APPENDIX C

The Jesuits in El Salvador: A Historical Perspective

Background

The Society of Jesus was founded by Ignatius of Loyola, a Basque nobleman and courtier who underwent a religious conversion in 1521 while recovering from battle wounds. He spent a year as a hermit in Manresa, Spain where he underwent a series of mystical experiences. These experiences formed the basis of his work *Spiritual Exercises* which contains a systematic series of meditation and other religious practices, aimed at uniting persons with God and making them more effective instruments of God's will, usually during a 30-day retreat. After receiving a university education and practicing missionary work in Italy, Ignatius drew up a statement of purpose and preliminary rules which were approved by Pope Paul II in 1540. In 1541 Francis Xavier sailed from Lisbon to Asia, establishing the tradition of the Jesuit Missionary. By the early 17th Century, the order had some 15,000 members and more than 500 colleges and seminaries which educated the nobility and middle class of Catholic Europe. The Society was suppressed by the Holy See from 1773 until 1814.

The Society of Jesus is the largest religious order in the Catholic Church. Its membership is all male and all committed to the organization by life-long promises of poverty (not to own any property), chastity (never to marry) and obedience (submission to the authority of superiors in the Society).

The word "Jesuit" did not originate with the Society of Jesus but was used in the Netherlands and Rhineland at least a century before the Society was formed. Jesuita, was one of several abusive terms applied to self-righteously devout individuals who practiced novel devotions and spoke censoriously of the clergy, religious Orders and ordinary Catholics. The semi-official term "Jesuit", which is still defined in the dictionary as "one given to intrigue or equivocation," has now been accepted by the Society.

Vatican II and Medellin

The Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965, at which several Jesuits played prominent roles, encouraged a profound rethinking of traditional Catholic values and attitudes. Prior to Vatican II, national churches in Latin America presented a traditional religious image, accompanied by conservative social and political attitudes. Virtually everywhere, including El Salvador, the church was allied with the regime. Two new principles would have particular impact in Latin America. They asserted that the church is in and of the world, with concerns well beyond the purely spiritual. They also emphasized that the church is a community of equals by baptism. The prelates refused to condemn communism per se, joining criticism of certain of its practices with an equally strong critique of capitalism's abuses.
In 1968, three years after the end of Vatican II, bishops from all over Latin America gathered in Medellin, Colombia for the Second Episcopal Conference. At Medellin the bishops called upon the church "to defend the rights of the oppressed;" to promote grassroots organizations; "to denounce the unjust action of world powers that works against self-determination of weaker nations;" in short, to make a "preferential option for the poor." According the Ignacio Martin-Baro, one of the six Jesuits slain last year, the pastoral approach outlined by Vatican II and Medellin implied "an identification with the sufferings and with the hopes of the people, especially with those of the poor and oppressed. That made the church's task eminently one of promoting awareness - conscientization - ... to create a society...in which all injustice, all exploitation, and all oppression would be done away with. This very fact, however, would make the church a subversive influence within a social order that was founded upon the injustice, exploitation, and the oppression exercised against the many by the few."

The primary means of accomplishing the goals of Medellin was the development of Christian Base Communities (CEBs). Under the CEBs, the participants began taking responsibility for important aspects of their own lives and for each other; they were no longer merely observers at a ritual conducted for their benefit by a resident or visiting priest. CEBs are small groups, usually no more than twenty or thirty, within a parish who meet regularly for Bible study. This form of participation, however, has had social consequences as CEB members have moved beyond purely religious concerns to political issues.

Rutilio Grande

The CEB approach was most aggressively pursued in the town of Aguilares when Jesuit Father Rutilio Grande arrived to take up pastoral duties in 1972. Grande set up 37 CEBs as part of his evangelizing effort. In his sermons, delivered in the language of the Salvadoran peasant, God was consistently portrayed as one who cares passionately about the poor, and wreaks his vengeance on the rich and powerful who became and remain that way through the exploitation of others. This lesson was far different than the traditional biblical message to "accept your lot here on earth because your real reward will come in the hereafter." CEB members from the Aguilares area soon became involved in strikes against low wages in the local sugarcane fields and tension with the authorities grew.

In 1976 government troops attacked a group of peasants who had occupied unused land in San Vincente. The peasants, six of whom were killed, took their action following a decision in their
CEB. Following the San Vincente attack, the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), a guerrilla group formed in 1970 which later joined the FMLN, sent a letter to Christians commenting on those events and inviting them to become involved in their struggle.

In early 1977 Grande was machine gunned to death as he rode in his jeep. No one was arrested for the crime but the bullets used were of the kind only issued to the army. The immediate spark for the murder may have been the previous day's discovery of the body of Roberto Palma, the head of the government tourist agency who had been kidnapped by guerrillas. The army and security forces then undertook a military sweep of the Aguilares area in what was called Operation Rutilio. Hundreds were arrested, including those whose only evident offense was possession of pictures of Father Grande. Three Jesuits who worked with Grande were expelled. In June 1977 the White Warriors Union, a paramilitary group generally believed to be affiliated with Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, announced that the Jesuits had thirty days to leave the country or be killed. Fliers urging Salvadorans to "Be a Patriot! Kill a Priest!" were circulated in San Salvador. While the threat was not carried out, it was now clear that the right wing associated the increasing guerrilla activity with the Jesuits.

The killing of Father Grande had a radicalizing effect on Oscar Romero, the new archbishop of San Salvador who became increasingly critical of the government's human rights record. According to some State Department officers familiar with El Salvador, the Jesuits became Romero's "ideological think tank," and often served as the authors of the political portions of Romero's controversial homilies, which included a reading of the names of individuals alleged to have been killed, assaulted or tortured by security forces. The right wing came to see Romero as a "tool of the Jesuits." According to Father Martin-Baro, when Romero was given an honorary by Georgetown University and nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 1978, the right-wing press in El Salvador interpreted the honors as part of a "Jesuit-communist conspiracy" against the country's prestige. In 1980, Romero was himself assassinated.

The Role of Jesuit Education and the UCA

Within the Catholic Church, the largest role currently played by the Jesuits is in education. In the 1940s the Jesuits founded a secondary school, the San Jose Day School, which was staffed largely with young Basque priests. According to Father Cesare Jerez, former Jesuit Provincial for Central America, the decision of the Day School in the early 1970s to admit poor students deeply offended members of oligarchy who wanted the school for the exclusive education of their children. The Jesuits also ran the national seminary, until 1972 when
archbishop Chavez removed it from Jesuit jurisdiction - largely because of the order's politics. Father Grande had taught at both the Seminary and the Day School.

