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Financing UN Peacekeeping Missions
In Trouble?

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Introduction

Since the first mission during the 1956 Suez crisis, United Nations peacekeeping operations have become the organization’s primary tool in maintaining peace and security in the global community (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, p. 35). As the need for peacekeeping operations increases, it is becoming more difficult for the United Nations to fund them (Lebovic, 2004, p. 910). There are several factors that affect the funding of peacekeeping missions. First, are the complicated procedures used to collect the necessary supplies and resources to achieve a sustainable peace. Second, more peacekeeping missions are being deployed because of increased internal conflicts (Lebovic, 2004, p. 917). Third, the main financial contributions for these operations come from large, industrialized countries because the United Nations ranks contribution according to a country’s size and GDP, and the assessment budgeting system (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652).

How much does the ability to fund peacekeeping missions affect the future of United Nations involvement? The United Nations’ capability to fund future peacekeeping missions could greatly affect the organization’s involvement because it does not have proper resources for this. The hypothesis for this paper is the more member countries contribute to peacekeeping missions the more able the United Nations will facilitate the deployment of peacekeeping missions. An improperly resourced and funded mission could result in its postponement, a troop deployment delay and prevent its completion, therefore prolonging the conflict (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, p. 108). This paper will explore the reasons that have led to the current financial difficulties in funding peacekeeping missions, how this influences the future of United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as the potential solutions to the problem. The constructivist school will be favored for this paper because of its analysis of peacekeeping contributions by the international community as an act for the public good explains the disproportions that exist in state involvement and behavior.

The Issues In Financing Peacekeeping Missions

A brief overview and history of various peacekeeping mission types is essential in order to understand the significance and evolution towards third-generation peacekeeping and its complexity. Peacekeeping is defined as the task of fully securing the peace in a state experiencing conflict (Snow, 2008, p. 353). United Nations military, police personnel and/or civilian participants are deployed with the consent of all the parties involved to prevent conflict and establish peace in the affected region (Agenda For Peace, 1992). The idea for peacekeeping was first proposed by the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Parson, in 1956 in order to account for the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egypt awaiting a political settlement (Mingst and Karns, 2007, p. 93-4).

During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were strictly a neutral, lightly armed force only used to safeguard against conflict (Lebovic, Dec. 2004, p. 917). Known as traditional or first-generation peacekeeping operations, they were designed to respond to interstate crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed United Nations forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or serve as a “buffer” zone during political negotiations (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 12). Traditional peacekeeping operations were obligated through consent from the parties involved that the impartiality and moral authority of missions would be maintained (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, p. 14). Nonetheless, if consent was ever withdrawn it significantly affected the peacekeeper’s ability to discharge a mandate
In order to improve missions, the United Nations decided to develop new strategies to create more inclusive operations (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 14). Known as second-generation peacekeeping, these missions involved the implementation of more complex, multi-dimensional operations that not only included the responsibilities of traditional peacekeeping, but would also involve troops in various police and civilian tasks with the goal of implementing a peace agreement (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 14).

State-building, also known as peace-building, is the reconstruction of a state’s infrastructure or its actual formation (Snow, 2008, p. 253). The goal of peace-building is to establish a sustainable peace by reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthen the rule of law, monitor and improve human rights, educate the people about and investigate past and existing abuses, provide technical assistance towards development, and promote conflict resolution and reconciliation (Brahimi Report, 2003). This is done with the aspiration that by addressing the structural sources of conflict that it will result in a solid foundation for peace (Brahimi Report, 2003). Third-generation peacekeeping missions are associated with peace-building because they were established with the expectation of protecting refugees and civilians from attack and genocide and coerce a cease-fire with little or no consent from all parties involved has been achieved (Mingst and Karns, 2007, p. 97). Therefore, these operations tend to cost more because they require a large number of military personnel with trained recruits, and heavy, sophisticated equipment, supplies and air power (Mingst and Karns, 2007, p. 97). For example, early peacekeeping operations normally had around 10,000 military personnel, but current missions can have as many as 30,000 to 60,000 (Diehl, Druckman and Wall, Feb. 1998, p. 34). Third-generation peacekeeping operations are low-level military operations used to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the enforcement of cease-fires and the authoritative assistance as well as the rebuilding of failed states (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 15-6). There are three types of third-generation peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 16). First, there are the international forces that are sent to impose order without significant local consent in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, therefore have to surmount the warring factions (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 16). Second, is when an international force is sent, normally without unanimous consent, to impose distinct arrangements on parties in the midst of conflict (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 16). Third, an international force is sent to implement the terms of a comprehensive peace from which one or more of the parties have chosen to defect (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 16).

