



Oral History Interview of William Shaevel (OH-017)

Moakley Archive and Institute

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Oral History Interview of William H. Shaevel

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Interviewed by: Robert Allison, Suffolk University History Professor and Joseph McEttrick, Suffolk University Law School Professor

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Interview Summary

William H. Shaevel, former Moakley State Senate staffer from 1967 through 1970, Moakley's law partner and current treasurer of the Moakley Charitable Foundation, recalls his time working with Congressman Moakley. The interview covers important state legislation that Moakley helped pass; Moakley's private law practice; the political environment in South Boston; Moakley's political campaigns; and the relationship between Congressman Moakley and his staff. He concludes with the personal impact Congressman Moakley had on his career and life.

Subject Headings

Boston Harbor Islands (Mass.)

Busing for school integration

Housing policy -- Massachusetts

Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law

Moakley, John Joseph, 1927-2001

Political Campaigns

Shaevel, William H., 1941-



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This interview took place at the Moakley Archive and Institute, Suffolk University Law School,
120 Tremont Street, Boston MA, on Wednesday October 1, 2003

Interview Transcript

(tape starts with the in-progress discussion of how
Mr. Shaevel, a Ford Foundation intern, met Mr. Moakley)

WILLIAM H. SHAEVEL, ESQ.: —and since state legislators didn't have staff—didn't have professional staff.

PROFESSOR JOSEPH P. McETTRICK: Especially in the House [Massachusetts State House of Representatives], because that's when they had the big House, right? The 240 members?

SHAEVEL: Yes, the 240 members in the House.

McETTRICK: They had nothing.

SHAEVEL: And even the Senate, you would have four senators in one office and they would have a court officer. But the court officer was the one who ran the—not demeaning them, they were important people—but they basically ran errands and didn't get involved with policy. So they [the Ford Foundation] paid the salary of four people per state, and they did it for four years, hoping that the legislatures would improve that.

And I arrived in '67, the height of the sixties. And I arrived there armed with my little certificate. They were going to pay me four thousand bucks. And I arrive at the Speaker's office, and the Speaker doesn't know what to do with us. He forgot we were coming, which is typical of this; it was a relatively new program. So in a moment of brilliance he said, "I want two of you to go over to the Senate." And he sent me and this very attractive, intelligent, sophisticated, mini-skirted woman with me.

And we went over to the Senate, and we go up. Maurice Donahue,¹ I think—his soul rest in peace—but a terrific leader, was there. And the Senate, you know, is now a semicircle. They call him down from the bimmer(?) [see below for explanation], and the aide from the House says, “The Speaker is sending over two of these Ford Foundation interns. Remember, we talked to you about it last week?”

And Maurice says, “What the hell do you want me to do with them?” And the aide says, “Well, you were going to get two, and we were going to get two.” And Maurice says, “I’m not touching them with a ten-foot pole.” And you’re standing there in the well of the Senate. (laughs) So he goes around and he asked twelve senators, and he just starts from—it was his side, if he’s on what we call the bimmer(?), the stage that’s on the left-hand side. There were two or three, one from Dorchester Center, Senator Kenneally,² a couple of liberals. Nobody wanted to take us on in that.

And the story has a relevance to Moakley, because it’s just clearly what he was. One senator says, “I don’t want staff. You got to talk to them; they’re a pain in the neck.” And another one says, “I don’t know where they’re from. I don’t want anybody in my office like that.” And it’s that kind of discussion, like “Oh, come on.”

We come to Moakley and Donahue says, “The Ford Foundation,” or whatever. Moakley shrugs his shoulders: “Yeah? It doesn’t come out of my budget?” “No, they’re paying the salary.” He says, “Why not?” And then he has to choose between this woman and myself. And I was kind of a schlumpy guy, and a little bit overweight maybe or whatever, and he has to choose between me and this good-looking woman. He never admitted it, but I think I got my first job based upon discrimination. (laughs) I think that his political sense was that he was afraid to take her—he wouldn’t admit it—but he was afraid to take a good-looking, mini-skirted woman because people would talk.

¹ Maurice A. Donahue (1917-1998) served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1948 to 1950, then in the Massachusetts Senate from 1950 to 1971. He served as Senate Majority Leader from 1958 to 1964 and as Senate President from 1964 to 1971.

² George V. Kenneally, Jr. (1929-1999) represented Boston’s Dorchester neighborhood in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1956 to 1963, then in the Massachusetts Senate from 1963 to 1971.

But it was a match made in heaven. It was just—he had been in the Senate about three years. And just his attitude, his shrug. And you went in there, and I was ready for changing the world. I'd been armed for it. And he was chairman of the Joint Committee on Legislative Affairs. I walked in there and he had a wonderful—he had a court officer. He shared the office with two other senators. They had a partition; you heard every conversation that ever went on in there and so there were literally no secrets, and I think that's why the others were afraid to do that. It was wonderful.

And I think you may have some questions, but I wrote out last night some of the points that I wanted to cover. And that is really his state house career, because I'm not sure you're getting a lot—

McETTRICK: Well, why don't you go with what you brought us, and why don't we talk about the subjects that you raise?

PROFESSOR ROBERT ALLISON: Yeah, we want to hear about the state house and—

McETTRICK: And then we can go back for it later. We'd like to be as spontaneous as possible. Why don't you just tell us; what was it like? What happened?

SHAEVEL: This was—I had talked a little bit about being raised, literally, in Boston in the Jewish ghetto. And so the Irish world to me was really strange. I mean, I had been through law school and I had gotten over being in the ghetto, but there was a mystery to this Irish political world. And the mark of the guy was—I mean, we're here and—there wasn't a prejudiced bone in the guy's body. I had moved from Blue Hill Avenue in Dorchester to Newton. I was a young Newton Jewish lawyer. And I brought, like all of us, the good of that and the bad of it in terms of my heritage. And he just accepted it; accepted it all.

And as the—he was in the Senate for three years when I was with him. And in his most private moments, I never heard him use a racial or an ethnic slur. Black people were “black people,”

they weren't something else. In some issues they may have needed some assistance, but it was never that they were fundamentally different or whatever, but situations had created it. The Irish versus the Italian—I always thought—he is half-Italian; his mother was Italian. And I think that being raised in Southie [South Boston], which is not as monolithic Irish as most people think, I honestly believe that it gave him a perception of a piece of the minority. And then that made him sensitive, maybe innately or even consciously, to the sense that there was a diversity amongst people, and he would be interested in it.

And so he kind of embraced me in that way. And I would watch—it was the whole gamut. And I just walked in there, and his management style was, “Here, go do it!” And you figure out how to do it, because he was good at the politics but not at the details. And you brought him an idea, and he was so receptive to it.

But he had the Boston political delegation, at that point when I looked at it, was made up of people like Senator Bulger³—President Bulger was the rep at that time; Michael Flaherty [Sr.], who's now the judge in BMC [Boston Municipal Court]. And Joe came from South Boston, but there was a fellow named George Kenneally.

And I came to understand that the South Boston mental concept was very much like a minority. They were as much of a minority as the Jewish. They felt inferior. There were the Irish in Quincy and Scituate; everybody had more money. And the South Boston Irish were the poor cousins, and they felt that way. They talked about themselves—it was not that they weren't competent, but I think the positive piece of it was that it brought to them a lot of humility. I, as an outsider, could really recognize that.

The negative aspect was that they were provincial. And I didn't see that as much as—there was something that bound them, like what keeps the Jews, as a minority, together, remembering their heritage. I think the geographic and the economics created this whole concept, “Southie's my

³ William M. Bulger (1934-) served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1961 to 1969, then in the Massachusetts Senate from 1970 to 1996. He served as Senate President from 1978 to 1996. He then served as president of the University of Massachusetts from 1996 to 2003.

hometown.” It had a lot of positive aspects. He represented that. He had a terrific humility. He would—you could argue with him. He had a voracious appetite to learn.

We had just seen a picture from El Salvador. You would get these calls and you would make an appointment, and someone would come in to talk about something. And he would sit there and be interested, even if they were off the wall. Afterwards, he would comment. He had a terrific street-smartness, and this was—I transferred because I spent a little bit of time in his law office, also. And after a year of being with him in the state house, I started working evenings and weekends. I would work in his law office, and then when he lost his run for Congress, I spent some time.

But in the state house, he always wanted to be a congressman. And the president, the governor, the mayor, none of that. It was McCormack.⁴ And McCormack was kind of an idol for him and he had come from the same stuff. And, “That’s where I want to be.” And he viewed the way to get there as—he viewed politics, I think, in maybe two or three vantage points: one was there was power, and that made him feel good as others. It was clearly that aligned with the power was, “I can do some good. I can get somebody a job, I can move the bureaucracy, and do it. It might be for socially redeeming value or just maybe because it’s your friend.”

And it was really a kind of—you can’t dissect the guy and say he was just altruistic to the core, because he was complicated like any human being, and he had lots of this reasoning stuff going on. But I just remember the experiences in the state house. We were there, and we were able to do about five things in the two, two and a half years that we were there.

The first was Boston Harbor Islands. They were owned by a mish-mash of people and although Studds⁵ eventually got some federal funding, Joe was able to put through [state] legislation that basically started the core of the creation of those Harbor Islands as governmental entities. It kind

⁴ John W. McCormack (1891-1980), a South Boston Democrat, represented Massachusetts’ Twelfth and, after redistricting, Ninth Congressional Districts in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1928 to 1971. He served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1962 to 1971.

⁵ Gerry Eastman Studds (1937-2006), a Democrat, represented Massachusetts’ Twelfth and, after redistricting, Tenth Congressional Districts in the United States House of Representatives from 1973 to 1997.

of stopped the privatization. And we had a Boston Harbor Commission, and legislation came out of that.

Another thing he was able to do was what we call retaliatory evictions. That was that—the landlord had all the cards in evictions, and if the tenant complained about anything, you could evict him. And the real estate industry was not excited about this particular proposal. But what it basically said was if a tenant has a bitch and communicates it to the landlord—whether it's bad sanitary conditions, whether it's lights or whatever—and you then get evicted, and you can prove the proximity of time, that it's in retaliation, that is a valid defense to eviction.

And it really came out of his—but you've heard a lot about his public housing, and he talked about the landlord there. Everybody walked around and they were afraid of saying anything to the manager, even if the manager was abusive. Because this was public housing, where were you going to find the units? That kind of stuff.

So there was a humility there, and a legal aide came in with the idea, and he was open. Like, “You make a phone call, I pick it up, because I'm the issues guy.” And I said, “Well, I'll see if I can get you an appointment with the senator.” And I said, “They want to come in and talk to you about it.” “That doesn't sound like a bad idea.”