In 1966 the University of Central America was established - largely as an alternative to the left wing University of El Salvador. The Salvadoran oligarchy contributed heavily to the construction of the new campus on the southwest side of the capital and thus felt a strong sense of proprietorship. But in 1970, at the time of the Agrarian Reform Congress, the Superior Council of UCA issued the first in a series of manifestos concerning various issues confronting the country. In this document, the Jesuits effectively told the oligarchy that the UCA was not its university and proceeded to take a strong position in favor of agrarian reform. In 1975, when students staged a march to protest the government's expenditure of $1 million in the Miss Universe finals held in El Salvador, National Guardsmen opened fire, killing about 30 students. By 1976, the UCA had became a target of right wing bombing attacks.

Father Ignacio Ellacuría, a philosophy professor and, since 1979, the rector of the UCA, became a world class liberation theologian at the UCA. By all accounts he was a spell-binding orator who urged revolutionary changes for the injustices in El Salvador. Accounts differ as to whether he actually condoned violent revolution. However, according to sources with the State Department, a number of his prize seminar students became leaders of the FPL during the 1970s.

The Jesuits occasionally also provided meeting places for members of the FDR, the non-guerrilla leftist coalition, later to ally with the FMLN. On November 27, 1980 six key leaders of the FDR were found tortured and killed after being abducted from the Jesuit-run Day School by a band of nearly 200 men. Church spokesmen accused the Salvadoran security forces of the crime.

The UCA's principle publications, Proceso, a weekly summary of news developments, and Estudios Centroamericanos, a monthly analysis magazine, have consistently published articles critical of the government and have placed the brunt of the responsibility for the violence in El Salvador on the government and its supporters. According to a 1982 State Department cable, "it is the most important of the very few non-clandestine pro-FMLN\FDR publications available in El Salvador." Unlike other opposition publications, they were never shut down. The UCA publications were read in detail by U.S. Embassy staff who wrote cables summarizing and critically analyzing the articles and editorials on such issues as alleged electoral fraud, economic crisis, and U.S. intervention.

The right wing responded with occasional bombing and strafing attacks on the University and the homes of professors.
In 1981 the Salvadoran Anticommunist League circulated a leaflet in San Salvador which was headed: "Out with Marxist Jesuits! Out with the creators of violence and crime in El Salvador. Out with the founders of the FPL!" The leaflet accused the Society of Jesus of, among other things, directing subversion from Panama. In addition to ten individuals, it named the major Catholic educational centers as organizations to be watched. In 1983 the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) placed bombs at the residence of the Jesuits teaching at the UCA, and at the home of UCA professor Italo Lopez Vallecollos. An ESA communiqué at the time called Lopez Vallecollos a "spokesman for international communism" and accused the Jesuits of "open membership in the terrorist organizations that make up the FMLN."

Attacks against the Jesuits decreased somewhat during the years of the Duarte Administration. During this period, however, Father Ellacuria was repeatedly accused of defending the FMLN's use of mines. When union groups held meetings in the UCA's auditorium, newspaper headlines declared that subversive strategies were planned in the UCA. Also during this period, however, President Duarte and the FMLN held a series of dialogues which were promoted by Ellacuria.

Interestingly, in the weeks before his death, Father Ellacuria publicly warned the rebel leaders that they lacked popular appeal and that their acts of terrorism had turned many people against them. He had also written that President Cristiani "was successful in his first 100 days in office" and urged support for his efforts toward a negotiated peace. At the time of his death, Ellacuria was no longer a voice for revolution but had become a voice of moderation.

Prepared by Jeff Swedberg - Office of Congressman Foley.
In reply refer to: I-90/51466

Honorable John Joseph Moakley
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman:

In response to your letter of February 26, the United States Military Group in El Salvador has researched each issue which you raised and provided information as detailed as their records permit.

Each question has been answered to indicate training provided, the U.S. instructors involved, and information on training of those Salvadorans implicated in the Jesuit murders.

There are several points which the attached data illustrate. The unit in question is representative of most Salvadoran units, inasmuch as it has a high turnover rate. This accounts, in part, for the periodic U.S. training of the same unit over a ten year period. Second, human rights has been a key focus of U.S. training and is an important component of training currently provided by the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The importance of human rights is emphasized to the Salvadoran recruit during basic training at the National Training Center, and is reinforced in the field by unit commanders. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces has institutionalized training by providing publications for every field commander, including a compilation of human rights-related laws and a guide for arrest procedures when there are human rights implications, and a guide on proper conduct for enlisted men. Human rights emphasis continues to improve and become more institutionalized, due in part to the combined efforts of the U.S. and the Government of El Salvador to press for progress.

An evaluation of the effectiveness of training has not been presented, because, as you are aware, our defense attaches reporting on Salvadoran military performance in the field are the only independent evaluation of the effectiveness of training.

We trust that this data will be useful for your report to the Speaker, and we are ready to clarify any additional questions you or your staff may have.

Sincerely,

CARL W. FORD, JR.
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
ISSUE 1: US training relationship with the Immediate Reaction
Infantry Battalion (BIRI) Atlacatl and training received by
members of the BIRI Atlacatl.

RESPONSE:

As stated in the information provided 9 Feb 90, no formal
advisory relationship with the BIRI Atlacatl exists nor has one ever
existed. US personnel assigned as trainers in El Salvador are
assigned at the National Staff level, fixed training centers,
and regional commands. The regional commands are responsible
for specific geographic areas and have forces permanently
assigned to accomplish their mission. The five BIRIs are
strategic national assets that respond directly to the national
staff and are assigned missions throughout the country. They do
not have fixed areas of responsibility; thus, US trainers are
not dedicated to them.

It should be noted that the Immediate Reaction Infantry
Battalion Training Center (CEBRI), which has a US trainer
assigned, is located near the Atlacatl. This trainer is not
attached to nor does he work with the Atlacatl. A conscious and
intentional split was made between what is the CEBRI training
center and what are the Atlacatl installations. This trainer is
not one of the US trainers charged with training Salvadoran
combat battalions, but rather part of the US National Basic
Training Center Staff who assists in the training of basic
recruits.

The BIRI Atlacatl was in fact trained by US forces in 1981.
This information was forwarded to USSOUTHCOM on 22 Feb 90. A
total of 1,383 soldiers were trained. The training was
conducted in El Salvador. The training consisted of basic
infantry training for individual soldiers and progressed through
company level operations. A memorandum for Ambassador Pickering
dated 14 December 1983 indicated that of the 1,383 soldiers
trained in 1981 only 250 soldiers remained on active duty in
1983. This is 18% of the force that was trained. The Atlacatl
currently receives 64% of its total strength as new recruits
each year. Therefore, the battalion that was trained in 1981,
or in any year up thru 1987, is not the battalion that exists
today.

USMILGP does not have records indicating specifically what
courses were taught, the unit which provided the training, names
of trainers who conducted the training, nor the names of those
who received the training in 1981.