New strategies were added to peacekeeping in order to foster economic and social cooperation in order to build confidence among previously warring groups to redevelop the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and lay the foundation for a durable peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 14). Since the creation of second-generation peacekeeping, the United Nations has facilitated peace treaties among parties, monitored the demobilization of military forces, resettled refugees, and supervised transitional civilian authorities (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 14). With the emergence of third-generation peacekeeping operations at the end of the Cold War, missions became even more multi-dimensional (Lebovic, Dec. 2004, p. 917). Secretary-General Kofi Anan emphasized and redefined the United Nations’ security role (Lango 2005). Anan himself has asserted that the United Nations should promote a culture of prevention (Lango 2005). He has emphasized that the United
Nations has a moral responsibility to protect vulnerable individuals from acts such as genocide; therefore a comprehensive approach that includes political, economic and diplomatic measures should be taken to guard against conflict (Lango 2005).

Since the early 1990s, more interstate conflicts have erupted because of the collapse of authoritarian regimes around the world, which has led to an increase in peacekeeping missions (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 651). For example, the expenditure for United States Peacekeeping Missions in 1980 was about $190 Million while in 1994 it was $3,500 million, eighteen times greater than ten years ago and ten times greater than during the 1970s and 1980s (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 651). From 1975 through 1980, United Nations traditional peacekeeping spending was around $164 million dollars per year (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). During this time period, the United Nations supervised six missions to the Suez Canal, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, 2004, p. 36 and 79). In 1981 through 1988, this expenditure rose to about $210.8 million, primarily because traditional peacekeeping missions were still the preferred choice (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). The United Nations was also maintaining many of its traditional peacekeeping missions in Jerusalem, India, Pakistan, the Suez Canal, Cyprus, Lebanon and the Golan Heights so the expenditure would not have changed dramatically (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, 2004, p. 36). The mission that explains this increase in the expenditure was the 1988 United Nations operation to Iran and Iraq, the only new mission sent off at the time (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, 2004, p. 36). In 1989 through 1996 peacekeeping spending increased to about $1, 750.6 million annually because peacekeeping missions became more involved and the United Nations began to assign an increased number of them (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). During this epoch the United Nations sent off twenty-two missions, including those to Angola, Central America, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Liberia, Libya, Chad, Croatia and Haiti (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate 2004, p. 36, 79-80). This number rarely altered throughout the late 1990s up to the turn of the twenty-first century, despite any implementation NATO might have included in operations (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). This increased number in peacekeeping missions has greatly affected the United Nations’ capability to find funding for them.

A major influence in the financial and material contribution to peacekeeping operations since the Cold War is ascribed to the interests and capacities of its participants (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 911). For example, the funding and support for recent peacekeeping operations have been attributed to “middle powers” in the United Nations like Canada, Austria, Chile, Sweden and Denmark (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 911). By their contribution and participation in peacekeeping efforts, these states hope to increase their international stature while enforcing their neutrality (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 911). However, even though the United Nations has welcomed involvement from various states, the majority are democracies (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 911). Nevertheless, the numbers demonstrate that the involvement of democracies is greater than other government types in peacekeeping contributions (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 911). For example, from 1992 to 2001 democracies contributed 401 personnel in comparison to the 164 from non-democracies (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 920). Even more telling years are from 1993 to 1995, in which 879 personnel were contributed by democracies to peacekeeping operations in comparison to the 232 by non democracies (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 920). These “democracies” included primarily European countries, but others as well such as Argentina, India, Uruguay, Australia, Thailand, Brazil, the Philippines, Botswana, New Zealand, Japan, Chile, and Columbia (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 920).
Another issue explaining why a limited number of Western states contribute to peacekeeping missions are because of its related controversies and risks (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 923). If a peacekeeping mission fails, for example, the contributing state will be seen as an embarrassment if they end up in criminal court for misconduct or fail to complete the mission (Lebovic, Dec. 2004, p. 923). Some states have also negatively critiqued the United Nations’ ability to coordinate peacekeeping operations effectively, and have therefore emphasized the responsibility be placed on regional NGOs or NATO (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 18). These controversies have led to the United Nations’ reception of disproportionate contributions. For example, twenty-nine states contributed 95% to mission financial costs from 1994 to 2000, with only half of them also contributing personnel (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 923).