And there were three other interns who would do this, and nobody had the access that I had. And you can say, well maybe I had some more skills. Maybe I did; maybe I didn't. But I had a guy who's so receptive to doing the right thing. And there's a Yiddish phrase, *al beshon*(?). And you'll hear me say that, because it's “his soul rest in peace” kind of stuff.

Now he was open because it was the right thing to do, but he also saw it as aggrandizing his reputation, making him a better politician. It was self-interest for the right reasons. And it was a wonderful combination and I think that's why he's really been able to do it. And so we put through retaliatory eviction. It was not a popular concept then.

The third thing we were able to do—and it’s still very, very controversial now—we called it snob zoning, but it’s called the comprehensive permit. And it was the concept that most of the low-income housing was in cities. And if you wanted to move to Newton or if you wanted to move to Weston, or wherever, you usually ran up against large-acreage zoning. Or you just ran against prohibitions for multi-family housing.

And so the legislature in their ultimate wisdom—this was really a legislative-pushed issue as opposed to the executive—had done a commissioned study with their legislative research arm, and they said, Zoning is keeping people out of the suburbs. And that’s contributing to bad schools, and the disparity of racial and ethnic and economic—

So it was not my idea, it was another group; Citizen Housing and Planning and a couple of others came to us with the concept of overriding local zoning. And Joe—there was a fellow who did not do well eventually, but Joe loved him. It was a guy named Marty Linsky.⁶

McETTRICK: Oh, I know Marty, sure.

SHAEVEL: Another Jewish kid, from Brookline. And Dukakis⁷ and him were the two state reps at the time. And Marty was one of those rarities, a Jewish Republican from Brookline, and with just a big heart and terrific skills, and Joe loved him. And the issue came before our Urban Affairs Committee. Joe was chairman of the [Joint] Legislative Committee on Urban Affairs, which included—in the state it’s the House and Senate together. And so this issue came in, and Marty kind of started to work on it.

And we had a subcommittee formed, a great group of people. There was a fellow named David Lederman(?), incidentally—and you’ll excuse me for being ethnic, but he was also Jewish—but again, it didn’t matter to Joe—and he was from Malden. And there were a couple of others.

⁶ Marty Linsky is an adjunct lecturer in public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He co-founded Cambridge Leadership Associates, a leadership consulting, training and coaching practice, and served as Assistant Minority Leader of the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

⁷ Michael S. Dukakis (1933-), a Democrat, served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1962 to 1970, then as governor of Massachusetts from 1975 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1991. He was the Democratic presidential nominee in 1988, but lost the presidential election to Republic George H.W. Bush.

This was a group of very young, idealistic state reps, and Moakley was the chairman. And he had to figure out how to relate to these kids, and still have power.

And so at one point, because the party didn't mean anything or whatever, he appointed Marty Linsky chairman of this subcommittee to work on this concept. And eventually we realized that he was a Republican, (laughs) so we had to put Lederman in, I think as chair, and put Marty in as sub-chair or vice chair, because how could you—but I mean, it was like it didn't [matter] to him. Marty had good ideas and could relate. But basically, Marty—and Lederman came from Malden, so it was an urban environment—but Marty and Dukakis and others who were what we call the managerial Democrats in the sixties, the liberals, said, Yes, we want affordable housing in the suburbs. And Moakley got together the Boston delegation, and the Springfield, and the others because you could never get that statute enacted. I mean, our problem is now to keep it.

McETTRICK: Yeah, what happened? Why did that coalition splinter, would you say? And what were the conditions that caused this to really happen? Well, you had mentioned some of the names. But as you said, today it's a different environment. What changed?

SHAEVEL: I think the country—I think the concept—there was a large suburban managerial class that still believed in the social compact; it was part of the sixties. And my assessment of now is that the social compact is broken in the suburbs. You can call it X Generation, you can call it whatever it is. But they don't see their role as curing societal needs.

But all that said, they still—they had tinkered around with what we call the comprehensive permit. But the legislature hasn't gotten a majority yet together to repeal it. And it's building a lot of housing, and it's finally ruffling some feathers. They're tweaking it a little bit, which is not a bad move.

But I think it was—nationally, we believed in the sixties that one, you could cure problems; and two, that government was the proper vehicle to be the catalyst. And I think in the late nineties and the two thousands, people believe the government's role is limited, the capacity of the

government to cure is limited, and they don't believe—I mean, I talk to younger people, Steve's⁸ generation. They don't believe in the social compact as strongly as we did.

McETRICK: Where do you think Joe Moakley was in that spectrum? If you spoke of people who believe in the social compact, or saw government in a particular mode, what was—I mean, Joe was very pragmatic. But if you managed to catch him and ask him about this, what do you think his response would have been? Where would he have placed himself?

SHAEVEL: He was a wonderful mixture of idealism and pragmatism, I think. When you talk pragmatism—and we'll talk about another couple of instances of where his pragmatism always brought him to the right place. So he would approach it—he was not an ideologue. He could get angry if it wasn't fair, but he was so political that there was very little that you couldn't compromise or that you couldn't negotiate.

So I think in terms of my discussions with him is, it's not fair. It's not fair to the individual, and it's also not fair to Boston. Boston has its obligations to take and provide affordable housing, but if someone wants to live in Newton, why shouldn't they? And not being derogatory, I'd like to get some of the lower-income people into the suburbs, so it doesn't cost us as much. So you've got the pragmatism of, "It's good to get them off of Boston's problem," and the idealism of, "It's not fair to keep people out, just based upon that."

And this was a guy who—I mean, he had a style about him, he dressed very nicely. He always liked large cars; they made him feel good. Always managed to negotiate a deal; he never used money absolutely frivolously, but he was very generous. And it wasn't like—I mean, he had a summer place in Scituate and he had a very nice house in Southie, right down the street, of course, from Louise Day Hicks.⁹

⁸ Mr. Shaevel is referring to Steve Kalarites, oral history project coordinator for the Moakley Archive and Institute.

⁹ Louise Day Hicks (1916-2003), a Democrat, served on the Boston School Committee from 1962 to 1967 (serving as chairman from 1963 to 1965), ran unsuccessfully for the mayoralty of Boston in 1967 and in 1971, and served on the Boston City Council before being elected to the United States House of Representatives in 1970, representing Massachusetts Ninth Congressional District. It was in the 1970 election that Moakley lost his first bid for Congress, in part because Hicks was an outspoken critic of forced busing in Boston, which helped her gain support in South Boston. Moakley defeated Hicks in the 1972 congressional election when he ran as an Independent so he wouldn't have to run against Hicks in the Democratic primary.

But part of this idealism-pragmatism—we were running against Louise Day Hicks. And she got up and she said something that had a kind of racial connotation to it. And he turned to me and he said, “That son of a bitch. She’s not a racist; she’s an opportunist. And that’s worse,” he says. “She doesn’t believe what she’s saying, she’s just using it to push her there.” So in one hand, he was not a racist and he understood the negativeness of racism. And the other hand, the pragmatist, “That son of a bitch is an opportunist,” and that made him even angrier. (laughs)

And so he served for a while on the Boston Common Garage¹⁰—and I think Jim Linnehan,¹¹ who’s been chairman of the trustees, who was an A.G. [attorney general] on that.

McETTRICK: That was the probe into the construction of the Common Garage?

SHAEVEL: And Jim had a tremendous responsibility, and did some wonderful things there. But I think it formed both Joe and Jim in many ways, in terms of their outlook.

McETTRICK: Now this wasn’t the Ward Commission; was that something else? Because that looked at contracting more generally, but was this a different outfit?

SHAEVEL: Right. I’m not positive, because it was before my time, before he had arrived. And he came away from it, in terms of the corruption, as angry but pragmatic. I mean, [he said,] “There will always be corruption,” and it is always here, but you got to put in four or five safeguards. And he was also a kid, you know, who was kind of raised on the street, and not taking anything from South Boston, but there’s a real competition there.

But getting back to this—and I’m going to talk a little bit, because it is an important story. This comprehensive permit, if he didn’t pull it together—he was able to go to a lot of senators and basically say, “This bill makes sense.” Senators who were resistant to it; other urban ones who

¹⁰ The “garage case” was an investigation into charges of corruption and graft during the building of the Boston Common underground parking garage. The garage was completed in 1961 and an investigation of the financial practices of the Massachusetts Parking Authority and other involved parties began in 1962.

¹¹ James F. Linnehan, Sr., was a classmate and close friend of Moakley’s and is a member of Suffolk University’s board of trustees. OH-065 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Mr. Linnehan.

didn't have the breadth of it. Because local control—whether it be schools, zoning, police—are etched in the Constitution, but also etched in our mindset. Nobody wants to surrender this control to the state kind of stuff.

And I don't remember individual conversations, but I remember moments when we he'd pull someone in, and he'd say—and ultimately this was Joe. If we couldn't convince him on the merits, he'd say, "I need this."

I remember sitting with another thing we got through. The Public Housing [now the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development] was one of the largest slumlords in the state. And the interesting part is that we can sit here in 2003, and we're talking about the same problems that we talked about in 1967. But I maintain it's better. We have a lot more affordable housing units than we had in '67, but we don't have enough. Public housing, a lot of it is in disrepair but it's still a lot better than—

This was right before Judge [Paul] Garrity, I think somewhere in the seventies, ordered Boston Housing [Authority] into receivership. But this was before it. We all knew that there were a lot of problems, and he was a guy who had come from it. And so there was a fifteen million dollar bond issue for state public housing. The Feds had enough money, and those developments were kept nice because you could get Fed money. But there was no money for the state ones. And Boston has this collection of state- and federal-financed housing in there.

And so we were in with Blackie Burke—his soul rest in peace—and Blackie says, "No way am I giving out"—he was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.

McETTRICK: And he was from where? From Brockton, was he?

SHAEVEL: Brockton, right. "No way am I going to sign on to that! Have you been through those projects? Those people live like"—you know, like goodness knows. And I'm sitting there biting my tongue, right? And so Joe says to him, "Blackie, you're right. The conditions are so

bad and we've got to do something. It's our obligation to do it." And then he played his trump card: "You know, I came from public housing, I know what it's like."

Blackie says, "Joe, this is my job, to say no. I'm Ways and Means chair." You know, words of those impute—and I'm probably glorifying it a little bit, but basically, "No way you're getting this through!" And so Joe turned to him and he said, "Blackie, I've done you a hell of a lot of favors. You're doing this for me."