Training in the United States has been provided to members of
the BIRI Atlacatl. MILGP records of this training consist only
of the student's name, date of course, and the name of the course a student will attend or has attended. No unit affiliations are provided by the El Salvador Armed Forces. Given a full name, soldiers can be identified as students and all course data can be provided. In the information provided on 9 February, USMILGP was given the names of identified Atlacatl personnel and then provided what specific training was received from US sources.

All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy from 1970 to 1977 and from 1980 to the present have attended the Salvadoran Cadet Preparation Course at USARSA or the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS) in one of its five forms which occurred as part of the course evolution during this time period. These courses are generally to provide military academy cadets with practical knowledge of concepts and fundamentals of military subjects, without regard to their future branch specialization. These five forms are: The Cadet Orientation Course, Combat Arms and Support Service Basic, Officer Preparation Course, Spanish OCS Course, and the El Salvador Cadet Course. Specific data concerning each of these courses is not available at USMILGP. Information may be obtained from USARSA or USAIS, Fort Benning, GA. All Atlacatl officers who are military academy graduates and the majority of those who received commissions after serving as non-commissioned officers received this training.

Three of the four officers implicated in this case attended the El Salvadoran Cadet Course.

1LT MENDOZA Vallejo, Yusshy Rene
1LT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo

Attended the Spanish OCS Course JAN – APR 82, conducted at United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

2LT GUEVARA Carrion, Gonzalo

Attended the El Salvador Cadet Course (ESCC) 13JUN – 30SEP88, conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

Selected company grade officers and NCO's attend the Small Unit Training Management Course is also conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. Course descriptions are available from that source. The course generally is to prepare individuals to plan, conduct, and manage small unit training. It teaches US Army training doctrine, principles, and techniques. The following persons implicated in this case attended this training:

SGT AVALOS Vargas, Antonio Ramiro
The names of all others implicated in this case have been cross referenced with US MILGP records and no other soldiers implicated have been found who attended this course.

The Special Forces Officer's Course (SFOC) is the same course US Officers attend. It is given at the Special Warfare Center (SWC), Fort Bragg, NC. The specific course description is not available at US MILGP but can be obtained from SWC, Fort Bragg, NC. Generally the course prepares students to conduct unconventional warfare, Special Forces Operations, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Individuals are trained to serve as an Operational Detachment -Alpha (ODA) Commander. The following officer implicated in this case attended this training from 11NOV88 - 21JAN89:

ILT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo

In addition to the training conducted at US Army installations, US MILGP has knowledge of the following additional training activities that involved the BIRI Atlacatl.

The first of these is a Designated Marksman Course supervised by the 1st Brigade Operations, Planning and Assistance, and Training Team (OPATT). The 1st Brigade OPATTs supervised a Designated Marksman Course of three weeks duration given to Atlacatl soldiers, CEBRI Training Center instructors, and to members of the four other BIRIs. The purpose of the course was to provide a cadre of instructors to train marksmen capable of obtaining a first round hit with their assigned weapons at 500 meters. There were approximately 20 students, all enlisted, of which 10 were from the Atlacatl. The course was taught at the Atlacatl Garrison from 06FEB - 25FEB89.

The US Trainers (OPATTs) involved were:

MAJ William Council, a Special Forces Officer with approximately 15 years service.
SFC Robert Jarman, a Special Forces Communications Specialist. Length of service unknown.
SFC Melchor Becena, a Special Forces Weapons Specialist, with approximately 12 years of service.

It should be noted that although these soldiers are all Special Forces qualified they were assigned as trainers to US MILGP and were not there as part of a Special Forces Unit.
The same instructors supervised a Sniper Course from 24APR89 - 20MAY89. This course was given at the Atlacatl Garrison to train personnel for employment as snipers in combat operations. The Atlacatl's sniper weapon system was used. There were 36 Atlacatl soldiers who received this training.

The names of the Atlacatl soldiers who received this training are:

ADVANCED MARKSMAN COURSE
06 - 25FEB89

SGT EDWIN ERNESTO RODAS TRUJILLO
HECTOR EDUARDO ESCAMILLA BARRERA
VALENTIN SERGIO MARTINEZ CRUZ
AGUSTIN AGUILAR HERNANDEZ
ANTONIO ARISTIDES GOMEZ CORNELIO
LUIS FRANCISCO VELASQUEZ HERNANDEZ
PEDRO ANTONIO MARTINEZ CORDERO
MIGUEL ANGEL MOLINA RENDENOS
CPT MIGUEL ANGEL MARTINEZ GARCIA
FRANCISCO ARRIAZA ZAMORA

SNIPER COURSE
24APR - 22MAY89

PVT ISMAEL DOLORES MELGAR
JOSE ORLANDO VENTURA VELASQUEZ
RAUL RAFAEL VALLE
ROLANDO DE JESUS ABARCA
JUAN FRANCISCO BARRIENTOS CHACON
JOSE LUIS TOBAR ZELADA
BENJAMIN ALCIDES FUNES CHICAS
HERBERT WALTER GUADRON FUENTES
FERNANDO LOPEZ ALFARO
JOSE EMILIO CARTAGENA DUEÑAS
JOSE VITIELLO MALDONADO MEJIA
NICOLAS GARCIA LIU
DANIEL FUENTES BANOS
DANIEL MARTINEZ JACOBO
EDGARM OSWALDO PALACIOS
ALBERTO QUIJANO CALLES
JOSE LUIS CHAVEZ ARDON
ELIAS PAYES GUZMAN
JUAN ANTONIO GALVEZ ARIAS
MOISES ROSALES CASTELLANO
ELISEO FLORES MANCIA
JOSE ADAN LIEVANO SIGUENZA
MIGUEL ANGEL MARROQUIN
OSCAR ARMANDO TRIGUEROS
MIGUEL ANGEL ESCALANTE
JOSE NOE NUNEZ AVELAR  
FERMIN ALFREDO PINEDA  
FRANCISCO ARMANDO HERRERA  
MARIO RENE AQUINO CATATA  
SONIA PERDOMO LIMA  
SANTOS PEREZ FLORES  
MANUEL DE JESUS DIAZ LOPEZ  
MARIO DE JESUS CARBAJAL  
JOSE ISRAEL BAUTISTA GUZMAN  
OSCAR ARMANDO HERNANDEZ  
FRANCISCO MEDRANO SERRANO

The final activity is the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Deployment for Training (DFT) exercise conducted from 10 - 20NOV89. The purpose of this DFT was to test a Special Forces Detachment in their ability to execute their primary special forces mission of training foreign armies. As part of the detachment’s evaluation, training was given to approximately 150 soldiers from the Atlacatl in order to evaluate the language and teaching skills of the Detachment. The training was stopped because of the 11NOV89 Communist offensive in which the Atlacatl was committed to combat on 13NOV89. The training conducted from 11 - 13NOV89 was in dismounted Infantry Patrol Techniques, Weapons Training, and day and night practical exercises of these subjects.