There is also an assumption by the international community that these missions are conducted solely towards the public good, which is why most states neglect to contribute because they view it as a free service (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). During the Cold War, for example, burden sharing was later institutionalized by UN assessments to ease mission funding, but in the Post-Cold War era, it has shifted to a greater alliance on a few large states who carry all of the financial weight towards peacekeeping (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). In this period, United Nations’ peacekeeping costs were covered under the regular budget so that a member-state’s peacekeeping burden corresponded to its assessed budget share (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 179). This changed when the United Nations suffered a financial crisis in the 1960s because of insufficient funds to cover the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Cyprus, in which bonds had to be issued to help pay for them (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 1998, p. 179). Since 1974, United Nations’ peacekeeping expenses have been primarily covered by assessment accounts, meaning that a fixed share is assigned to each United Nations member-state for the annual costs of each mission (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652).

This system was first established by the General Assembly in Resolution 3101 in order to create a more permanent funding source and to cover the annual peacekeeping expenses (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). It was also created with the consideration that more developed states are able to contribute to peacekeeping operations than less-developed and of the special financial responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council (GA Resolution 3101). Additionally, the Secretary-General was also authorized to enter commitments at a rate not to exceed $5 million per month if supplementary aid was necessary (GA Resolution 3101). Since 1974 the assessment shares program has been incorporated in other peacekeeping efforts encouraging a similar contribution percentage according to a member-state’s size, GDP and political influence within the United Nations.

In addition to making payments to these assessment accounts, member-states still have to pay the annual membership fee which helps to fund the United Nations’ regular budget (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). Any payments to the assessment accounts made in arrears are made up in the regular budget or through voluntary contributions (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). Voluntary contributions could either come in the form of cash, services and supplies as approved by the Secretary-General (GA Resolution 3101). If there is any shortfall in a particular contribution it could cause a delay in the reimbursing of states contributing troops (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). The assessment account’s charges are apportioned under four classes: A-the five permanent members of the Security Council, B-22 countries developed states outside class A, C-wealthy developing states, and D-other developing states (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 180). Class A states pay about 22% or more than their regular budget assessment scale, in contrast to class D countries pay one-tenth of their...
regular budget (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 180). In effect, more than 95% of peacekeeping assessments are levied on class A and B nations (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 180). For example, states like the United States and Canada under classes A and B would contribute 31.7% and 3.1% respectfully while Ghana and Fiji under class D would contribute 0.002% (Coulon, 1994, p. 37). Therefore, if the peacekeeping budget was $3 billion, the United States would contribute $800 million, Canada would give $75 million, and Fiji and Ghana would spend $45,000 (Coulon, 1994, p. 37).

The United Nations normally reimburses the states involved according to the norms that apply to all implicated, but there are rare occasions when the Security Council requires states to completely finance their own participation (Coulon, 1994, p. 37). For example, the United Nations reimburses each state for providing troops with $1,048 a month for each soldier, which accounts for basic allocation, a daily rate and allowances for clothing and wear on equipment (Coulon, 1994, p. 37). With this same reimbursement money, the United Nations will also pay for the troop’s rations and transportation (Coulon, 1994, p. 37).

The United Nations reimbursement money has a very slow arrival period, which is an issue for less-developed states, who rely on this monetary assistance to pay their troops (Coulon, 1994, p. 38). However, less-developed states have come to view the financial and military benefits of participating in peacekeeping operations because of the United Nations’ monetary incentive through reimbursement, and are therefore offering their services more on a massive scale (Coulon, 1994, p. 39). For example, in 1982 ten out of twenty-five participating states were less-developed, around 3,200 out of 10,500 (Coulon, 1994, p. 39). In 1989, this number rose to where twenty-seven were less-developed states out of forty-six participating, and by 1994, this had increased to forty-eight out of seventy-three, around 45,500 out of 76,600 (Coulon, 1994, p. 39).