And, "Well, if you put it in those terms! But I'm telling you, those people, they'll never thank you for this! Those liberals!" And he says, "Blackie, you're right." And then we walk out and I said, "Joe, I'm going through the roof! Does he always—is that guy a racist?" Because this is the sixties and anybody over thirty is a "Fascist." And he puts his arm on me. "Relax, he's really a nice guy. You just have to find the key to how to get to—"

But he had this ability to get things done, and he did that with the snob zoning. He never wanted much credit. And I think it's important—I mean, I was trying to decide how open I am, or not-open I am. And I decided in the terms of posterity—on the snob zoning, the comprehensive permit—politically he became a congressman, he's now representing all the suburbs, and so on. And never that he dwindled in his support of the comprehensive permit, but, "Do we need to push it so hard? I mean, I've got other accomplishments." And that was the politician or the pragmatic.

Joe would not—I don't know if he came to some issue that was so cool that he would go commit political suicide. After being with him and understanding, I'd like to believe that. But believe me, before he would commit political suicide, he would have thought of some way where he didn't have to idealistically do this, that there'd be some pragmatic way around it, where he maintained his integrity and got the right thing done, but then committed—and that was, I think, his value as a politician where he wasn't so ideologue—

McETTRICK: I didn't want to break your thought, but just to keep the historical record in perspective: when you spoke of Judge Garrity, you meant Paul Garrity from the Housing Court, that was dealing with the Boston Housing [Authority]?

SHAEVEL: Right, as opposed to Judge [W. Arthur] Garrity from Wellesley or something.

McETTRICK: Right, okay. And we should also ask you—because I know you want to continue, and I didn't let you to get to four and five yet, but just so we had kind of a core idea: if you could just tell us just a little bit about your own background in school and in college, and then you spoke of law school. If you could just tell us where you went, before you got to the state house, just so we have the whole picture?

SHAEVEL: Right. And actually I had spoken to Bob [Professor Allison] on the way up. I'm a Jewish kid who was born on Morton and Blue Hill Avenue, which was what we called Ward Fourteen in Dorchester. And it was a terrific neighborhood, but it was a ghetto. Everybody knew everybody else's business. South Boston would be surprised to see that when you reproduce the humanity and the neighborhood-ness and the provincialism, that these Boston neighborhoods were wonderful. The three-deckers, and how everybody was together, and they knew it.

And so I was there till probably age fifteen. And then my folks did part of what we called the migration, and they moved about five miles out to the suburbs, quote-unquote, which is Newton. And so I started high school in [Boston] Latin School, and then I moved on to Newton High School. And then I went on—I was thinking of being a history professor.

But given there was an entrepreneurial spirit to me, and so law seemed like a terrific compromise between teaching, and it also seemed like a good social tool. So I went on and got my law degree from New England School of Law, but we called it Portia at that time. We were up on Beacon Hill right near Suffolk at that time, a very small school. Oh, do we have a distinguished alumni. Everybody had a story at school, and I loved the place.

McETTRICK: Now did you go at night or day?

SHAEVEL: I went days, but it was such a small school, we had the ability to—I was the librarian. And there's a story behind the story. It was a small school and it was right in the area of the state house, but I actually never saw the state house. But when I graduated, the Ford Foundation had been offering, and we discussed it. And so I had gotten that, and Joe was my first job out of law school.

And I worked for him in the state house for three years, and then he ran for Congress. And if he had been elected, I would have gone on to Washington with him. But he didn't, and so I then was involved in the city council fight. And at that point, I went over and I was the only Jewish lawyer in South Boston. And I was there for a period of about seven years. It was wonderful.

McETTRICK: Now this was in South Boston, in the [Moakley's] law office?

SHAEVEL: In South Boston, at 149 Dorchester Street. Our office was right opposite the premier funeral home, called O'Brien's. And it was a brownstone, and Joe had bought it, and had fixed it up. It was really not in the center of town, and so I arrived there and I said, "Joe, maybe we ought to move up to the center of town right near the courthouse, because that has all the dignity." And it was partly his view of the law versus the politics. The law provided a living; the politics was really what he was about.

He said, "Are you kidding me? (laughs) This is right opposite the most popular funeral home. I can get down there, in for the wake, in and out." And then he says, "You know, when they're having the funeral, the shingle is right out there." He said, "No way am I moving!" And it was cute, but he was right.

And the law practice was one that we had a partner, Dan Healy, who had run for city council from Dorchester and lost badly. And himself and I would work—until we lost the first election, I would work evenings and nights over there. But half our clientele didn't pay. It was because they had held a sign, they had done "Dear Friend" cards. Everybody had a story. And who

worried about overhead? It was the age of the tort. Like motor vehicle accidents were still very popular, and Joe had a major criminal practice. And Bulger, actually, had one also; he was a good criminal lawyer.

So I came in, and half my stuff would be pro bono because somebody had done us a political favor. And although Joe drove a nice car and dressed well, the money was never it for him. He did alright; it was enough. He didn't need to be wealthy.

And it was such a great way. We would walk in, a neighborhood law office. You didn't know what would walk in the door on Monday. You just didn't. There would be from the gamut of divorces to motor vehicle accidents, to criminal stuff. He had a great ability in the courtroom, and the fact that he knew the police and he knew all the judges.

His judge up in Southie was a Judge Linnehan; I don't think he was related to Jim. But his theory in life was, he had been a state rep, and as a state rep, people would come to him for a job. He'd say to them, "You sent me here to legislate, not get a job." And Judge Linnehan never gave us an inch. If the guy was guilty, he was guilty; if he was innocent or that kind of stuff—in fact, in civil cases, he was a wonderful—great integrity. And the other judge—

McETTRICK: Joe Feeney?

SHAEVEL: Joe Feeney, yes. Joe Feeney was a little more colorful than Judge Linnehan, a little more pragmatic.

ALLISON: He was a Special Justice.

McETTRICK: That's right, that was the year of the Special Justice over there.

SHAEVEL: That's right.

McETTRICK: They could sit on civil cases—no, they heard criminal cases, but could practice civil. That was the deal.

SHAEVEL: I used to take all of my civil cases and file them in Dorchester, because Judge Linnehan would be fairer to the other lawyers. And one day he said to me, “Lad,” he said, “you know, I never see you and Moakley in here with civil cases. You’re always in with criminal.” And I said, “Oh, I’m going to tell you the truth, Your Honor. You don’t treat me fairly. You’re always worried about somebody from the town whatever.” And he said, “Well, you know, we need to maintain appearances, and the law is impartial.” And I said, “We”—meaning Joe and I— “respect you for that, Your Honor. We just get a better deal down the street.” (laughs)

McETTRICK: I don’t want to break your flow too much, but you had mentioned Mike Dukakis awhile ago, and then you mentioned tort reform, no-fault and so forth. You were in the state house with Joe when that came through, right?

SHAEVEL: Yes.

McETTRICK: Is there anything that you could tell us about that? Because that must have been an awful lot of pressure on lawyers who had the neighborhood practices where the automobile tort was a big use of the practice.

SHAEVEL: Joe really respected Dukakis, and I saw that a number of times. He thought Dukakis was idealistic, but he loved his enthusiasm. And Dukakis, I think, changed over time, became warmer, more sensitive. And then my stories about Dukakis—oh, how hard I worked for him in certain things, and never really got a slap on the back, where you would get it from Joe. But I think Dukakis changed.

But during that period, Dukakis was still one of the young Turks. And they had some—I’m not answering your question, but I think it’s important. Dukakis would come to Joe for advice, and they would talk through the politics of it, and I had always appreciated that. And again, here is

someone he should not have related to, and he would help Dukakis get stuff through, that Dukakis would be interested in but couldn't get through. And there was an openness.

I think the tort reform was Joe's pragmatism. I didn't see him oppose it. I don't think he was excited about it, but I think he knew its time had come. And what I learned from him in terms of the politics and the momentum: there's this time for things, and good politicians recognize the time for change has come.

So I think he probably had a lot of friends in the tort business. And I don't know if he voted against tort reform, but I do know that he didn't try very hard to defeat it. And I think he just—it was a shrug, you know, "its time has come."

McETTRICK: You had a number of other issues that you wanted to talk about.

SHAEVEL: Sure.

McETTRICK: You knew him so well on your own, I didn't want to get in the way.

SHAEVEL: Because Steve and I discussed it also. Well, in the two and a half years, in terms of—I think that what he did, was he picked up on a lot of terrific issues, and when it came time to run for Congress in 1970, he felt confident—I mean, it wasn't just that "I'm from South Boston and I have an Irish name." But it was his ability to get these things done and sign on.

So we talked about snob zoning, we talked about Boston Harbor Islands. Even environmentally, he put through an anti-toxin dumping in Boston Harbor where, as we now know, it was just a garbage pool. And he got it outlawed in the late sixties, and recognized that. In '68¹² there was an Earth Day in Harvard. And because of many of the things he had been involved with, a state senator from South Boston got invited to speak with everybody who had long hair and everything else.

¹² The first Earth Day actually took place at Harvard University on April 22, 1970.

McETTRICK: That must have been a scene. (laughs)

SHAEVEL: Oh, it was a scene. He loved it! He loved it. I remember one weekend during the antiwar protests. And Joe didn't fully understand that. I mean, we all know about his World War II record. And Southie viewed—in terms of the monolithic viewpoint, they were very patriotic about the war for a long time.

And so it was the end of a week and he hadn't shaved. And he didn't feel like shaving that week, and it was a Wednesday afternoon. He put on this seersucker rain hat or something and a dirty jacket, and just went off to Harvard Square. There was a demonstration, and he didn't want me to go with him, like an ambassador or anything. “No, no, I want to go, I want to listen. I want to”—I mean, can you ask anything more from an elected person, to [say,] “I want to see what's going on with these kids and their passion?”

I remember there was one thing that came before our committee. And though Joe publicly never supported abortion—he would not admit to me, but I don't know if he really believed, in the sense that government should get involved, and that he had to stick with personal choice. But he was very conflicted, like a lot of Irish Catholic politicians, to the personal choice versus the moral piece of it.

But I remember being in committee and we had a bill that had to do with population control. And the House Chair was very angry at it, and started to really get angry to the people who were coming to that. And Joe leaned over to him and he said to him, “George, relax. Overpopulation is part of the problem of this world. I mean, these other countries that have it, they can't feed their people,” and so on. And he calmed him down. But for him to have this perspective—

McETTRICK: Who was that gentleman?

SHAEVEL: He was a nice guy. It was a guy named George Breck(?) from Quincy.

McETTRICK: Oh yeah, okay.

SHAEVEL: A nice enough man, but just in terms of what's narrow or important—and we're talking about somebody else with the same background as Joe—Irish Catholic, coming from Quincy, which was just a richer South Boston in some respects—but couldn't see it, and Joe could.