The training provided as part of the DFT included:

- Organization of Combat Patrols
- Duties and Responsibilities of Patrol Members
- Military Troop Leading Procedures
- Combat Orders
- Patrol Base Activities
- Immediate Action Drills
- Techniques of Fire and Maneuver
- Rapid Fire Techniques (Firing without looking through sights)
- Preparation of Arms and Equipment for a Patrol
- M16 Zero Fire (Procedure to align sight of the M16 to the soldier’s view of the target)
- Practical Exercise in Combat Orders

After 14NOV89, the Detachment trained Atlacatl personnel that remained behind to secure the base in various subjects. USMILGP does not have a detailed list of the training conducted by them after 13NOV89 nor of what personnel were trained. This information may be available from the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC. Listed below is the information available at USMILGP:
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<th>NO OF PERSONS TRAINED</th>
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<td>Weapons Tng (M16; G-3; FN)</td>
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<td>Mortar Tng (81MM and 60MM)</td>
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The personnel that conducted the training were:
- CPT David C. Akins, Special Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
- MSG Elton D. Read, Special Forces Operations Sergeant
- Operations Sergeant
- SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Special Forces Engineer Specialist
- Detachment Engineer Sergeant
- SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
- Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
- SFC Elmer Bas-Gay, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist
- Detachment Intelligence Sergeant
- SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist
- Detachment Medical Sergeant
- SSG Mario Rodriguez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
- Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant
- SSG Mark L. Alexander, Special Forces Communications Specialist
- Detachment Communications Chief
- SSG Daniel S. Briley, Special Forces Medical Specialist
- Detachment Medical Specialist
- SSG Reyes Lopez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
- Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant
- SSG Randal Whitely, Special Forces Communications Specialist
- Detachment Communications Sergeant
- SSG Laurence J. Cardass, Special Forces Medical Specialist
- Detachment Medical Specialist
- MSG Richard J. McGuinness, Special Forces Operations Sergeant
- Exercise Evaluator

The length of service of these individuals is not available at USMILGP.

It is important to note that this was not training for the Atlacatl but the annual evaluation of the Special Forces
Detachment in its ability to conduct Foreign Internal Defense training missions.
It is also possible that training conducted by Mobile Training Teams (MTT) has been attended by members of the Atlacatl.
Records of such training and names of soldiers who would have attended this training are not available at USMILGP. Further
information about MTT’s may be available from the US Army
Security Assistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA).

No other information of US sponsored training is on record at
USMILGP El Salvador.

The Detachment’s file was transferred to the ODDR.

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ISSUE 2: Detailed information relating to time, location, nature, and evolution of US training for every member of the Atlacatl who received US training.

RESPONSE:

Providing the evolution of US supervised training for each and every person who may have ever received such training within the Atlacatl is not within the capability of the US MILGP. The US MILGP does not maintain an accountability for the thousands of soldiers who come in contact with US sponsored or advised unit training within EL Salvador. FMS and IMET funded individual training provided in the US is accounted for within the US MILGP by name, course and course dates. The Salvadoran military does not provide unit information and there has not been a need to have that information.

Additionally, there has been no formal training relation with the Atlacatl. There are no US Military trainers assigned to the Atlacatl nor have there ever been US trainers assigned to the Atlacatl. A US trainer is assigned to the CEBRI Training Center which is located near the Atlacatl. This trainer is not assigned to nor does he work with the Atlacatl.

Subsequent to our response on 9 February, we identified that US trainers trained 1,383 soldiers of the BIRI Atlacatl in 1981 in El Salvador. This information was provided to US SOUTHCOM on 22FEB90. The training included Basic Infantry training for individual soldiers and progressed to Company Level Operations. In 1983 only 250 soldiers of the 1,383 trained in 1981 remained on active duty. The Atlacatl's current personnel turn over rate is 64%. It is doubtful that many enlisted soldiers trained in 1981 are still on active duty today. Officers remain in service for much longer periods and are subject to rotation on an almost annual basis. It is possible that there are officers assigned to the Atlacatl that received training in 1981. It is unlikely that they have been at the Atlacatl since 1981 without a break in service. In any event, US MILGP does not have any records indicating the specific training given in 1981, the names of the personnel who gave the training, the unit of the personnel who gave the training, nor the names of the personnel who received the training.

US MILGP has no records of any Mobile Training Team that may have provided training to the Atlacatl. It is possible such training may have occurred. If so, the information would be available from the US Army Security Assistance Agency for Latin America, Quarry Heights, Panama.

The summary of the courses given in the February response was intended to answer paragraph three of Congressman Moakley's 26JAN90 request for information, which requests a description of any US military programs or classes in which COL Guillermo and other officers, or other military personnel have been enrolled.
All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy since approximately 1983 attended the Commando (Ranger) Operations Course at the US Army School of the Americas (USARSA). Specific course descriptions are not available at USMILGP; this information can be obtained from USARSA, Fort Benning, GA. The following individual implicated in the Jesuit case attended the Commando Course:

**ILT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene**. LT Mendoza is not a member of the Atlacatl.

Training was conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. from 28APR - 15JUN88. This course develops leadership skills by requiring students to perform effectively as small unit leaders. Training is in light infantry tactics, airborne, airmobile, and amphibious operations.

All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy from 1970 to 1977 and 1980 to present have attended the The Salvador Cadet Preparation Course at USARSA or the United States Infantry School (USAIS) in one of its five forms which occurred as part of the course evolution during this time periods. These courses are generally to provide military academy cadets with practical knowledge of concepts and fundamentals of military subjects, without regard to their future branch specialization. The five forms are: The Cadet Orientation Course, Combat Arms and Support Service Basic, Officer Preparation Course, Spanish OCS Course, and the El Salvador Cadet Course. Specific data concerning each of these courses is not available at USMILGP. Information may be obtained from USARSA or USAIS, Fort Benning, GA. All Atlacatl officers who are military academy graduates and the majority of those who received commissions after serving as non-commissioned officers received this training.

Three of the four officers implicated in this case attended the Cadet Course.

**ILT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene**
**ILT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo**

Attended the Spanish OCS Course JAN - APR82, conducted at United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

**2LT GUEVARA Cerritos, Gonzalo**

Attended the El Salvador Cadet Course (ESCO) 13JUN - 30SEP88, conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

Selected Company Grade Officers and NCOs attend the Small Unit Training Management Course also conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. Course descriptions are available from that source. The course generally is to prepare individuals to plan, conduct, and manage small unit training. It teaches US Army
persons implicated in this case attended this training:

SGT AVALOS Vargas, Antonio Ramiro
23OCT - 14DEC88

CPL PEREZ Vasquez, Angel
30SEP - 20NDV87

The Special Forces Officer’s Course (SFOD) is the same course US Officers attend. It is given at the Special Warfare Center (SWC), Fort Bragg, NC. The specific course description is not available at USMILGP but can be obtained from SWC, Fort Bragg, NC. Generally the course prepares students to conduct unconventional warfare, Special Forces Operations, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Individuals are trained to serve as an Operational Detachment - Alpha (ODA) Commander. The following officer implicated in this case attended this training from 11NOV88 - 21JAN89:

LT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo

In addition to the training conducted at US Army installations, USMILGP has knowledge of the following additional training activities that involved the BIRI Atlacatl.