Assessment shares change slightly every year, and are based on a United Nations member-state’s status and its GDP (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 652). Approximately 98% of peacekeeping assessments are assigned to roughly 27 states (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 653). States like Bangladesh, Egypt and Malaysia often contribute peacekeeping troops as a source of foreign exchange earnings because the flat payment paid per soldier far exceeds their domestic salaries (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 653). As a result, the burden of these troops is negative, which results in the deployment of poorly trained and ill-equipped peacekeeping forces and therefore has the potential of limiting the effectiveness of the mission (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 653). For example, entire contingents from such states have arrived to participate in peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia or Somalia without military equipment, received no pay, lacked special training, and were incapable to communicate with the United Nations because of language barriers (Coulon, 1994, p. 39). In contrast, the flat payment as paid by NATO member-states like the United States and Canada comes nowhere near to compensating peacekeeping troop contributions, so any disproportionate burden sharing that is uncovered becomes a lower bound assessment (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 653).

Economic assistance plays a significant part in deploying peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 108). Higher levels of net-current transfers per capital are included in the supplies, aid and resources contributed to a mission such as unilateral transfers and food aid, which will substantially further an operation’s chance of success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 108). An improperly financed peacekeeping mission could either be postponed, its completion and/or potential
success hindered, and/or the necessary aid may not be sent (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, p. 108). The financing for peacekeeping missions also tends to lag behind the demand, with an increase in peacekeeping arrears since 1988 (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, p. 108). The relevance of this study is to look at the impact financing has on the future of United Nations’ supported peacekeeping missions as well as the possible solutions considered to solve the problem.

Theories behind Peacekeeping Contributions

One of the major influences behind financial and military contributions to peacekeeping missions are theories used to explain its importance and function. There are several schools of thought that related to peacekeeping contribution: the realists, the liberalist, and the constructivists.

The liberal school of thought supports the idea that democratic countries are attracted to peacekeeping operations because of their humanitarian appeal (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 912). In his article, “Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War,” James H. Lebovic discusses how democratic nations are more ready to recognize the importance of safeguarding the rights of individuals through the belief that the spread of democracy will only promote peace and security (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 912). This is because it is believed that democracies promote individual liberties through the economic, political and security conditions that it puts into place (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 912). This also enforces the idea of Kant’s theory that wars provide domestic opportunities for despotic forces to undermine republican governance, and that democracies should prevent the spread of war and ameliorate their conditions (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 912). Liberalists like Lebovic also believe that certain objectives can be pursued through multilateral initiatives with aid from international organizations when it is insufficient for any one state to act unilaterally (Lebovic, Dec. 2004, p. 913-4). With a multilateral operation, the risks and costs are spread out among the participants, with the promise of scale and efficiency advantages, provide political cover by legitimizing operations and dilute the spread of opposition when opponents must target an array of political targets, and permit states to monitor and control the behavior of other intervening states (Lebovic, Dec. 2004, p. 914).

The realists argue that a state may get involved only to maintain control over the mission or if there is a direct security concern if they do not intervene (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 913-4). This depends on the state’s power, rivalries, involvement in the conflict and how much they have at stake in the operation (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 914). For example, a state’s size and military power can greatly influence how much it contributes to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in question, or whether or not it is economically wealthy and/or a major global power (Lebovic Dec. 2004, p. 914).

Scholars in the constructivist school like Shimizu and Sandler discuss how peacekeeping is viewed as an act towards the public good. According to this theory, peacekeeping is seen by the global community as a public activity (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). The hypothesis of Olson avers that contributions from larger versus poorer states is greater and quite disproportionate because the latter equates its marginal willingness to pay for peacekeeping to the associated marginal cost is more likely than the more destitute states (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). In order for this hypothesis to exist, peacekeeping has to be viewed as purely a public activity because the activities of one country are considered a sufficient substitute for another (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). Another term for
this hypothesis to exist is for peacekeeping to be viewed as a normal good because a country’s demand would rise with its income (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655).

An additional theory associated with this school is the concept of the suboptimal, especially if supported on a voluntary basis (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). This means that a state’s marginal willingness to pay is equated to the marginal cost in its peacekeeping contribution while also ignoring the spillover benefits that it would confer on others (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). For a peacekeeping contribution to be considered optimal it would require the donating country to equate its marginal willingness to pay over all benefit recipients to the associated marginal cost (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655).

Shimizu and Sandler also discuss the debate over whether or not peacekeeping is strictly a public or impurely public good (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 656). Peacekeeping can be considered impurely public if some of its benefits are partially excludable or rivalled (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 656). The benefits of peacekeeping are partially rival when they begin to decline along with the number of countries deriving gains from such operations (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 656). A peacekeeping operation is considered purely public when it yields multiple outputs or joint products, however some countries might consider them to be impurely public (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 656). Peacekeeping operations are also considered public goods because of their goal to maintain international peace and security and enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, p. 726).