So he went in and reorganized the MDC [Metropolitan District Commission]. And I still remember this: we were working on it, and the issue became the dollars and cents, what we should pay the MDC commissioner. And the MDC has always been political, and I think they've now abolished it or something. But it was a great experiment in regionalization. And so John Sears, who served on the city council, was the chairman of the MDC. And in those days when you did this legislation, it wasn't like the budget office, and they figured out what people are going to be paid; we put in the amount.

And so I said to Joe, "How much?" He says, "Why don't you call John and discuss it with him?" I said, "Maybe you should talk to him about it?" And he says, "That's too heavy-handed. You call him." And so Sears says, "You're asking me?" I said, "Yeah, that's what Joe said." "All right," and he was kind of like taken aback. And at the end of the conversation, I think Sears said to me, "You sure you got authority to do this?" And I said, "Joe thought it would be politically wiser if you and I talked, and it wouldn't be heavy-handed." He said, "You know, I had good instincts about that guy." But it was a prime example.

But we reorganized it, and Marty Linsky played a big role in it also, in terms of it. The MDC sold the water to the cities and towns, and the cities and towns marked it up 100 percent. And so we had done a study: the cities and a lot of towns are killing their users. So I came up with this great thing of getting more money from the MDC. It made sense and we put it in; got lots of controversy. And Marty Linsky came in and helped work it out with us in terms of Joe was looking bad. It was my naïveté that had done it, because everybody in the cities and towns, it was big profit to them. But it was kind of him being involved.

So I talked about the snob zoning, the Boston Harbor Islands, retaliatory eviction, renovating public housing. There was the Mass Housing Finance agency, which was really a Dukakis managerial issue; they had a word for that as Democrats.

McETTRICK: Was this Representative Buckley?

SHAEVEL: It may have been.

END OF TRACK 1

TRACK 2

(interview picks up during conversation)

SHAEVEL: —that was in contributors; very irrelevant. When he got up there in what I call more of the big time, I'm sure that you cannot know what people give and not give. But it was always irrelevant to him, and I think he was supportive of campaign finance. Like most politicians, he hated raising money. He hated it.

ALLISON: Now how much would it cost to run for State Senate? What were we talking about?

SHAEVEL: The State Senate probably wasn't large dollars for those times. He basically ran unopposed, but maybe in those years, I would say it was ten thousand or fifteen thousand dollars. But that was a lot of money in '67. And our first congressional fight cost us probably 150,000 dollars. Later on, even though we didn't have large competition, we spent a million bucks.

McETTRICK: Bill, can you tell us a little about that interval? The period of time where Joe lost the first race, and then went to city council—I guess there was a two-year term in there someplace—and then came back again in '72. Could you describe what that was like, and the decision to go again and kind of rethink in 1970, and sort of recasting the whole approach, and

trying to knit together the minority groups and so forth? What was that all like, after post-'70, when he went forward from there?

SHAEVEL: And I'll answer that question. But I just want to say, the other major thing that Joe was involved with, the rent control. He was able to—and he didn't believe it was an end-all and it should be there forever, but one of the other things that he really pushed through when he was there. But you can understand, and I think the newspapers and the press stuff about losing the election. He was crushed.

And it wasn't the first time he had lost. And I'd like to talk a little bit about those there. But it is so personal. And then, if this is what you are about and this has been your dream, to be the congressman. He had no doubt when McCormack said he wasn't running. He didn't have to think about it; he was in the race. And so he just was like a duck out of water. I mean, he had this law office to go back to, but some of the spark in his eye, his gait, all the other stuff changed. And it wasn't that he didn't have a busy practice, but it was, "So what are we going to do?" from day one.

And I think there was a fellow who was important to him, his court officer, Roger Kineavy,¹³ who was a very, very nice man, and he was one of the grassroots guys. And then I continued at the state house when he lost, and it wasn't any fun. I got assigned to somebody else who just—the guy didn't have the breadth, the excitement, and so I went over to the law office full-time. And so it was very, very exciting. Again, half the people weren't—but he was a duck out of water, and he was always plotting about how he could get back, how he could "get Louise [Day Hicks]."

And so the strategy was to really get back into the city council, because when we started his first congressional fight—congressional districts, regarding the senate—fifteen percent of the people knew him; that was the poll. And it's a wonderful story, too, because the guy is so famous and has done so well. But Jack Connors, he hired Jack—Hill Holliday—as our ad agency. And it was a wonderful mesh of personalities in terms of Jack and himself.

¹³ Roger Kineavy volunteered for Moakley's early campaigns and served as his district director from 1973 to 1994.

But he was really a duck out of the water. I remember a lot of people came to him. Like the real estate industry came to him and said, “Why don’t you represent us at the state house?” And he said to me, “How can I do that?” And I said, “Well, we know housing issues,” and that kind of stuff. “I’ve got to change all my positions! I can’t do that! Where’s my credibility?” So “credibility” meant “politically looks bad,” but at the same time he was striking to his core essence. He would never admit it, that he had values, I mean a real core sense of integrity as opposed to being pragmatic. It was always this wonderful blend of it.

And so there was that, and I’m trying to think; there was another—I remember somebody called me and wanted me to rep—that they were having a hearing on UMass Boston that had gone into—such a shame in terms of building that wonderful campus. And somebody had called me about assisting the lawyer who was going to represent Governor Peabody¹⁴ and a couple of other people. And Joe said, “No, don’t take it.” And I said, “Why? It’s a good opportunity.” “You’re going to get your fingers dirty.” I mean, who knows what went on there.

And it was such good, practical sense. Clients would come in, and they’d want him and he’d say, “No.” And I’d say to him, “We haven’t been doing that great this week. Everything I’m working on is for no fee.” (laughs) And he’d say, “Bill, if you don’t pick your clients in a law practice, you’re going to get killed.” And his sense of it—if a person was a little bit of a rogue, it wouldn’t bother him. Someone would come in and they’d be a little bit roguish and I’d say to him, “You told me that we’re supposed to pick and choose. And do you really think we ought to be working for this guy?” He says, “Yeah.” I said, “Well, he’s a little bit roguery.” He says, “This guy *says* he’s a rogue. He has a sense of integrity; he knows what he is, he’s up-front about it. I can deal with that personality. I can’t deal with somebody else.” And once again, the pragmatism.

I mean, if the guy was really like this—but he wasn’t long. He devised the strategy of, “Well, I got to get out there. If only 15 percent of the people knew me, I’ve got to get out there and run for council.” But I remember, he hadn’t decided to run for city council, but we devised this

¹⁴ Endicott Peabody (1920-1997) served as governor of Massachusetts from 1963 to 1965.

strategy that he would stay interested in the issues. So there was some attack against rent control, and a bill in the legislature. And so we did up a speech, and I went with him, and we were going to testify.

And under the rules, when you're a senator you get heard right away in the state house hearings. But if you're not a senator, even though you're a previous senator, you don't get that legislative courtesy. I think he thought he was going to get it, but he didn't this year. And so we were near the end. Well, Cardinal Medeiros¹⁵ was being inaugurated, and he wanted to go. And I said, "How can you go? We've worked so hard, and we're going to get press on this," and so on. And so I appealed to him, and he stayed.

And so we go running down, and the Cardinal is already in the church in the South End. And if he didn't know the police officers, we never would have gone through the barrier. And Evelyn¹⁶—*al benshon* (?)—was standing in the rear of the church. And she reamed into both of us. (laughs) And they had a relatively honest relationship there. "Joe Moakley, you son of a bitch! How can you—I'm here, and how many times are they inaugurated there?" And then she looked at me; I think she was saying, "And what do you know about this?" (laughs) And I said, "Well Evelyn, he was testifying at the hearing," and so on. And the way she went, "Politics!"

But he still managed the ultimate, always winded up—he somehow managed to sit behind [Senator Edward] Kennedy, and that's where the pictures were taken. So the next day, who's on the front page of the *[Boston] Globe* but Kennedy, and to his left in the next row is Moakley. And so having learned from the master, I said, "Thank you." He said, "Why am I thanking you?" "If I didn't make you late, do you think you would have been sitting behind Kennedy?"

McETRICK: That's nice; that's a nice vignette.

¹⁵ Humberto Sousa Cardinal Medeiros (1915-1983), a Roman Catholic cardinal, was appointed Archbishop of Boston on September 8, 1970, then appointed a cardinal on March 5, 1973.

¹⁶ Evelyn (Duffy) Moakley (1927-1996) was Congressman Moakley's wife. They married in 1957.

SHAEVEL: But it was that kind of thing where he went back to the grassroots. The city council was not an easy fight, because the senate had been a confined district. We had him out, Roger and I—

McETTRICK: And this one, you had to win at large then, right? Everybody was at-large?

SHAEVEL: That's right, everybody was at-large. Louise had even been a city councilor. And I think he topped the ticket, is my recollection, and Roger was really responsible. I like to think that I helped, even with my not being grown up on this. I provided the issues, and he was so open to it, I could be the coach. I could say to him, "Hey, that speech was horrible, You've got to do this." I mean, there was a very open relationship. He was so attainable, and he used to say to me, "You wait! Your day will come! You think it's easy to sit here!"

And it wasn't. When I ran for city council, the first day I went to go door-to-door—and it's a good story—with Joe. I bang on the door and this fellow says to me—I tell him I'm running for all the men in Newton, and I'd like his support. And he says, "We're trying to build some elderly housing down the street. What's your position on it?" And I said, "Well sir, Newton has got a lot of people who are aging, and they want options so they could sell their houses and move on. And so we really have a deficit, so that's needed. But on the other hand, we're a single-family neighborhood, and we need to build buildings that don't dwarf the—," and he takes the door and he slams it right in my face.

And so, my first call! So I follow up, and I call up "Dad" Moakley and I said, "Oh, Jesus. I mean, what did I do wrong? I was discussing the issue." He says, "Bill, he doesn't want a discussion of the issues. He wants to know where you stand. And he doesn't want you to take forever to say it!" He says, "You liberals! You want to look at this, and that, and so on. You're for it or against it, and tell him how you feel. And if he can't accept it, move on to the next person. And you're not going to get everybody to love you." And of course, he was absolutely right. And the guy just wanted to know, was I for it or against it?

ALLISON: Right. How did you do?

SHAEVEL: With great pride and a little bit of arrogance, it was a four-person fight. And to get a majority when four people are running, I achieved percent of the vote.

McETTRICK: Not bad!