The first of these is a Designated Marksman Course supervised by the 1st Brigade Operations, Planning and Assistance, and Training Team (OPATT). The 1st Brigade OPATTs supervised a Designated Marksman Course of three weeks duration given to Atlacatl soldiers, CEBRI Training Center instructors, and to members of the 4 other BIRIs. The purpose of the course was to provide a cadre of instructors to train marksmen capable of obtaining a first round hit with their assigned weapons at 500m. There were approximately 20 students, all enlisted, of which 10 were from the Atlacatl. The course was taught at the Atlacatl Garrison from 06FEB - 25FEB89.

The US Trainers (OPATTs) involved were:

MAJ William Council, a Special Forces Officer with approximately 15 years service.
SFC Robert Jarman, a Special Forces Communications Specialist, length of service unknown.
SFC Melchor Becerra, a Special Forces Weapons Specialist, with approximately 12 years of service.

It should be noted that although these soldiers are all Special Forces qualified they were assigned as trainers to USMILGP and were not there as part of a Special Forces Unit.

The same instructors supervised a Sniper Course from 24APR89 - 20MAY89. This course was given at the Atlacatl Garrison to train personnel for employment as snipers in combat operations. The Atlacatl’s sniper weapon system was used. There were 36 Atlacatl soldiers who received this training.
The names of the Atlacatl soldiers who received this training are:

ADVANCED MARKSMAN COURSE
06-25FEB89

Sgt Edwin Ernesto Rodas Trujillo
Hector Eduardo Escamilla Barrera
Valentin Sergio Martinez Cruz
Agustin Aguilar Hernandez
Antonio Aristides Gomez Cornelio
Luis Francisco Velasquez Hernandez
Pedro Antonio Martinez Cordero
Miguel Angel Molina Renderos
Cpt Miguel Angel Martinez Garcia
Francisco Arriaza Zamora

SNIPER COURSE
24APR-22MAY89

Pvt Ismael Dolores Melgar
Jose Orlando Ventura Velasquez
Raul Rafael Valle
Rolando de Jesus Abarca
Juan Francisco Barrientos Chacon
Jose Luis Tobar Zelada
Benjamin Alcides Funes Chicas
Herbert Walter Guadron Fuente
Fernando Lopez Alfaro
Jose Emilio Cartagena Duenas
Jose Vitelio Maldonado Mejia
Nicolas Garcia Liu
Daniel Fuentes Banos
Daniel Martinez Jacobo
Edgard Oswaldo Palacios
Alberto Quijand Calles
Jose Luis Chavez Ardon
Elías Payes Guzman
Juan Antonio Galvez Arias
Moises Rosales Castellano
Eliseo Flores Mancia
Jose Adan Lievano Siguenza
Miguel Angel Marroquin
Oscar Armando Trigueros
Miguel Angel Escalante
Jose Noe Nunez Avelar
Fermin Alfredo Pineda
Francisco Armando Herrera
Mario Rene Aquino Catata
Sonia Perdomo Lima
Santos Perez Flores
Manuel de Jesus Diaz Lopez
Mario de Jesus Carbajal
Jose Israel Bautista Guzman
Oscar Armando Hernandez
Francisco Medrano Serrano
None of these soldiers are assigned to the Reconnaissance Platoon nor do their names appear among those currently implicated.

The final activity of which USMILGP has records is the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Deployment for Training (DFT) exercise conducted from 10-20 NOV 89. The purpose of this DFT was to test a Special Forces Detachment in their ability to execute their primary special forces mission of training foreign armies. As part of the detachment's evaluation training was given to approximately 150 soldiers from the Atlačatl in order to evaluate the language and teaching skills of the Detachment. The training was stopped because of the 11 NOV 89 Communist offensive in which the Atlačatl was committed to combat on 13 NOV 89. The training conducted from 11-13 NOV 89 was in dismounted Infantry Patrol Techniques, Weapons Training, and day and night practical exercises of these subjects.

The training provided as part of the DFT included:

Organization of Combat Patrols
Duties and Responsibilities of Patrol Members
Military Troop Leading Procedures
Combat Orders
Patrol Base Activities
Immediate Action Drills
Techniques of Fire and Maneuver
Rapid Fire Techniques (Firing without looking through sights)
Preparation or Arms and Equipment for a Patrol
M16 Zero Fire (Procedure to align sight of the M16 to the soldier's view of the target)
Practical Exercise in Combat Orders

The personnel who received the training were:

**COMMANDO SECTION**

1LT  Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Co. Commander
2LT  Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, Section Commander
SGT  Oscar Armando Solorzano Esquivel
      Oscar Rafael Molina Aguilar
      Jose Napoleon Argumedo Gutierrez
      Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas
      Rigoberto Antonio Loarca Penate
      Tomas Zarpate Castillo
CPL  Angel Perez Vasquez
      Marcos Gonzalez Rodriguez
      Santos Cesar Cota Hernandez
      Angel Cearaín Malandrez Ramos
PVT  Angel Rafael Machuca Mendoza
      Angel Chavez Moran
      Baltazar Antonio Sanchez Pineda
      Edwin Leonel Alberto Menjivar
      Hector Antonio Guerrero Maravilla
Ines Orlando Garcia Manjivar
Israel S. Alvarado
Jose A. Joaquin Garcia
Jose Francisco Monterrosa Cortez
Jorge Alberto Sierra Ascencio
Jose Armando Martinez Ramirez
Jose Edgardo Quezada Mendez
Jose Luis Martinez Carpio
Jose Hernando Tadeo Santos
Juan Narciso Sosa Delgado
Jorge Amilcar Reyes Perez
Jose Roberto Hernandez Rochez
Juan Francisco Chicas Aviles
Juan Antonio Gonzalez Torres
Jose Leonel Guzman Rosa
Miguel Angel Martinez Soriano
Miguel Angel Soriano Cornejo
Manuel Oscar Garay Linares
Neftaly Ruiz Ramirez
Noe de Jesus Palma Chamul
Orlando Martinez Dubon
Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi
Oswaldo de Jesus Argueta Alvarez
Oscar Armando Argueta Villatoro
Oudene Oswaldo Ramirez Deleon
Raul Perez Juarez
Rodolfo Armando Escobar Mejia
Rena Zelada Godinez
Rufino Barrientos Ramos
Salvador Alonso Torres Bachez
Victor Antonio Delgado Perez
Ormidez Lopez Diaz
Luis Ernesto Salguero Mendoza