Jointness refers to the consumption of a good by one individual that does not diminish the amount available for consumption by another (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, p. 725). State-specific benefits to those involved in peacekeeping could be the status enhancement through contribution, greater stability for neighboring states, and economic benefits for trading partners (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 656). However, self-interest can always work against the collective yet there are some scholars like Sandler who claims through his joint product model of public good provision that states are more likely to contribute to the provision of such goods when there are higher levels of private benefits associated with it (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, p. 726). Sandler also describes how the thinning in the consumption of public goods affects the way the global community views peacekeeping operations because of its impurity of defense spending that conventional forces possess a higher private goods component than nuclear forces (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, p. 727).

The peace and stability achieved through peacekeeping operations give rise to benefits that could only come from transnational efforts towards the public good in the form of humanitarian effort (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). For example, operations used to secure democracy can also have transnational benefits by extending political freedoms and fostering peace (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). Peacekeeping also enables hostilities to end as well as any negative consequence that could ensue, such as its spread (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655). Peacekeeping operations can also achieve a peace and stability that give rise to benefits that could only come from transnational efforts towards the public good in the form of humanitarian effort (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 655).

This paper shall favor the constructivist school of peacekeeping contribution as an effort towards the public good because it explains why these disproportions exist. Certain less-developed countries have discovered it more of a private benefit to contribute troops rather than financial need because the
reimbursement from the United Nations, yet they recognize the participation in such operations a humanitarian effort towards peace as a public good (Coulon, 1994, p.38-9). In contrast, wealthier nations recognize the benefits, responsibility and need for peacekeeping operations such as the United States and Canada, who consistently contribute financially and militarily to missions (Coulon, 1994, p. 37).

Will the United Nations Still Fund Peacekeeping Operations?

Since the end of the Cold War, more internal or civil wars began to occur, causing concern in the international community over how to maintain peace and security (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 3). This explains why in the years 1990 through 1993 that the United Nations Security Council adopted new interpretations on security and peace enforcement provisions (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 1). The Security Council broadened the traditional reasons for intervention, including domestic political oppression, massacres and “failed states” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 7). Later in 1998 Secretary-General Kofi Anan made it clear in a speech that United Nations would in its new role intervene in a conflict whenever possible to contain and prevent it because it is the organization’s job (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 6).

Nonetheless, the United Nations is having a difficult time financing peacekeeping missions because the economic, humanitarian and political interests are disproportionately shared among member states. Even though the assessment shares program was created to make financing peacekeeping missions more efficient, it was not prepared for the political climate or the United Nations’ increased peacekeeping initiatives and changes in the post Cold War period. It has become evident that it is impossible for the assessment shares program to properly help finance peacekeeping missions because it is a system that relies on the size and GDP of a country, therefore limiting contributions to wealthier nations (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 192). States with a lower GDP tend to rely on Security Council reimbursements rather than on contribution, which limits the amount of money the United Nations receives. Not all states view peacekeeping as a public activity and feel that the United Nations should be more careful about which conflicts rightly deserve international intervention. If a particular conflict is not viewed as appropriate to intervene in, a state may decide to withdraw its contribution, or not contribute at all because it is viewed by them to not be in their best interest, or that of the afflicted state. Some states will choose not to contribute at all, because peacekeeping is noted as a public good that the United Nations should supply, despite the consequences. This delay or lack of funding and support caused by such actions results in the slow deployment of missions and poorly equipped and supplied troops, which could hinder at its success. The debate over funding and the disproportions related to contribution in return contributes to heated member state debates over when a particular mission would be beneficial to support in the name of the public good.

An example of an actual peacekeeping mission that reflects this conflict of member state contributions is Bosnia. Between 1992 and 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced mass ethnic cleansing in concentration camps, resulting in almost 100,000 deaths (McMahon and Western, Sep.-Oct. 2009, 71). Since the beginning of the dispute the international community debated over whether or not military intervention was appropriate (Coulon, 1994, p. 127). The United States at first favored taking military action against the Serbs through unilateral air strikes (Coulon, 1994, p. 127). The Russians, French and British in contrast believed military intervention would promote violence in Bosnia (Coulon,
1994, p. 127). Nevertheless, the international community finally relented in sending a peacekeeping mission because of the conflict’s escalation and the humanitarian need (Coulon, 1994, p. 127).