SHAEVEL: And so I feel terrific, and in my own precinct, I was like five hundred, and the next person at seventy-five. But it was all the people stuff. I had been present, and I just learned to—Moakley had a theory that you're nice to the people on the way up, because guaranteed, you're going to see them on the way down. Wow! And so, as a lawyer you go into the clerk's office. "I don't know what I'm doing," and they continually help you. You go in there and you act like you know it all, you're going to get the bureaucratic resistance. And he was up there, and then when he lost, he had lots of friends that really came to him.

McETTRICK: So that was '71 then, for the Council?

SHAEVEL: Right, and the council was terrific because it was mundane. I mean, in some ways he would have been doing a city councilor job because he lost it—they touch like in no other place, I think. They touch their state and even federal people as much as they touch their city councilors. So I could be sitting in his law office at two o'clock in the morning, and I'd get a call on the sewer being blocked up, because it was Moakley's office and somebody wanted to do it. And so yeah, at two o'clock in the morning what we did was call down to the Public Works. We had the emergency line, and we would get them service. So the city council wasn't a lot different.

I'm trying to remember who was mayor—

McETTRICK: In '71?

SHAEVEL: Yeah, in '71 it was—

McETTRICK: Oh, I'd say that's Kevin White,¹⁷ yeah,

ALLISON: It was Kevin White.

McETTRICK: Because '67, I think, was his first election and those were four-year terms, so White would have been on his second term, for '71.

ALLISON: Right, '71.

SHAEVEL: And I mean, Joe was torn between Louise in '67 and White. And this was before the animosity, and Louise was from the neighborhood. And Joe recognized really even then who she was. So the wonderful thing was, he found a position that was a state senator from Jamaica Plain running. So he didn't have to wrap up Louise; didn't have to be disloyal to Southie.

McETTRICK: Was that Steve Davenport?

SHAEVEL: Yeah, it may have been something like that, I'm trying to—but he supported that, and the guy didn't have a prayer and a chance. And I said to him, “You know, that guy doesn't have a prayer and a chance.” He says, “He's been my friend in the Senate for ten years.” And you heard this thing about loyalty, but it's this blend of idealism, loyalty, with this pragmatism. “I can go support him; I don't have to choose between Louise and the next”—I'm trying to think.

But his relationship with White, I had the impression, was a good one. It had been complicated when he ran for Congress the first time. Maurice Donahue had been president of the Senate, and Maurice was running for governor. And at the convention, Joe believed in not going to state conventions because all you do is make enemies. And he was right. I think most congressmen now, you talk to them, they don't want to get involved in the state issues. And even as the state senator, he tried to stay away from the conventions. But he felt as if White was the mayor of Boston at that point, and so he supported White over Donahue, who I think got over it but was

¹⁷ Kevin White (1929-), a Democrat, served as mayor of Boston from 1968 to 1984. He ran unsuccessfully for governor of Massachusetts in 1970.

angry. And because of that, I think that some of the state senators did not break their back for Joe in the congressional fight.

McETTRICK: That's right. White got the Democratic nomination, but then lost in November, right?

SHAEVEL: That's right. Dukakis was his lieutenant governor.

McETTRICK: That's right.

SHAEVEL: And in some ways, that was a political decision. I don't think Joe was excited about it. He made it out of pragmatism and it may have cost him some votes, but I think he lost that '70 election mostly because it was a three-person fight, and Louise Day Hicks could always win in a multi-person. The good thing I can see is, as an outsider from Boston, was you never had a majority of haters in this city. They wouldn't give her a majority; she could never get it. She could get a percent, but she couldn't—and that's why White was able to beat her each time.

McETTRICK: So then that really takes you into the dynamics of '72, sort of the second time around.

SHAEVEL: Seventy-two, where Senator [Robert] Cauley from West Roxbury is redistricted. It's time to redistrict, and he creates a district that has a suburban quality added to it. Because he's—

McETTRICK: Oh, so the nature of the district changed from the '72 election, okay.

SHAEVEL: Yes.

McETTRICK: So that was important.

SHAEVEL: That's right, because before that it was a large part of Boston and Dedham, and that was it. And I'm trying to think of Westwood or not; I believe not. So Cauley goes out and takes West Roxbury, picks up Westwood, which was in his senatorial district; goes out to Norwood, Needham, Walpole, Canton. He pushed the district really out.

And the real reason we lost the '70, even though, was that Judge David Nelson¹⁸ had been in the fight, and he had basically only gotten five thousand votes. And Joe had lost by five thousand votes. And so he had taken the liberal faction and Louise got her forty percent, and we're not talking about large numbers even then—sixty percent—so she might have gotten—whatever the numbers were, Nelson was a major, major factor in it.

So we now come to '72. Cauley is chairman of the Redistricting Committee; he's a state senator, nice man. He wants to be congressman. So he creates a district that will give him a better shot at it than Louise. And we take a look at it, and there are four or five Democrats running. And so it's failure; he's going to lose. I mean, it's just basically there.

There was a fellow—and a prime example of how we could acquire people—a young guy who's twenty-four years of age, Pat McCarthy from California, “stricken with the politics.”

McETTRICK: And he ran for Congress, himself.

SHAEVEL: He ran for Congress twice, against Blackie Burke or somebody.

McETTRICK: No, it was Jim Burke¹⁹, the incumbent.

SHAEVEL: Right. He comes into our group and he wants to work with us. He says, “I think we could try doing the City Council, or something.” And he was very dynamic; he could drive you crazy. But he had an ability that I do not have. I was very humble in my youth.

¹⁸ David S. Nelson (1933-1998) was the first African American to serve as a judge of a federal court in Boston. He was appointed to the position in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter.

¹⁹ James Anthony Burke (1910-1983) served in the Massachusetts State House of Representatives from 1959-1979.

And some people were terrific strategists, and Joe was a good one. He could see around the corner; he could understand that. And I think politicians are terrific at strategy. They can see, “You take this action, and what impact will that have? And then that will have another impact.” And getting in your mind, it’s almost like playing chess three times, is hard.

So Joe was sitting there saying, “Well, there’s no way.” And Pat says, “Yeah, there’s no way, so run as an Independent!” And so I’m not giving Joe credit for the idea, but what I’m giving Joe credit for is I got this twenty-five year old kid who came in. I thought he was great, he had good ideas, and I’m pushing him to be part of it. And Joe’s not saying to me, “Oh my God, what am I, taking some kid from California, wet behind his ears.” He could see the value in human beings, and this kid had about as much in common with Roger Kineavy. And he was very caustic in terms of his personality, but he was brilliant. I fired him twice and he wouldn’t stay fired, because he became the campaign manager in ’72.

McETTRICK: Patrick Henry Hall McCarthy.

SHAEVEL: That’s right, Patrick Henry Hall McCarthy. And he tried twice, and then he went on. He was in news casting, I think he practices law in Philadelphia or something, but a very interesting—

And Joe collected these people and could understand the value of them. Jim McGovern was a wonderful staff person. And you can say that Jim was responsible for El Salvador, or you could say Joe used staff people. He came up with the concept, gave it to Jim, and Jim developed it, and he supported Jim in the right way, and that was—Joe was a generalist, not a specific—

McETTRICK: So were you surprised with the ’72 outcome? I mean, at what happened?

SHAEVEL: Well the ’72 I thought was—it took a long while to convince Joe. He could see there, but you know, and “Oh my God.” And then there was like a little—there was always a

piece of contrarian in the '70 election, or something, because we supported Lindsay²⁰ for president.

ALLISON: In '72, yeah.

SHAEVEL: In '72, Lindsay for President.

McETTRICK: Wow.

SHAEVEL: He said, “The guy is interesting.” I say, “He doesn’t have a prayer.” “It doesn’t matter to me, he’s interesting.” (laughter) And so Joe was city councilor in '71. And so Lindsay had no urban support outside of New York City. He said, “I’ve listened to him, I’ve seen him a couple of times, I was at some affair where he spoke, I like him.” And so we went off to support him, and we worked hard. I don’t think he ever got our state’s nomination.

But there was a contrarian piece of him. And so I think down deep, as much as he’s talking about “Oh God, I’m leaving the Democratic party to run,” I think he was a—(laughter)—I mean, there was a piece of him that was a little bit of devilishness. He liked to take on the bureaucracy.

McETTRICK: He was “off the reservation.” (laughter)

SHAEVEL: “Off the reservation:” “out of the box” we would call it in 2003. But in Boston circles it was a creative thing to do. And it was a very, very lively campaign. We were not great at fundraising. Jack Connors was terrific to us, I remember. And Jack Connors didn’t have a track record, and we took him in '70.

And I remember the story that convinced Joe. It was my job to find an ad agency, so you know what you do, you call around, and we brought in three people to talk. And Jack Connors had this

²⁰ John Vliet Lindsay (1921-2000), first a Republican and later a Democrat, represented New York’s Seventeenth Congressional District in the United States House of Representatives from 1959 to 1965, when he resigned to become mayor of New York City. He held that position until 1973. After changing his party affiliation to Democrat in 1971, he ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972.

story about this young agency, and he had just been trying to woo an account in Philadelphia. So the guy's hesitation was that he was in Philadelphia, and it would take him awhile to get—you know, too far away. And so the next time the guy called for the next interview, Connors chartered an airline and brought down twenty of his people, and was down there in like four hours, to prove to the guy he could do it.

And then Connors was telling us this story and he gets the account. And Joe just—it was a wonderful story, you know, it's what advertising people do, and so on. And I said, "You do realize that the guy doesn't have political experience," because there were other more established ad agencies. He said, "I got the right vibes about this kid. He'll do alright," and he did.

He developed a terrific—"The Urban Fighter," I think, was us. And he was our ad agency all the way through, and they developed a wonderful relationship. And Jack Connors is probably one of the more important—and indeed, you could always call. We called Jack for advice and it was very, very mutual, and they'd pick up the phone and talk to each other. And Jack's got some wonderful, wonderful stories about that.

So it was—strategically we had no other choice; otherwise don't run, because—and the election proved it. Louise won the nomination; Bob Cauley sent Joe a note saying—the note was very cryptic, as he lost. He said, "Joe, you were right." That was after Joe ran, I guess, maybe—no, it was after the primary and before Joe did that. And it was Cauley's district that gave it to us, because—and Nelson was gone, and I think the election results are there.

But Joe came out of Roxbury, out of the black wards with a ten thousand plurality. Louise came out of the white precincts with an eleven thousand or twelve thousand plurality. Adding—and I don't mean to demean Dedham or Norwood—but they were very conservative towns. She beat him in Dedham, she beat him in Norwood. But he beat her in Needham, he beat her in Westwood, he beat her in Walpole, he beat her in Canton. And when you add those up, she came out of Boston maybe with a one thousand plurality. And he got five thousand plurality in the suburbs and that offset—and he always understood that the black community had basically helped elect him; always did. But he was never uncomfortable with that.

