joint statement was issued which stated that “every step taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration on the course of unilateral membership in the EU will speed up the integration process between the TRNC and Turkey.” Finally, the TC hardening approach was again exposed when Rauf Denktash placed severe restriction on UNFICUP’s freedom of movement. The TC leader employed a counter-constructive move in order to express his objection to ROC’s acceptance by the UN Security Council as the sole and legitimate government of Cyprus.

### III) The transformation of the Westphalian state and EU’s significance: a postmodern approach towards conflict-resolution

Numerous adjuncts have been attributed to the Cyprus conflict in order to denote the island’s powder-keg potential. It has been often described as a ‘double minority’ (Tocci) problem, a ‘reluctant republic (Xydis, 1973), a ‘protracted social conflict’ (Azar 1983, 1990), an ‘intransigent conflict’ (Muftuler-Bac, 1999), ‘a forced togetherness’ (Yilmaz) and with many other alike labels. However, we consider that the post WWII European scene maintains a different historical account vis-à-vis conflict resolution. The 1990s direct EU involvement in Cyprus provides a unique opportunity for all Cypriots to reconcile negative past memories they might maintain against each other. In this regard, we fully conform to Jean Monet’s remarks pertinent to the Franco-German hostility who once claimed that “when you change the context, you change the problem”. It is now more evident than ever that the Westphalian state is undergoing a comprehensive transformation. Sovereignty no longer implies an absolutist and exclusive territorial national authority; nevertheless, it has granted states with additional mechanisms that have to be adopted in order to cope with challenges within a globalized world. In our view, the ‘unbundling of territoriality’ that is taking place in the international political arena is a dynamic but at the same time elastic method towards conflict resolution. According to Ruggie’s apt definition, “the unbundling of territoriality is a productive venue for the exploration of contemporary international transformation…this is the institutional means through which the collectivity of sovereigns has sought to compensate for the ‘social defects’ that inhere in the modern construct of territoriality”.

Albeit, World War II has negatively stigmatized human history we might argue that it was ‘necessary’ to a certain extent in order to thrust a new rationale pertinent to the relations between national entities. In the European continent the progeny of this new thinking was the creation in 1951 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The main objective of this initiative was to share the strategic resources of coal and steel-

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66 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.
68 Ruggie, 171.
which were necessary by that time for a country in order to wage war—mainly between France and Germany; but also among Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. The underlying logic was to create technical agencies that would handle various aspects of human life. Thus, ‘as more and more areas of control were surrendered, states would become less capable of independent action. One day the national governments would discover that they were enmeshed in a ‘spreading web of international activities’ (Mitrany 1966:35)”.

Looking in retrospect, Mitrany’s prophetic words corroborate the proto-European ‘spillover’ effect. Today, ECSC has been transformed into a powerful world player since the European Union maintains a common market, customs union, judicial and police affairs and increasing cooperation in matters of foreign and security policies. Moreover, one of the most important theoretical EU contributions is related to the development of the ‘multi-level governance’ (MLG) logic; which is a European governance theory that further expounds on functionalism thinking. According to this post-modern notion, national governments are not perceived as monopolistic policy makers. In contrast, policy setting and policy-making are comprehended of being an amalgam of supranational and sub-state actors. Gary Marks, who has extensively written on MLG defines it as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers-supranational, national, regional and local”.

Following EU’s lead

So, why after so many years of tensions we still have to adhere on polemic national politics? This is a question both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots should take into consideration. In this regard, it is imperative for them to forever cut the umbilical cord that connects them with their respective motherlands. The EU experiment to the dismay of Cypriot hard-line politicians has blatantly revealed that conflict is not an endemic human feature. EU’s constructivist apparatus can be utilized in order to facilitate a permanent solution vis-à-vis Cyprus. In our view, a ‘loose federation’ solution can serve as a springboard for building a pan-Cypriot identity. The Union’s post-modern constructivist approach pertinent to conflict resolution can stimulate a functional spillover process that will eventually be inoculated in the island’s institutions and residents as well. In the apt summary of Thomas Diez, “if the EU is to become a catalyst in Cyprus, it is not because EU membership will automatically solve the problems on the ground, but because the institutional and discursive framework that the EU provides allows for the re-articulation and re-presentation of identities”.

The following section briefly presents some constructive European ventures that can be used by Cypriot leaders in order to ignite a cooperation path. Moreover, the espoused rationale of the following structures can be infused in the united new Cypriot institutions.