After the international community finally conceded to aiding Bosnia, the United Nations faced recruitment problems for troop contributions (Coulon, 1994, p. 127). The Russians, for example, went back on their promise to contribute troops because of the mission’s ambiguous mandate and the government’s division over its sympathies with Serbia over Bosnia (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). The United States was eager to participate, but was concerned about the safety of their soldiers on the ground (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). The Germans gladly sent troops, while even though Turkey sympathized with Bosnia and wanted to participate in the mission, they also backed down because the Serbs threatened war against them (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). The French, British, Canadians and Spanish were already providing half of the 25,000 peacekeeping force sent to the former Yugoslavia, and cringed at the thought of sending more, even though France eventually consented to dispatch another thousand soldiers (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). There were a few less developed states willing to contribute, but they did not have the necessary military supplies and transportation for their troops (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). The most generous offer outside the more developed world was from Pakistan, which offered to supply 18,000 soldiers, while Iran offered 10,000 (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). The more developed states opposed the offer because they argued that soldiers more experienced in peacekeeping should be sent to Bosnia (Coulon, 1994, p. 126). The troops in Bosnia faced issues, to where some of them were poorly equipped with military supplies and provisions (Coulon, 1994, p. 139). Eventually, the United Nations had no choice but to collaborate with NATO to complete the mission (Coulon, 1994, p. 127).

The NATO mission to Bosnia included the support of thirty-six countries, led by the United States, which sent a total of 60,000 troops to enforce the Dayton agreement (McMahon and Western, Sep.-Oct. 2009, p. 71). The already existing peacekeeping force was extended by the NATO-led Stabilization Force or SPFOR, which remained in Bosnia for over a decade (McMahon and Western, Sep.-Oct. 2009, p. 71). Starting in 2005, the NATO transferred to the European Union’s sponsored mission, EUFOR (McMahon and Western, Sep.-Oct. 2009, p. 79). By 2007, EUFOR withdrew all 1,000 troops stationed in Banja Luka, however currently EUFOR still has 2,000 troops deployed within the entire country (McMahon and Western, Sep.-Oct. 2009, p. 79). From 1996 to 2007, Bosnia received $14 billion in foreign assistance, which amounted to $300 per person per year for a country of four million people (McMahon and Western, Sep.-Oct. 2009, p. 71-72).

Since Bosnia, non-United Nations led peacekeeping missions, such as those led by NATO have become more important (Shimizu and Sandler, Nov. 2002, p. 651). At the 1992 Oslo summit, NATO declared that it would include peacekeeping as part of its official mission (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 1998, p. 177). NATO became involved in peacekeeping in 1995 when it sent its implementation force to take over the Bosnia operation (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002, p. 651-2). NATO later sent a subsequent mission to Bosnia, the Stabilizer Force, in December 1996, as well as the Kosovo Force in June 1999 and others (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002, p. 652). Non-NATO led missions have also appeared such as Support Hope in Rwanda or the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002, p. 652). Other non-NATO and United Nations peacekeeping operations include Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, and Operation Deny Flight from 1993 to 1995 (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 1998, p. 190). NATO tends to have more even contributions than the United Nations because the majority of its contributors are the same rich states that carry the burden in the United
Nations (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 191). With NATO’s ability to more rapidly deploy forces than the United Nations, as well as the plans of its richer members like France, the United States, and Germany to augment their power projection abilities is further evident of the disproportions in peacekeeping burden sharing (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 191). Therefore it is predicted that the United Nations might have to collaborate more with NATO, or might even become the new leader in peacekeeping (Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu, 1998, p. 193).