McETTRICK: I don't want to hold you forever, but one thing we haven't talked about, and I guess probably ought to get into just a little bit, was the impact of the busing environment on Joe in your office and the difficulties that the people went through. Because I mean, he told us himself what an awful situation it was to be in, in South Boston, with his neighbors. Could you just tell us a little bit about how that looked from your foxhole, as you were going through it?

SHAEVEL: I basically understood it, and the conflict was really the two parts of his personality, if I could analyze it. "This was my neighborhood, these were my people, these were my friends," on the one hand. On the other hand, deep down—and busing was an awful solution; it was like rent control, where it's a massive solution to get at a few bad apples. On the other hand, here was a people that he understood needed some help, understood the prejudice, and that understood—and Joe was able to do this. He was a state rep—before, I mean, he was much more provincial; he became a senator and his horizons expanded, and he became a congressman. And I maintain that he was like that, Bulger was like that, and not all, but many of the urban Democrats were able to— I mean, they're true Democrats; they expand to meet their district.

And so he was just—I'm not sure how much he's disclosed, but he was depressed; it was awful. I mean, there were days when he didn't—and this conflict, he took it so deeply and so personally that he didn't want to do much. And he would talk to me, "Duh-dah, duh-dah," and that kind of stuff. And I don't think we would have recognized it as clinical depression, but we're now talking about twenty years later. And I don't think he thought busing was right, but he had to choose between whether he would lead the stuff in the street, and whether he would stand on the sideline.

And I think he absolutely stood on the sideline during busing. He didn't support it but he didn't oppose it, and by standing on the sideline—I know that during the busing crisis, it was awful. I mean, I was in the law office and there was a policeman on every corner. And for me, as an outsider—it changed the personalities; people were not gracious, because everybody was so angry. And ultimately I left South Boston because I could not get people from Dorchester or

West Roxbury to come to my office. And I was doing a discrimination practice, and so I couldn't get minorities to come down; it was dangerous.

But mostly with people, it was a wonderful community. I'm just doing an aside, because I think I need to—being the only Jewish lawyer in South Boston, we would get people in. “Mrs. McGillicuddy” was a prime example. It would happen once in awhile, she would owe Jordan's. And she would be being harassed by what I would call an obsolete, older lawyer market that was dominated by—God bless them—Jewish lawyers. And they were not ethical. I mean, they would just harass these people, but they came out of a culture where that was done.

And so “Mrs. O'Leary” would come in to me in Southie and she'd say, “Joe told me to see you, and that Jew-bastard downtown is—and I can't afford it,” or whatever. And so I'd listen to her plight, and then I'd finish and I'd say, “Mrs. O'Leary, I want you to go home, and I want you to stop losing sleep, because I'm going to worry about it. And what you need is a young Jewish lawyer to play havoc. To hell with that Jew-bastard downtown!” And I said, “You're lucky, because you're in the only Jewish law office in South Boston.” (laughter)

And “Mrs. McGillicuddy” would just say, “Oh my God, Shaevel, I didn't—” and she didn't mean it in a racist way.

McETTRICK: Right, right. (laughter)

SHAEVEL: She would— you know, I'd get Italians, and she could as much hate Jews as— I mean, most of these “Mrs. O'Learys” were wonderful women, or whatever. And so I mean, and it was wonderful. I would call up the guy and I'd say, “You son of a bitch, you're giving us a bad name down here!” And I said, “Besides that, you know what you're doing is unethical. If you ever call that woman again—first of all, you're going to call me— if you ever call her at night, you're going to the Bar! You hear me?” And, “Oh, Bill, I'm sorry,” and so on. But they were unethical, I mean, they truly were.

But it was a wonderful community. What I'm trying to say is that busing had a racist quality to it, but it really had more a provincialism in the sense that, "We're minorities, and we're getting stiffed!" Sure, I mean, I'd be naïve to not say that there were—and this was the wonderful part about Joe. After I got off the Ford Grant, I got the General Counsel to the Urban Affairs Committee. "What are you giving this Jewish guy a job for? You know, it's not going to do you any good." And I know those comments came in, and he would say no to them.

And a large portion of—there were some people in Southie who were clearly racist, and they didn't have much contact with black people anyway. But there was much more peace; I mean, anybody who calls them—or Dershowitz;²¹ I get so angry at him because he pushed at Bulger, and he says, "Bulger is an anti-Semite!" Bullshit Bulger is an anti-Semite. Bulger is a provincial guy with strong beliefs, and with a very, very big heart, and that's unfair.

And then people say that Southie is—they produced a terrific brand of politicians, much more than—and I don't mean to minimize the ones that came from Newton. But in Southie, when a seat opens up, ten people run because that's the aspiration. In Newton, three people run, two, because the aspiration is not to be governor of this state; the aspiration is to be a doctor or lawyer, or something else. And so—not to minimize any of the people that are representing my town; they've got good people—but the competition to get elected [is different].

And Steve Lynch, I don't agree with all of his positions—and he took a terrific beating in his campaign—but I think he's going to be a gifted politician. And I thought Bulger was gifted, in terms of—I think the Irish have a calling for this; it's just, it's almost innate. And this is the age of the Italian politician. The mayor [Thomas M. Menino] is Italian, [former Massachusetts State Senate President Robert] Travaglini. Taking nothing away from the Italians, the Tip O'Neills, the JFKs, the Moakleys, the Bulgers—that's why I want to be Irish and Liberal in my second life! (laughs)

²¹ Alan Dershowitz (1938-) is an American political commentator, lawyer and author. He has taught at Harvard Law School since 1964.

ALLISON: Well in your office you have a picture taken of you and Joe Moakley when you were in the state house. You told us a story about that, one of those years.

SHAEVEL: Oh, right. I'd been there about six months or so and I was still on the Ford Foundation, so he hadn't made his choice for me yet, or whatever. He says, "How would you like to take a picture of me and you?" "Oh, Senator, oh, I would love that!" and so on. So we take the picture and afterwards he says, "I think we should send it off to *The Jewish Advocate*." And I said, "Excuse me?" I was still very naïve. He said, "It'll be nice for my image."
(laughter)

So we sent it off, "Senator Joe Moakley has appointed Bill Shavael, General Counsel. Bill Shaevel's parents are William and Lee Shaevel, Newton, Massachusetts." And so, I mean he was doing the right thing, but he was always—you know, I'd like to drop on my face that kind of stuff. Never done maliciously. Never, never done maliciously.

You know the story about how he ran for office? He'd come back on the streetcar, there was a whole group of them, and Bulger talks about the hand cards and everything else. I don't think Joe was as politically oriented to that. I think he had lots of friends and was popular, and there was going to be a vacancy. And one guy says—and they're young; he was only twenty-two or twenty-three—"Joe, you ought to run." "You think that's a good idea?" They're on the streetcar! "Yeah, I think you can do it!" And so he did, and he was like the second-youngest guy elected. And it was on a whim, as the story goes. And the last they knew—

I got enough time, but do you guys?

ALLISON: No, I do.

SHAEVEL: There was just the sense that he was in the House. And I wasn't with him, but I understand he was very successful. He moved up to be whip. And there was a guy called Iron Hand—

McETTRICK: Oh, the Iron Duke?

SHAEVEL: Yeah, Iron Duke Thompson.

McETTRICK: John Thompson.²²

SHAEVEL: John Thompson, who ran the House. And we think—who’s the guy, Finneran²³— is heavy-handed. Finneran is genteel in comparison to what I think Thompson—Thompson is the kind of guy, if he didn’t like a bill, he called up the chairman and he said, “Rip it up!” and you were expected to rip it up.

McETTRICK: Oh, he was legendary.

SHAEVEL: Legendary. And I think Joe just didn’t like working for him and so he said, “I got to get out of the House.” And he thought that Powers²⁴ was going to be a little bit vulnerable, but I think it was mostly driven by the fact that his political sense is, “I don’t want to stay here. This guy is not a good guy to work for, it’s not a good environment. This is not why I got elected.” And part of his motivation, running for the Senate, and he got killed!

McETTRICK: That was a tough race.

SHAEVEL: Yeah, a tough race.

ALLISON: Now Evelyn didn’t like politics.

(interruption—Professor McEttrick gets up to leave)

²² John Thompson (1920-1965), a Democrat, served in the Massachusetts State House of Representatives from 1948 to 1964. He served as Speaker of the House from 1957 to 1964.

²³ Thomas Finneran (1950-), a Democrat, served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1979 to 2004. He served as Speaker of the House from 1996 to 2004.

²⁴ John E. Powers (1910-1998), a Democrat, represented South Boston in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1939 to 1946 and in the Massachusetts State Senate from 1947 to 1964. He served as Senate President from 1959 to 1964.

SHAEVEL: A pleasure meeting you, Professor.

McETTRICK: A great opportunity, you're a great person to talk to.

SHAEVEL: Well, thank you.

McETTRICK: We can have another round.

SHAEVEL: Sure, if you'd like to, and I thank you for doing this, and continuing the interest.

McETTRICK: Okay, thank you, bye-bye.

ALLISON: Well Evelyn, she didn't like politics.

SHAEVEL: No, she didn't. She was a very, very attractive woman but she was very private. There were a lot of political wives, and it is a major burden for women to be. There was always a competition between his public life and meeting her needs, and I think he tried very hard to balance it. But I don't think she ever really—in fact, I know she never really loved the public part of it. And I've met a lot of women, including—even when I ran for office, my wife was supportive but she wasn't excited about it.

And think about it: you go to all these dinners and all these affairs, and fifty percent of the people are nice and fifty percent of the people are obnoxious. To Joe it didn't matter, it was kind of the fun of it. To Evelyn, she didn't have the perspective, the sensitivity. And so some drunken guy speaks in your face and spits on you. I mean, that's what happens in terms of the political. And I think he was always torn by it. But there was a piece of him, and he was very private. Like you wouldn't find Joe, even in Washington, at any of the parties; he would rather go home.

But I think they managed to paper it as well as they could, but he was always choosing between them. But marriage is complicated.

ALLISON: Yeah, he told us that in the interview, how tough this is on a marriage to be in politics, and you can see that.

SHAEVEL: Right, and that you see lots of the politicians, now that divorce is acceptable, and you can understand it. Even if the woman loves—or the vice versa, because where the man likes—there is no sense of privacy, there is always having to be “on”. You need to come from the same place, otherwise it’s really hard. I think Hilary [Clinton] loved it, did well with it. [Rosalynn] Carter did well with it. Eleanor Roosevelt hated it, but finally found her own footing, but I think hated it.