The European Union maintains various post-modern institutions that promote and at the same time celebrate sub-national unique features. For instance, the Committee of Regions (CoR) is a European political forum that gives the opportunity to local and

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70 Ibid, 34.
71 Diez, 7.
regional entities to articulate their interests. The European Council and Commission are compelled to consult with CoR before taking decisions that might affect regional and local actors. It is many times the case where CoR members influence the European decision making process. In this regard, several sub-state actors have established in Brussels lobby groups in order to independently promote their regional interests. In the mid-1990s, “there were around 3,000 interest groups active in Brussels with around 10,000 individuals involved in the lobbying industry”. The presence of an extensive lobby network exposes EU’s growing significance and corroborates the assumption that Brussels makes some very important decisions vis-à-vis the region’s future. The fact that all sixteen German Lander, the Spanish comunidades autónomas (such as the Basque country, Catalonia, Andalusia) and Belgium’s three regions maintain representation offices in Brussels is indicative of EU’s non-linear governing structure.

Another scheme Cypriot leaders can utilize in order to reconcile their interests and peacefully promote them are via EU’s regional policy structures. According to the official EU definition, the “European regional policy is designed to bring about concrete results, furthering economic and social cohesion to reduce the gap between the development levels of the various regions. From a scientific approach, regional policy brings added value to actions on the ground. The policy helps to finance concrete projects for regions, towns and their inhabitants”. In this regard, the EU maintains various projects such as its structural and cohesion funds. Since the 1988 structural funds reform, sub-national actors became actively involved in shaping, monitoring and implementing European Regional policy.

The Assembly of European Regions (AER) is an additional post-modern mechanism that celebrates EU’s regional diversity. Its goal is to promote “diversity, subsidiarity and democratic regional structures. It also enables the Regions to form the essential link between Europe and its citizens”. AER encourages cultural diversity and tries to modernize regional governance.

The above discussion regarding some of the EU’s supranational institutions exposes that albeit, the European Union is a mosaic of different cultures it has pooled its resources in order to promote collective interests that benefit the whole region. The Multi-Level governance theory complements Europe’s supranational orientation and institutions. In this regard, we believe that the EU’s governing method can be utilized and at the same time emulated by Cypriots in order to achieve but also to sustain reunification. It is our view that the European governing approach will safeguard and promote each community’s ethnic uniqueness while promoting a pan-Cypriot identity. As a result, reunifying Cyprus under a ‘loose federation’ model is perceived to be a constructive and feasible starting point. We firmly believe that the TC ‘confederal model’ approach is deficient since it will sustain the current ‘enclave’ mentality that promotes political, social and territorial division. On the other hand, we also consider that the GC preference

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72 Bache, 334.
towards ‘federation’ is premature. The two communities have lived apart for 34 years and this would be an abrupt step that would sooner or later revive the 1960s intercommunal violence. In contrast, since its inception the pan-European project followed a gradualist integration mode. Thus, if Cypriot reunification eventually succeeds it will ineluctably lead towards closer political and societal cooperation.

**Concluding Remarks**

The Cyprus problem is a chronic challenge the international community has faced. Albeit, the United Nations has taken numerous initiatives towards reunification the ‘double minority’ psychosis has so far prevented both ethnic communities for reaching an ultimate agreement. However, we believe that this perception should not be assessed in teleological terms. The transformation of the Westphalian state is a positive sign that promotes the end of the state’s sacrosanct position which perceives conflict as a zero-sum game. It is our thesis that EU’s post-modern nature can serve as a conflict catalyst vis-à-vis Cyprus. Despite the fact that during the 1990s the European Union was criticized for its weakness to induce GCs and TCs to find a solution before the former’s accession to the EU; nevertheless, it is our view that the European institutional and discursive framework can be utilized in order to achieve a gradual reunification. The Multi-Level Governance theory that is palpable in many European institutions and policies can be employed in order to promote a pan-Cypriot identity while maintaining the actors’ unique features. As a result, both parties will engage in a ‘participatory peace’ that will appease respective political and societal concerns. Eventually, this constructivist methodology will lead towards psychological reconciliation and promoted an inclusive Cypriot identity. For all the aforesaid reasons we do not believe that engaging Cyprus into the European chariot is a utopian task or an academic absurdity that will have the same fate like past UN reunification schemes. Instead, Europe’s post WWII successes corroborate its designation of maintaining a ‘subversive character of integration’. As a result, this elastic approach vis-à-vis conflict resolution can magnetize both actors to join forces in order to prosper in a globalized world.

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