Some scholars have suggested that the United Nations should consider peacekeeping missions that combine international contribution with regional forces (Hirsh, Nov.-Dec. 2000, p. 3). Many of these regional forces are already trained and pressured to act in accordance with United Nations’ law, and go under the auspices of Security Council resolutions (Hirsh, Nov.-Dec. 2000, p. 3). If the United Nations were to adopt this new system, it would legitimize the use of regional forces in humanitarian effort and also solve the issues related to keeping humanitarian intervention aligned with national interests (Hirsh, Nov.-Dec. 2000, p. 5). The regional forces involved would be looking out for their own national security against the conflict, but also less expensive in the long run than a United Nations peacekeeping mission (Hirsh, Nov.-Dec. 2000, p. 6). This solution also resolves the issue on how to control poly-got troops who work under different military customs because the regional forces will have their own commanders to report back to (Hirsh, Nov.-Dec. 2000, p. 6). However, maintaining control and supervision over such peacekeeping missions using regional forces could be an issue because of a lack of standardization and proper communication back with the United Nations (Hirsh, Nov. – Dec. 2000, p. 6). Another issue with this proposal is whether or not the regional forces will have the proper training and resources needed to complete their mission if United Nations were to completely rely on the regional forces (Hirsh, Nov.-Dec. 2000, p. 6).

Other solutions considered are the acceleration of payments, reducing arrears through more disciplined payment schedules, and levying the interests on arrears (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, p. 108-9). A $50 million revolving fund was created in 1993 to assist the United Nations in the funding process, and will be enlarged to reflect the demand for operations (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, p. 109).

Following the September 2005 World Summit, the Peace-Building Commission was established to assist states transition from conflict to living in a sustainable peace environment by laying down the appropriate foundations (Wittig, 27 Jan. 2010, p. 2). According to the scholar Thomas G. Weiss, “the PBC’s [Peace-Building Commission] mandate is to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building, ensure predictable financing for recovery, draw international attention to peace-building, provide recommendations and information to improve coordination, and develop best practices requiring the collaboration of a variety of actors” (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). The PBC is comprised of 31 members (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). Its members are divided as such: 7 from the Security Council, 7 from ECOSOC, 5 from the United Nations’ major financial contributors, 5 from the United Nations’ top military contributors, and 7 from the General Assembly elected to rectify geographical imbalances produced by selections in the other associate categories (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). Attached to the PBC are the PBSO, or Peace-Building Support Office and the PBF or Peace-Building Fund (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). The PBSO assists and supports the PBC, advises the Secretary-General, and oversees the PBF (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). The PBF was established by Kofi Anan in 2006 with a target of $250 million, but deposits reached $200 million by February 2008 with an estimated total portfolio at $256 million (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). The
PBF’s intention is to provide initial support towards peace-building efforts and as a preliminary investment donor towards long-term recovery (Weiss, 2009, p. 187). If supervised efficiently, the fund could prospectively enhance coordination among financial contributors by centralizing the decision-making process, therefore reducing duplicated and wasted efforts from occurring (Weiss, 2009, p. 187-8). Nonetheless, the PBC does experience its own predicaments. For example, it is an ancillary body of the General Assembly and the Security Council which aggravates reporting problems because its function depends on the cooperation of the major United Nations’ organs (Weiss, 2009, p. 188). Furthermore, the PBC is an advisory body and not a decision making one, hence it does not contain the necessary enforcement mechanisms to improve its efficiency (Weiss, 2009, p. 188). Some of the activities performed by the PBSO also overlap those of the DPA and DPKO, which has the potential to cause responsibility disputes (Weiss, 2009, p. 188).

The primary goal of the PBC is to live up to the prospects of the populations re-emerging from conflict and improve contribution towards peace-building efforts (Wittig, 27 Jan. 2010, p. 3). In order to realize this for the 2010 Review and towards future efforts, the PBC has identified the following areas that will further enhance it: strengthen the Organizational Committee, use the partnership and dialogue with international financial institutions, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society as complimentary initiatives, hold host governments and donors more accountable towards fulfilling commitments by identifying peace-building objectives, increase the interaction between the PBC and the Security Council, facilitate the PBC’s working methods by identifying country-specific priorities, and finally enhance and clarify the Peace-Building Support Office (Wittig, 27 Jan. 2010, p. 3-6). If these goals of the PBC are fulfilled, it will facilitate the organization and funding of peace-building missions to better attain a sustainable peace.

Final Considerations

Even though there are suggestions over how to lessen the financial burden of United Nations’ peacekeeping operations, the assessment shares system is still in use and the organization’s leading role has not changed. Nonetheless, it is most likely that the United Nations will still be involved in peacekeeping operations in some fashion, yet it will be involved with another organization or institution like NATO. Nevertheless, the humanitarian benefits provided through peacekeeping as a public good of peace, stability and security cannot be ignored and is welcomed by the international community (Shimizu and Sandler 655).
Works Cited


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