ALLISON: Are there other things you wanted to get off your chest or talk about?

SHAEVEL: Well, we talked about South Boston being special in terms of the competition to get elected, and that’s why I think they produce such great leaders. The other is, I’d like to talk just a little bit about the lawyer, and I touched on it. But most of these politicians had another position. And I think we talked about Bulger and Moakley and Flaherty,²⁵ who was the state rep. And I don’t think they necessarily ran for office to aggrandize their law practice. I think the political was in them, and then the law was a way of making a living that meshed with it. But I don’t think any of them—Bulger was a good lawyer and Moakley was, but I think they needed to make money whereas the Kennedys didn’t need a job. But these guys, politics didn’t pay enough and you had your family.

And so Moakley would come into the state house every day at one o’clock. But he would call four times from nine o’clock to one o’clock to find out what was going on, and he would be in the law office. “Anything happen? Anybody call?” And I’d say to him, “Would you leave us alone and practice law?” And he would say, “Well, just wondering.” Just wondering what was going on. But to me it was—the law was second place.

²⁵ Michael F. Flaherty, Sr., a Democrat, represented South Boston in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and is an associate justice for the Boston Municipal Court and a former state representative.

ALLISON: What kind of cases would he have?

SHAEVEL: He had a combination of personal injury and criminal. And the criminal ran the whole gamut; driving under the influence, breaking and entering, larceny. We had one that was a longshoreman who stole a group of radios from a truck that was sitting on the docks. And so the Feds are in charge of the docks. So the Feds basically gave the information to the state police, who used that information for a search, and therefore arresting him based upon the seizure.

And the problem was that the state didn't have what we call probable cause. And I think the law has changed a little bit, but the federal court could not empower the state, they needed more.

END OF TRACK 2

TRACK 3

(interview picks up during conversation)

SHAEVEL: —[Joe] worked on it with me. And we had convinced Judge Winningham that the search was illegal; it wasn't an easy thing to do. And we're walking down the courtroom steps, and the chutzpah of the guy! He says to Joe, "Well, we got the evidence suppressed, so you mean I can now get those stereos?" (laughter) And Joe looked him in the eye and he said, "You are so lucky. Get out of here!" But he was a good lawyer, but it just didn't move him as much.

So South Boston, as we all know, it just had a very special sense of community and abilities, and produced a wonderful set of competent human beings. And the politics were just so much—and I got accepted into it. My parish is St. Brigid's,²⁶ I feel like, and I never felt excluded, even though I was out—I mean, they could exclude me because I just wasn't from Southie, that had a whole different cultural stuff to it. And I never, never was excluded.

²⁶ St. Brigid Parish is located on East Broadway in South Boston. It was Moakley's parish church.

The guy understood people and made them feel good. You've heard all of that. And just this sense of outpouring at the funeral, and just seeing people on the street. And what a legacy. But he always thought about that, his name and the importance. I mean, the guy went off to Congress and we pay our congressmen not bad. But I can tell you, he didn't get rich in Congress. He maintained two households, and between the tax structure and stuff like that, he could have made a fortune in terms of he had the ability to attract business, and that and his law practice, there will always be more money.

ALLISON: And he could have been a lobbyist for the real estate industry.

SHAEVEL: Yeah, but it never was important. I thought that the legislature was made for him because he didn't like to say no to anybody. So I think he would have admitted that he would have been not a great mayor or a great governor, because you're going to make people unhappy. And as a legislator, you can seek ways of accommodating all of that kind of stuff.

And I think he loved Suffolk Law School in terms of his ability to be able to get that degree and what it meant, and so I think we all respected its place in the city, the importance of it, and the ability to educate. But it wasn't Harvard, it wasn't BC [Boston College], and BU [Boston University]—[they] have their own elitism attached, the triple eagle, which I never was. But it's nice that people have their pride in that. Suffolk represented more of who he was and the kinds of people, and he liked stories and stuff.

ALLISON: Can you tell us anything about the idea behind the Moakley [Charitable] Foundation, when that came up?

SHAEVEL: Have you interviewed Fred Clark already?²⁷

ALLISON: No, we're still working on Fred.

²⁷ Fred Clark was a member of Congressman Moakley's district staff from 1982 to 2001. OH-020 and OH-061 in the Moakley Oral History Project are interviews with Mr. Clark.

SHAEVEL: Yeah, getting him in, he will be terrific because Fred did my job on the federal level, as well as Roger, and Joe had a wonderful relationship with them. The Foundation, I think, was Fred's idea but it was Joe's openness. Fred had this vision that we ought to try to remember him beyond. And Joe hated to raise money, so it was interesting that Fred was able to sell it to him, by the sense that we could help a lot of people after he was gone; he could do some good.

And he said one thing to us in terms of it: "It's a great idea we're going to help some people, and I like that. Except you got to promise me, we're not going to be like Conte."²⁸ And I said, "Excuse me?" And he said, "Conte, we fundraised for his stuff, he's gone fifteen years already, and I don't want people fundraising, using my name when I'm gone." So we said no, we would manage the dollars, and he was very proud at the amount of money that was raised. But I give Fred entirely the vision. And Fred had done that because he had seen some other foundation set up; I know it'll come to me.

But Fred is another primary example of what a young person—he put a lot of trust in him; he fulfilled it. Fred was that way.

ALLISON: Well I'm sure we'll think of more things; you'll think of more things. And this has been really a pleasure, talking to you.

SHAEVEL: Well thank you again. It's an hour and a half of talking about one of my favorite subjects.

ALLISON: This is great. And I'll—Steve do you have anything?

STEVEN KALARITES: Yeah. You mentioned Fred Clark as part of his staff down in D.C. Well, actually the district, but kind of did your job on the federal level. Who were some of the

²⁸ Silvio Conte (1921-1991), a Republican, served in the Massachusetts State Senate from 1951 to 1958, then represented Massachusetts' First Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1959 to 1991.

other prominent staff people that he really relied on? And also, how did that affect the Moakley office environment?

SHAEVEL: Well, he had this wonderful ability to pick self-reliant people. He could just spot that in a person, and give him—and so I remember, I discussed this Ford Foundation grant that I had. By the end of my term, which was one year, there were four interns and three of them were working out of our office, because the other senators were not receptive. And they played very, very important roles. And I remember one was a Leo Allen(?) who went on to New Bedford. There was another woman, Judy Weber(?) who'd come from New York, and she was terrific.

And he was open, as we talked about. So on the federal level, early on, on our first campaign we picked up a lot of young people in our first fight. One of them was Jimmy O'Leary,²⁹ who came from West Roxbury. And eventually, in Congress after Joe got elected, he was a young lawyer and he took my job. He became like the lawyer on the congressional staff. Jimmy O'Leary went on to be chairman of the MBTA [Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority]. He was the one, when he first got the job, that there was graft and kickbacks going on, and he blew the whistle on it, which was a very difficult thing for someone just coming in new to do; a very, very ethical guy. He was the chairman of the MBTA, and now has a major consulting firm.

And Joe developed good instincts. Another Irish kid who had the right political instincts, Roger Kineavy was a rough-and-tumble longshoreman who had fell through the hold of the ship and had become disabled. And he was Joe's court officer, and then kind of a campaign manager. The campaigns were always disorganized. Contrary to—you hear this national stuff and everybody, "The campaign is going well," this and that; I haven't been in a campaign yet that's been properly organized. It's always mass confusion, and you're always making a thousand mistakes, and Roger was part of the mistake stuff. But he was a terrific guy with a great ability to get right to the grassroots, to the longshoremen, to the laborers, and he could relate with a lot of humility, like Joe.

²⁹ James O'Leary was a volunteer on Moakley's early congressional campaigns and then was a member of the congressman's district staff from 1974 to 1978. OH-068 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Mr. O'Leary.

And so he was the district officer for a number of years. And then Fred, who we picked up on a campaign, like Jimmy—motivated, got in there, and we offered him a position, and eventually he became district—he was a graduate of not one of the big schools, Bridgewater State College; he came from Easton. Not negating Bridgewater State. Not coming with the Harvard credentials, but a zest for it. And Fred was able to help him a lot with what I would call “the waterfronts,” the Boston waterfront, the Fan Pier, all of that stuff that Joe played such a role in.

“Woody,” Jim Woodard,³⁰ which was an interesting man, a Vietnam veteran, a minority, a very, very gentle man. Joe had made a commitment to have a number of minority staff, at least two out of five or two out of four, when he first was elected. There was another woman, Carole Ray³¹ who went on to work for the MBTA and I think maybe at Massport [Massachusetts Port Authority] now. Competent minority people who liked the politics, but the same way we were. Sean Ryan, who’s now with Barrett Siegel and somebody [sic—Donoghue Barrett & Singal], a very good lawyer, issues guy. Lives in Southie now but came from the suburbs. Joe Moynihan, who’s now a student at Suffolk. A little bit of a character, did speech writing, kind of the penultimate politician, knew everybody.

Again, attracted—it just would continue. And then he would give you terrific responsibility, and if you were that kind of person and wanted it, you could shine and you’d make him look good at the same time. In Washington he attracted a number of people. His first aide for about six or seven, maybe even ten years, was typical Joe. He got assigned an office; he comes into the office. And there’s this chubby guy, Joe Duffy or something like that. Chubby guy, kind of frumpy. He’s lying on the couch, snoozing, and Joe says, “What are you doing here?” “Oh, I used to be on the staff of the former congressman, and I just wanted to make sure his papers were all right. So I just finished up today, and I’ve been working for three nights, and I’m really tired and I took a nap. I’m sorry, Congressman, I’ll be getting out of here.” Joe says, “So you got another job?” “No,” he says. “How’d you like to work for me?”

³⁰ James Woodard was Congressman Moakley’s assistant district director from 1973 to 2001.

³¹ Carole Ray was a member of Congressman Moakley’s district staff from 1974 to 1984.

This guy went on to be head of the Rules Committee³² staff, and he had a wonderful affinity; all the congressmen liked him, Republicans and Democrats. He was gay; it never bothered Joe. I think that he eventually died of AIDS. He was a real loss to Joe. But again, we were talking about the sense of—I mean, his relationship with Barney Frank³³—but he loved Barney. And then Barney came out with it [announced that he is gay], and I mean, never, never—it shouldn't, but it never affected his relationship. He was always supportive of Barney, and probably knew even well before Barney came out of the closet that he was gay. They had a wonderful working relationship in terms of issues and how do you get things done.