After 14NOV89, the Detachment trained Atiaccatl personnel that remained behind to secure the base, in various subjects. USMILGP does not have a detailed list of the training conducted by the after 13NOV89 nor of what personnel were trained. This information may be available from the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC. Listed below is the information available at USMILGP:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SUBJECT TAUGHT</th>
<th>NO OF PERSONS TRAINED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15NOV89</td>
<td>Communications Training</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons Tng (M16; G-3,FN)</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mortar Tng (81MM and 60MM)</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Map Reading</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Medical Tng</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>16NOV89</td>
<td>Mortar Tng</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Map Reading</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Weapons Tng</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17NOV89</td>
<td>Mortar Tng</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>17NOV89</td>
<td>Mortar Tng</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19NOV89</td>
<td>Mortar Tng</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The personnel that conducted the training were:

CPT David C. Akins, Special Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton D. Read, Special Forces Operations Sergeant
Detachment Operations Sergeant
SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Special Forces Engineer Specialist
Detachment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Bas-Gay, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist
Detachment Intelligence Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist
Detachment Medical Sergeant
SSG Mario Rodriguez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant
SSG Mark L. Alexander, Special Forces Communications Specialist
Detachment Communications Chief
SSG Daniel S. Briley, Special Forces Medical Specialist
Detachment Medical Specialist
SSG Reyes Lopez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist, Detachment
Light Weapons Sergeant.
SSG Randal Whitely, Special Forces Communications Specialist,
Detachment Communications Sergeant.
SSG Laurence J. Cardass, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Specialist
MSG Richard J. McGuinness, Special Forces Operations Sergeant,
Exercise Evaluator.

No other records of US sponsored training is on record at
USMILGP El Salvador.

The length of service of these individuals is not available at
USMILGP.

It is important to note that this was not training for the
Atlicatl but the annual evaluation of the Detachment in its
ability to conduct Foreign Internal Defense training missions.
ISSUE 3: A detailed description of human rights training given: identification of which and how many persons received human rights training.

RESPONSE:

Human rights issues have been and continue to be a central issue in the US military effort in El Salvador. The very presence of US Military Advisors is a reminder to the Salvadoran Armed Forces of the US Government's commitment and insistence on human rights.

Specifically in El Salvador, all officers and NCO's at the CEMFA Basic Training Center for the last three years have received human rights training by instructors from the International Human Rights Commission, and troops since May 88. The material is taught to the approximately 4000 basic trainees trained at CEMFA annually. The US MILGP does not have a lesson plan for the course of instruction with which to provide a detailed description of the course content.

No US trainer is assigned to the Atlacatl; therefore, it is not known what human rights training is given at the Atlacatl. In the past, each BIRI has been responsible for training their own basic trainees. The CEBRI Training Center, which has been operational for approximately a year, teaches Law of Land Warfare. The course of instruction is still undergoing revisions to standardize the training with that given at the CEMFA Training Center. As quickly as the International Human Rights Commission is capable of producing a standardized lesson plan, the exact training given will be available.

Human rights training is an integral part of many training courses conducted at USARSA as well as other US training centers. A detailed description of the human rights training received by Salvadoran students as a result of US training is not available at US MILGP. This information is available from the School of the Americas (USARSA), Fort Benning, GA; the US Army Infantry Center (USAIC), Fort Benning, GA; the US Army Security Assistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA), Quarry Heights, PN; and other US Training Centers. Additionally, information about human rights training given by Mobile Training Teams to El Salvador may be available from the US Army Security Assistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA).

An example of training received at US training center is the Cadet Course (8 courses, one per year) at USARSA which has included a block of instruction in human rights since 1982. All cadets from the Escuela Militar, the Salvadoran military academy, receive this training. Therefore, in effect, almost all Salvadoran officers have received human rights training.
This training is reinforced each time an officer goes to a US School.

**ISSUE:** A general recollection of human rights training during recruitment of McGreg and how such personnel received human rights training.

**RESPONSE:** Human rights issues have been and continue to be a constant issue in the context of the efforts to ensure human rights training and development in the US militia advisors as a reminder of the significance of human rights training for future officers and government personnel.

Specifically in the context of the 2014 and 2016 reports of the CEMA Training Advisory Group, it recommends to the Secretary of Defense to issue a policy on training in the context of human rights. The CEMA Training Advisory Group has recommended some changes, including the inclusion of human rights training in basic training for new officers. The CEMA recommends that the Secretary of Defense issue a policy on training in the context of human rights.

No US officer has received training on human rights. Therefore, in order to know what effect the training has had, it is imperative that US officers receive training on human rights. The CEMA Training Advisory Group has recommended some changes, including the inclusion of human rights training in basic training for new officers. The CEMA recommends that the Secretary of Defense issue a policy on training in the context of human rights.
ISSUE 4: Specific training provided since the beginning of 1988 to Atlatl personnel assigned to the unit involved in the massacre.

RESPONSE:

The 9 February response stated that since 1988 the only training given to the Atlatl was a three-week Designated Marksman Course and a Sniper Course. Both of these courses were taught at the Atlatl garrison. The response also stated that 10 Atlatl soldiers attended the Designated Marksman Course and that approximately 30 attended the Sniper Course. We have since been able to determine the actual number of students for the Sniper Course was 36. The names of these students are:

ADVANCED MARKSMAN COURSE
06-25FEB89

SGT EDWIN ERNESTO RODAS TRUJILLO
HECTOR EDUARDO ESCAMILLA BARRERA
VALENTIN SERGIO MARTINEZ CRUZ
AGUSTIN AGUILAR HERNANDEZ
ANTONIO ARISTIDES GOMEZ CORNELIO
LUIS FRANCISCO VELASQUEZ HERNANDEZ
PEDRO ANTONIO MARTINEZ CORDERO
MIGUEL ANGEL MOLINA RENDEROS
CPT MIGUEL ANGEL GARCIA GARCIA
FRANCISCO ARRIZA ZAMORA

PVT ISMAEL DOLORES MELGAR
JOSE ORLANDO VENTURA VELASQUEZ
RAUL RAFAEL VALLE
ROLANDO DE JESUS ABARCA
JUAN FRANCISCO BARRIENTOS CHACON
JOSE LUIS TOBAR ZELADA
BENJAMIN ALCIDES FUNES CHICAS
HERBERT WALTER QUADRÓN FUENTES
FERNANDO LOPEZ ALFAR
JOSE EMILIO CARTAGENA DUENAS
JOSE VITELIO MALDONADO MEJIA
NICOLAS GARCIA LIU
DANIEL FUENTES BANOS
DANIEL MARTINEZ JACOBO
EDGAR OSMARDO PALACIOS
ALBERTO QUIJANO CALLES
JOSE LUIS CHAVEZ ARDON
ELIAS PAYES GUZMAN
JUAN ANTONIO GALVEZ ARIAS
MOISES ROSALES CASTELLANO
ELISEO FLORES MANCIA
JOSE ADAN LIEVANO SIGUENZA
MIGUEL ANGEL MARROQUIN
OSCAR ARMANDO TRIGUEROS

SNIPER COURSE
24APR-22MAY89
None of the students are assigned to the unit involved in the Jesuit killings and none of their names appear on the list of the soldiers implicated in this incident.