I'm trying to think of some of the other—he had a real collection of staff people: Deborah Spriggs,³⁴ a woman in Washington, a minority woman who just kind of ran the whole place, the Rules Committee stuff. George Crawford, who they've kept on as head of the Rules Committee. Competent people.

And I, as executor of his will—I had the honor of being executor, and he left money to each one of them. And I think it's worth saying, in terms of the terms of his will. And we wrote it, and we kind of joked, "If this ever gets to the press, it's going to sound pretty good." And we just smiled about it, but it was the way he felt. He left each one a sum of money which was substantial; I think the smallest was five grand. And the will read: "To my staff, who together just treated everybody with dignity, and never turned anybody away. And I was always so proud of you," something along that line. But he kind of recognized how nice they were to people.

And it got picked up in the newspaper, and it got terrific play. And I said to myself, He's upstairs smiling at that. And we were writing a will so it would have a public impact. (laughter)

³² The House Rules Committee is responsible for the scheduling of bills for discussion in the House of Representatives. According to the Rules Committee website, "bills are scheduled by means of special rules from the Rules Committee that bestow upon legislation priority status for consideration in the House and establish procedures for their debate and amendment." (See <http://www.rules.house.gov/>) Congressman Moakley was a member of the House Rules Committee from 1975 to 2001 and served as its chairman from 1989 to 1995.

³³ Barnett "Barney" Frank (1940-), a Democrat, has represented Massachusetts' Fourth Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1981. OH-075 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Congressman Frank.

³⁴ Deborah Spriggs was a member of Congressman Moakley's Washington, D.C., staff from 1995 to 2001. OH-025 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Ms. Spriggs.

ALLISON: I think what really is impressive about the staff are two things: one, how long people stayed with him, and it was phenomenal, almost like a family. And when I went down in—the April before he died to see what the office was like, we didn't know anyone there. And we hired a guy who said he could tell us the lay of the land, and this guy had been a staffer for another congressman. Those staffers will last about three years, and then go in the first—David Carreiro³⁵ was there. He said, "It's a life sentence in reverse. It started with a six-month job, and now its eighteen years." And everyone had just been there for so long. And he had told them, when he'd told them he was sick, "This is a time to go find something else," and everyone stayed.

SHAEVEL: Yes.

ALLISON: And the other thing that just amazes me is how well organized everything was. I was picturing rooms just filled with junk, and they had every box labeled with what it was: constituent mail from such-and-such a year, press releases from such-and-such a year, issue papers, boxes of the different issues.

SHAEVEL: I know that Kevin Ryan³⁶—who at that point had now become the administrator, AA or something in the Washington office—a South Boston kid with terrific political instincts and abilities, given a lot of responsibility and just rose to it. And I think Kevin has got a college degree; I'm not really sure. And if you went there, they were a collection of not the most beautiful people in the world, not the thinnest. There was a whole sense of diversity in terms of the economics, and ethnic and racial kind of stuff, and who liked it.

ALLISON: Yeah.

SHAEVEL: Yeah, that's right, so it was a good thing. And that's why my—I mean, here we meet this guy thirty years later. He never had kids, but he was a father figure for any of us. Or

³⁵ David Carreiro was a member of Congressman Moakley's congressional staff, first in Boston then in Washington, D.C., from 1991 to 2001.

³⁶ Kevin Ryan was Congressman Moakley's chief of staff at his Washington office from 1997 to 2000. OH-027 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Mr. Ryan.

I'll call back and say, "Joe, what do you think of this? What do you think of that?" Just I'm saying, I never heard him raise his voice to a staff person, or demean them.

ALLISON: Have you worked on other campaigns, other than his?

SHAEVEL: Yes, and I love campaigns, but they are bedlam!

ALLISON: Yeah.

SHAEVEL: His, of course, I was at the pinnacle, one of the people who made decisions. So I was there making decisions at young ages. But public service is like that. They let young people have responsibility. They don't pay anybody much, but it is a terrific opportunity, because I would never have gotten that responsibility if I—in a private law firm, you could spend five years in the library.

And within the first month, I was writing speeches and doing press releases. And nobody asked me if I even knew how to write a press release; I had to go to a library and get it out of a book and say, "This is how to format it, and this is what it's supposed to say." Because he just, you know, [said,] "Go get it done." And I'll probably think of some others. A real good collection of people.

KALARITES: I guess the other thing I had a question about, that I had mentioned the other day—and you said that today's generation isn't as involved as in Joe's time. But the goal of the Archive and Institute is to encourage young people to go into public service, participate in government. So I guess what I would ask is, what would you like to see the Archive and Institute provide? Or how would you like to see it used for today's students?

SHAEVEL: That's an excellent question. I will say that I'm very excited about—I didn't expect the Archives to be so proactive, and I'd forgotten really what it meant. And when Joe decided to leave a good portion of his estate—he was not a rich man—to the Archives it was, "Not that they're going to do anything for me; I just love this place and I ought to be giving them

some money.” But I would like to see them go into the colleges and sponsor forums in which there’s some kind of controversy.

And it’s not easy, but a prime example: [Mikhail] Gorbachev was in town and he spoke at the Kennedy Library, which was great, and then he went down and got a degree from Brown or something. I’d like to see the Archives become a cutting-edge forum for difficult social and political issues. And what might some of them be? For instance: Is the social compact gone? Is your generation no longer doing anything? And get three or four people with historical [sic] in there. What did busing accomplish, and why? And we could sit and brainstorm, and come up with some cutting-edge difficult issues that people don’t want to touch. And I think that would be a terrific legacy.

If we think about Joe, maybe he’d be saying, you know, maybe a little bit, “Do we want to really ruffle feathers, or leave it?” But I would be speaking to the contrarian piece of him, and the concept is to get people in a public way to talk about hard issues, and contribute to the debate or the scholarship in that. And I think rather than maybe directed to my audience—like I got the thing on the Kennedy Library for Gorbachev, and unfortunately I couldn’t go; I was angry—but maybe direct it to the college level, and to the high school level. And the high school level is very hard to direct it to. But we all know that many of those kids are bouncing off the wall, and if you get something that excites them, that kind of stuff.

ALLISON: Yeah, that’s a great idea.

SHAEVEL: And maybe the Foundation can help, just because he was always—that we might use in more creative ways than just giving the scholarships.

ALLISON: No, that is something we’d like very much to do, is this could be a place to engage in a civic dialogue about these things. And you really can’t, in the context of a campaign or really in any other way, just to talk about these issues. Like the busing issue is one that always

comes to mind, that still is such a divisive thing. And at the opening of the exhibit, when else do you have an opportunity to talk to a Byron Rushing³⁷ and Wacko Hurley³⁸ in the same place?

SHAEVEL: Yes. Byron Rushing and he got along so well. I remember when we were redistricting; Joe had made a commitment to Byron to keep him in the district. And so Representative Brett³⁹, who was chairman of the Redistricting Committee, comes back. We meet him at the plane, and he's got the new census data where they're drawing it. And we didn't know which census tract Byron Rushing was in.

At three o'clock in the morning, I'm there with two other people, and—no, but we're down in Roxbury, three white guys driving around trying to find Representative Rushing's house. And we couldn't find it, and we couldn't relate it to—it was crazy, because it was on one street in the census tract. At three o'clock in the morning a guy comes up, and we roll down the window and say, "Do you know where Byron Rushing lives?" "Oh, that politician? He's full of shit. He lives right there." (laughter) We got our answer, right. But they had a good relationship; it's just what you're saying. Wacko's fight on the parade,⁴⁰ and the gays had less to do about—I don't think Wacko is that anti-gay.

ALLISON: No!

SHAEVEL: I think he's provincial, true. And I didn't mean to get on another side. It was a wonderful story about him and the redistricting process.

ALLISON: That is, yeah.

³⁷ Byron Rushing has served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives since 1982. OH-062 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Representative Rushing.

³⁸ John J. "Wacko" Hurley is a South Boston resident and community activist. OH-019 in the Moakley Oral History Project is an interview with Mr. Hurley and his wife, Molly, who was a member of Congressman Moakley's district staff from 1977 to 2001.

³⁹ James Brett served for fifteen years in the Massachusetts House of Representatives.

⁴⁰ In *Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston et al.*, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that John "Wacko" Hurley and other organizers of the St. Patrick's Day Parade in Boston were not required to include the members of Irish-American GLIB Group in the parade, despite the argument that excluding them was discriminatory. The ruling was based on the premise that the parade organizers, collectively known as the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, had the right to use the parade to portray a specific message, and they could not be required to include participants whose message was contradictory to their own

SHAEVEL: And trying to figure all that—it was a fun time, the redistricting, because they wanted to put him—they were working the districts and Joe was not feeling well; I think it may have been the kidney or the liver, or something like that and he was not up to his game, though a lot of people didn't know it. And Weld⁴¹ basically made the commitment and said, "We need more Republicans, but I'm going to protect Moakley." And they really got along, and that was a prime example.

Weld got elected and Moakley said, "You are the governor, and whatever I can do for this state, if it makes you look good, I don't care." Just a wonderful relationship. But Weld had his own strengths in terms of being able to relate. Weld always tells the story about that he voted for—he crossed party lines and voted for Moakley. He was living in Needham or Dover, I don't know. (laughs) And he could have voted for the Republican candidate, and he said, "I voted for you, and I don't know why." And so they had a good relationship.

I wonder if he'd have the same relationship with Romney.⁴² Maybe he would, in spite of Romney. (laughs)

ALLISON: Right.

KALARITES: Well thank you very much.

SHAEVEL: Okay, good.

KALARITES: Unless there's anything else you'd like to add?

SHAEVEL: Not at the moment, except thank you for doing this. It would probably be wonderful to hear other people's—I would just say that I got my line to Joe Moakley purely by accident, and I literally owe everything I am and my whole perspective on life—and as any good

⁴¹ William Weld (1945-), a Republican, served as governor of Massachusetts from 1991 to 1997.

⁴² Willard Mitt Romney (1947-), a Republican, served as governor of Massachusetts from 2003 to 2007.

I've been able to do, and I think I have been able to—has really been a reflection of Joe, and kind of carrying on his legacy, and it's a way of multiplying it. It's kind of mindful of the *Schindler's List* movie, and at the end Schindler saves two hundred people, some 240, and then there are now four thousand descendents. And I think Joe did a lot of good, but he trained a lot of people in the right way, and those people can magnify it in geometric ways.

So a Jewish kid from Newton who still thanks, to this day—and he has a wonderful appreciation of the Irish—could see it through Joe's eyes. Wonderful people; good family. And with that, we're signing off. It is now October second, in the year of our Lord 2003, as they say.

END OF INTERVIEW