The US Trainers involved were:

MAJ William Council, a Special Forces Officer with approximately 15 years service.
SFC Robert Jarman, a Special Forces Communications Specialist, length of service unknown.
SFC Melchor Becana, a Special Forces Weapons Specialist, with approximately 12 years of service.

As previously stated, USMILGP has no record of any other training given to the Atlacatl by USMILGP sponsored trainers. The Atlacatl did participate in the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Deployment for Training (DFT) exercise beginning on 11NOV89, which was an exercise evaluating the Special Forces Detachment's ability to perform its primary mission of training foreign armies. As part of the evaluation of the Detachment, members of the Atlacatl, to include those implicated in this case, received two days of training in dismounted infantry patrolling techniques before the Atlacatl was sent into combat during the communist offensive. Listed below are the general topics covered prior to the Atlacatl's departure to combat operations on 13NOV89:

Organization of Combat Patrols
Duties and Responsibilities of Patrol Members
Military Troop Leading Procedures
Combat Orders
Patrol Base Activities
Immediate Action Drills
Techniques of Fire and Maneuver
Rapid Fire Techniques (Firing without looking through sights)
Preparation of Arms and Equipment for a Patrol
M16 Zero Fire (Procedure to align sight of the M16 to soldier view of target)
Practical Exercise in Combat Orders

The following is a list of personnel implicated in the Jesuit killings:

MIGUEL ANGEL ESCALANTE
JOSE NOE NUNEZ AVELAR
FERMIN ALFREDO PINEDA
FRANCISCO ARMANDO HERRERA
MARIO RENE AQUINO CATATA
SONIA PERDOMO LIMA
SANTOS PEREZ FLORES
MANUEL DE JESUS DIAZ LOPEZ
MARIO DE JESUS CARBAJAL
JOSE ISRAEL BAUTISTA GUZMAN
OSCAR ARMANDO HERNANDEZ
FRANCISCO MEDRANO SERRANO
# Commando Section

**1LT** Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Co. Commander

**2LT** Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, Section Commander

**SGT** Oscar Armando Solorzano Esquivel
Oscar Rafael Molina Aguilar
Jose Napoleon Argumedo Gutierrez
Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas
Rigoberto Antonio Loarca Penate
Tomas Zarpate Castillo

**CPL** Angel Perez Vasquez
Marcos Gonzalez Rodriguez
Santos Cesar Cota Hernandez
Angel Cermin Melendez Ramos

**PVT** Angel Rafael Machuca Mendoza
Angel Chavez Moran
Baltazar Antonio Sanchez Pineda
Edwin Leonel Alberto Menjivar
Hector Antonio Guerrero Maravilla
Ines Orlando Garcia Menjivar
Israel S. Alvarado
Jose A. Joaquin Garcia
Jose Francisco Monterrosa Cortez
Jorge Alberto Sierra Ascencio
Jose Armando Martinez Ramirez
Jose Edgardo Quezada Mendez
Jose Luis Martinez Carpino
Jose Hernand Tadeo Santos
Juan Narciso Sosa Delgado
Jorge Amilcar Reyes Perez
Jose Roberto Hernandez Rochez
Juan Francisco Chicas Aviles
Juan Antonio Gonzalez Torres
Jose Leonel Guzman Rosa
Miguel Angel Martinez Soriano
Miguel Angel Soriano Cornejo
Manuel Oscar Galay Linares
Neftaly Ruiz Ramirez
Noe de Jesus Palma Chamul
Orlando Martinez Dubon
Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi
Oswaldo de Jesus Argueta Alvarez
Oscar Armando Argeuta Villatoro
Odume Oswaldo Ramirez Deleon
Raul Perez Juarez
Rodolfo Armando Escobar Mejia
Rene Zelada Godinez
Rufino Barrientos Ramos
Salvador Alonso Torres Bachez
Victor Antonio Delgado Perez
Ormidez Lopez Diaz
Luis Ernesto Salguero Mendoza
The following is a list of the personnel who conducted the training:

CPT David C. Akins, Special Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton D. Read, Special Forces Operations Sergeant
Detachment Operations Sergeant
SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Special Forces Engineer Specialist
Detachment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Bas-Gay, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist
Detachment Intelligence Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist
Detachment Medical Sergeant
SSG Mario Rodriguez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant
SSG Mark L. Alexander, Special Forces Communications Specialist
Detachment Communications Chief
SSG Daviel S. Briley, Special Forces Medical Specialist
Detachment Medical Specialist
SSG Reyes Lopez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist, Detachment
Light Weapons Sergeant
SSG Randal Whitely, Special Forces Communications Specialist
Detachment Communications Sergeant
SSG Lauranca J. Cardass, Special Forces Medical Specialist
Detachment Medical Specialist
MSG Richard J. McGuinness, Special Forces Operations Sergeant,
Exercise Evaluator.

Personnel trained with IMET and FMS funds are identified at
USMILGP by name only. The names of all personnel implicated in
this case have been cross referenced with all available USMILGP
training records. The following has been determined.

All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy since
approximately 1983 attended the Commando (Ranger) Operations
Course. This course is taught as a single course of instruction
and is also an integral part of the Salvadoran Cadet Course.
Specific course descriptions are not available at USMILGP. This
information can be obtained from the United States Army School
of the Americas (USARSA). Though not a member of the Atlaocatl,
the following individual implicated in this case attended the
Commando Course:

ILT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene

Training was conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. from 2BAPR
-15JUN88. As stated earlier this course develops leadership
skills by requiring students to perform effectively as small
unit leaders. Training is in light infantry tactics, airborne,
airmobile, and amphibious operations.

All graduates from the Salvadoran Military Academy from 1970 to
1983 attended the Salvadoran Cadet
Preparation Course in one of its five forms which occurred as part of the course evaluation during this time period. These courses are generally to provide military academy cadets with practical knowledge of concepts and fundamentals of military subjects, without regard to their future branch specialization. The names of the Cadet Course have been: Cadet Orientation Course, Combat Arms and Support Service Basic Officer Preparation Course Specific, Spanish OCS Course, and the El Salvador Cadet Course. Specific data concerning each of these courses is not available at USMILGP. Information may be obtained from USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

Three of the four officers implicated in this case attended the Cadet Course.

ILT MENDOZA Vallecillos, Yusshy Rene
ILT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo

Attended the Spanish OCS Course JAN - APR82, conducted at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

2LT GUEVARA Carritos, Gonzalo

Attended the El Salvador Cadet Course (ESCC) 13JUN - 30SEP88, conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

Selected company grade officers and NCO’s attend the Small Unit Training Management Course, also conducted at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga. A course description is available from that source. Generally, the course is to prepare individuals to plan, conduct, and manage small unit training. It teaches US Army training doctrine, principles, and techniques. The following persons implicated in this case attended this training:

SGT AVALOS Vargas, Antonio Ramiro
23OCT - 14DEC88

CPT PEREZ Vasquez, Angel
30SEP - 20NOV87

The Special Forces Officer’s Course (SFOC) is the same course US Officers attend. It is given at the Special Warfare Center (SWC), Fort Bragg, NC. Specific course descriptions are not available at USMILGP but can be obtained from SWC, Fort Bragg, NC. Generally the course prepares students to conduct unconventional warfare, Special Forces Operations, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Individuals are trained to serve as an Operational Detachment - Alpha (ODA) Commander. The individual implicated in this case who attended this training is:

ILT ESPINOZA Guerra, Jose Ricardo
1NOV88 - 21JAN89

Since 29APR88 we have located only two individuals from the Atlacatl who have been trained at a location where a US Advisor
is assigned to support training. The two individuals were trained as actors. The training’s purpose was in how to put on "Skits" at civic actions. Students were trained in how to put on clown acts for children at Government and Army sponsored civic actions to aid the people of conflictive areas.

TL Menosha Valettica, Russ Rende
TL Embrinoa Guerara, Joey Rondo

Attended the officer's course Jan - Apr 88, conducted at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.

2LT Guaira Center, Ontario

Attended the 2nd Officer's Center Course (EECC) Jan - Nov 88.

2nd Officer's Center, conducted at Fort Benning, GA.

Special Unit Training Management Center located at Fort Benning.

Subject Generaliz is to prepare us to be leaders in the Army.

2LT Avaros Verge, Antonio Ramirez

2nd Lt. Verge, Antonio

2nd Lt. Verge, Antonio

2nd Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio

2ND Lt. Verge, Antonio
ISSUE 5: Information on all US training of military personnel charged in the massacre.

RESPONSE:

Members of the Atlacatl charged in the Jesuit killings have received the following training from the United States:

COL Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, no US training on record at USMILGP El Salvador.

LT Yusshy Rene Mendoza Vallecillos, Salvadoran QCS Course JAN - APR82 given at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. and the Commando Course 28APR - 15JUN88, given at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

LT Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Salvadoran QCS Course JAN - APR82 given at US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. and the Special Forces Officer's Course 11NOV88 - 21JAN89, given at Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC.

2LT Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, El Salvador Cadet Course 13JUN - 30SEP88 given at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

SGT Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas, Small Unit Training Management 30SEP - 14DEC88.

CPL Angel Perez Vasquez, Small Unit Training Management, 30SEP - 20NOV87. The Small Unit Training Management course is given at USARSA, Fort Benning, Ga.

The following individuals implicated in the case in question participated in 2 days of the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Deployment For Training (DFT) exercise from 11 - 13NOV89:

1LT Jose Ricardo Espinoza Guerra, Co. Commander
2LT Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, Section Commander
SGT Oscar Armando Solorzano Esquivel
    Oscar Rafael Molina Aguilar
    Jose Napoleon Argumedo Gutierrez
    Antonio Ramiro Avalos Vargas
    Rigoberto Antonio Loarca Penate
    Tomas Zarpata Castillo
CPL Angel Perez Vasquez
    Marcos Gonzalez Rodriguez
    Santos Cesar Cota Hernandez
    Angel Cerafin Melendez Ramos
PVT Angel Rafael Machuca Mendoza
    Angel Chavez Moran
    Baltazar Antonio Sanchez Pineda
    Edwin Leonel Alberto Menjivar
    Hector Antonio Guerrero Maravilla
Ines Orlando Garcia Menjivar
Israel S. Alvarado
Jose A. Joaquin Garcia
Jose Francisco Monterrosa Cortez
Jorge Alberto Sierra Ascencio
Jose Armando Martinez Ramirez
Jose Edgardo Quezada Mendez
Jose Luis Martinez Carpio
Jose Hernando Tadeo Santos
Juan Narciso Sosa Delgado
Jorge Amilcar Reyes Perez
Jose Roberto Hernandez Rochez
Juan Francisco Chicas Avilas
Juan Antonio Gonzalez Torres
Jose Leonel Guzman Rosa
Miguel Angel Martinez Soriano
Miguel Angel Soriano Cornejo
Manuel Oscar Garay Linares
Neftaly Ruiz Ramirez
Noe de Jesus Palma Chamul
Orlando Martinez Dubon
Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi
Oswaldo de Jesus Argueta Alvarez
Oscar Armando Argueta Villatoro
Odume Oswaldo Ramirez Deleon
Raul Perez Juarez
Rodolfo Armando Escobar Mejia
Rene Zelada Godinez
Rufino Barrientos Ramos
Salvador Alonso Torres Bachez
Victor Antonio Delgado Perez
Ormidez Lopez Diaz
Luis Ernesto Salguero Mendoza

The following is a list of the personnel who conducted the training:

CPT David C. Akins, Special Forces Officer, Detachment Commander
MSG Elton D. Read, Special Forces Operations Sergeant,
Detachment Operations Sergeant
SFC Marcus L. Woodward, Special Forces Engineer Specialist,
Detachment Engineer Sergeant
SFC Miguel L. Jaramillo, Special Forces Weapons Specialist
Detachment Heavy Weapons Sergeant
SFC Elmer Bas-Gay, Special Forces Intelligence Specialist,
Detachment Intelligence Sergeant
SSG James L. Marcus, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Sergeant
SSG Mario Rodriguez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist,
Detachment Light Weapons Sergeant
SSG Mark L. Alexander, Special Forces Communications Specialist.
Detachment Communications Chief
SSG Daviel S. Briley, Special Forces Medical Specialist.
Detachment Medical Specialist
SSG Reyes Lopez, Special Forces Weapons Specialist, Detachment
Light Weapons Sergeant.
SSG Randal Whitley, Special Forces Communications Specialist,
Detachment Communications Sergeant.
SSG Laurence J. Cardass, Special Forces Medical Specialist,
Detachment Medical Specialist
MSG Richard J. McGuinness, Special Forces Operations Sergeant,
Exercise Evaluator.

USMILGP has no other record of US training being received by
individuals implicated in the Jesuit killings.